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Abstract:	Starting in 2012, several industry-insiders described a system of corruption to the 
Charbonneau Commission, an inquiry by the Quebec Government to investigate corruption in 
Montreal’s public works contract tenders. Many testified about a cartel-like system where 
construction companies colluded to win bids. Funds from the public contracts were diverted to 
corrupt bureaucrats, political parties, city engineers, and to the Rizzuto Mafia family. The 
relationship between private sector construction companies and the mafia is an illustration of 
Criminal-Private-Sector-Corruption, because it involves corruption of private sectors by a 
criminal organization. Morselli's network analysis model and Albini’s patron-client model will be 
applied to this case to better understand the nature of CPSC. This thesis argues that CPSC within 
the Montreal construction industry persisted over time due to the construction industries’ natural 
susceptibility to corruption, the use of racketeering and bid-rigging, and due to Vito Rizzuto 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This MA thesis uses a case study approach to analyze organized crime-related corruption 
that is tied to the private sector – or what will be referred to as criminal-private-sector-
corruption (CPSC). The case study used to explore CPSC entails price-fixing and bid-
rigging, involving private sector construction companies and the Montreal Mafia. 
Construction companies bidding on public sector contracts set up a variety of cartels. 
Cartel participants would agree to take turns winning contracts using inflated bids. This 
collusion resulted in increased costs of the contracts (relative to the costs that would have 
resulted from a competitive bidding process). Engineering firms illegally donated to 
election campaigns and, when their candidate won, they cashed in on city hall contracts.  
The Rizzuto Mafia organization in Montreal played numerous roles in the 
conspiracy: organizing the cartel, determining which companies would be the winning 
bidder on any one contract, arbitrating disputes, and using intimidation and violence to 
ensure the cartel system was not disrupted. In exchange for these services, the Mafia took 
a cut of the winning contracts, which were delivered in cash to senior Mafia members 
often by officials from companies in the construction industry. 
The over-riding goal of this thesis is to better understand the nature of criminal-
private-sector-corruption through a case study of corruption in Montreal’s public sector 
construction contract tendering process. Specifically, this thesis will examine (i) how 
CPSC emerges and persists through time, (ii) the roles of key actors in the criminal 
sector, private sector, and public sector, (iii) the relationships among these actors, and 
(iv) a conceptualization of the roles played by the Mafiosi in this CPSC by applying 
specific theoretical models.  
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CPSC within the Montreal construction industry persisted over time due to the 
construction industries’ susceptibility to corruption and Mafia infiltration, the use of 
racketeering and bid-rigging by the Montreal Mafia and the personal interventions of its 
leader, Vito Rizzuto, as a driving force behind the Mafia’s infiltration of the construction 
sector. Vito’s main roles include arranging financing for construction projects, choosing a 
contractor for a project (including the winning bidder of a rigged contract) and resolving 
conflicts. 
Carlo Morselli's network analysis model and Joseph Albini’s patron-client model 
are applied to this case to better understand the role of the Mafioso as a “broker” within 
this corrupt network and a “patron” to the conspiring private actors. This study argues 
that there is the overlap between Morselli's network analysis (specifically his conception 
of the role of the broker in criminal networks) and the patron-client model of organized 
crime. It concludes that the conception of the Mafiosi as an all-powerful patron to his 
clients greatly influences and even subsumes the broker or mediator role they play in a 
criminal network. Regardless of the brokerage role Vito Rizzuto played, as a traditional 
Mafiosi the roles were imbued with and heavily influenced by his self-conception as a 
patron to his clients. While a patron and broker share roughly the same roles (bringing 
parties together, making business deals, protecting their clients, mediating conflict), the 
main difference when applying the two theories to this case study is that the conception 
of the patron in the context of the Mafia is that the contractors are often victimized by the 
Mafiosi through a protection (extortion) racket, which is generally not the case with 
brokers in a criminal network.  
Chapter one of the thesis details the goals of the research along with its 
contributions to knowledge, research design, methodology and methodological 
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limitations. Through a review of the extant literature, chapter two provides a background 
on the relationship between organized crime and the private sector with an emphasis on 
describing and analyzing racketeering (including bid-rigging) in the construction 
industry.  Chapter three presents the research findings and provides a brief overview of 
the Montreal Mafia and Rizzuto family. This chapter also analyses how organized crime 
is involved in the corruption of the construction industry. Chapter four describes 
Morselli’s network analytical framework and Albini’s patron-client model, with emphasis 
on identifying the key conceptual elements of the frameworks. These conceptual 
elements and frameworks are then applied to the Montreal CPSC case study. Chapter five 
provides a detailed discussion and analysis of Vito as the patron and broker. Based on the 
findings of this research, Chapter six draws conclusions based on this case study and 
extrapolates these conclusions to better understand CPSC. 
Problem Statement 
Lyman (2011) states that corruption is a strategy used by criminal groups to support their 
profit-making activities and can implicate a range of public sector actors: law 
enforcement officers, judges, prosecutors, and elected officials. However, little research 
has been done on the scope and nature of CPSC; that is, the corruption that involves 
private sector entities.  
 The scholarly literature fails to comprehensively analyze and explain how 
organized crime has contributed to corruption in the private sectors. There have also been 
few attempts to apply theoretical or analytical frameworks to understand the nature of 
CPSC. Perhaps of most importance is the lack of scholarly research on organized crime 
related corruption in the private sector in Canada, generally, and with specific respect to 
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the construction industry. This includes a lack of research on the bid-rigging and price-
fixing involved in the awarding of construction contracts. 
There have been few scholarly studies of the Canadian construction industry’s 
various crime problems, in part, because scholars and academics had previously not had 
access to the necessary material or research tools needed to conduct a detailed analysis of 
the widespread corruption problems within the industry (Kelly, 1999). There has only 
been a few government reports and commissions that have established widespread 
corruption and racketeering in the industry in the United States and Canada. Sources that 
support this information are the following: the Kefauver Committee (1951), the 
McClellan Committee (1960), Virgil W. Peterson’s scholarly research on organized crime 
in New York (1983), the President’s Commission on Organized Crime (1986), Peter 
Reuter’s work on racketeering in legitimate industries (1987), Schneider’s research on 
Canadian organized crime (2009, 2017), and the Charbonneau Commission of Inquiry 
(2015) examining the granting of public contracts in the construction industry in Quebec.  
Based on the above information, this thesis offers a different analytical framework to 
assess the problem by providing the following: (i) a description and analysis of how 
organized crime and the Montreal Mafia facilitate corruption in Canada’s private sector, 
as well as a description of bid-rigging and price-fixing in the construction industry 
specifically, and (ii) a conceptualization of the specific roles played by the Mafiosi by 
applying Albini’s patron-client model and Morselli’s criminal network analysis to the 
Montreal case study.		This thesis can also provide an empirical and theoretical foundation 
for public sector policies and applied interventions on how to prevent CPSC corruption 
by shedding light on the roles that Mafia groups and the Mafioso play in such corruption.  
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Research Objectives 
The over-riding goal of this thesis is to better understand the nature of criminal-private- 
sector-corruption – including how it emerges and persists – through a case study of 
corruption in Montreal’s public sector construction contract tendering process. In 
particular, this thesis will examine (i) how this CPSC emerges and persists through time, 
(ii) the roles of key actors in the criminal sector, private sector, and public sector, (iii) the 
relationships among these actors and (iv) a conceptualization of the roles played by the 
Mafiosi in CPSC by applying specific theoretical models. The specific objectives of this 
research are as follows:  
• Provide a background on CPSC and, more specifically, the use of corruption and 
racketeering by organized crime in the private sector by exploring definitions, causes, 
specific racketeering techniques used, and the negative consequences of private 
sector corruption. 
• Describe and analyze a select number of CPSC case studies documented in the 
literature (restricting this analysis to case studies involving the Sicilian Mafia in Italy, 
La Cosa Nostra in America, and Italian-Canadian organized crime and those cases 
involving bid-rigging and price-fixing specifically). 
• Provide a brief overview of the Montreal Mafia and Rizzuto crime organization. 
• Describe in detail the CPSC case study that will be used for this thesis. 
• Describe the theoretical frameworks used in this study: Morselli’s criminal network 
analysis framework and Albini’s patron-client model.   
• Apply Morselli’s and Albini's theoretical frameworks to the Montreal case study in an 
attempt to better understand the roles played in the CPSC by the Mafiosi. 
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• Draw conclusions on this case study specifically and CPSC generally, emphasizing 
the role of the Mafiosi. 
Research Design  
The research for this thesis uses a case study approach to investigate organized crime 
related corruption that affects the private sector. In particular, this research examines 
corruption within the Quebec construction industry, focusing on the role played by the 
Montreal Mafia and the nexus between organized crime related corruption and certain 
construction companies between May 2012 and November 2014. This period was 
selected because the Charbonneau Commission of Inquiry began its hearings in May of 
2012 and ended in November of 2014. The main source of primary data for this study is 
transcripts from the Charbonneau Commission of Inquiry (2015). Although public 
corruption was certainly present in this case, a direct link between organized crime and 
the public sector (politicians) was never proven. Certainly, a limitation of this thesis is 
that it couldn’t provide a sufficient amount of evidence that criminal-public-private-
sector-corruption existed. However, the important point is that bid-rigging could have 
been conducted by the Montreal Mafia and private sector companies without the use of 
public officials (politicians).  Moreover, the private sector corruption (bid-rigging) could 
have existed even without any facilitating of corruption from the public sector. This 
research focuses on private sector corruption because public sector corruption would 
have been beyond the size and scope of this thesis. The other primary reason this thesis 
did not pursue public sector corruption is because there is extensive research conducted 
in this field; however, there is very little research conducted on criminal-private-sector-
corruption.  
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Case Study Research 
As Thomas (2011) points out, “case study research is one of the principal means by 
which inquiry is conducted in the social sciences” (p.512). For the purposes of scholarly 
research, a case study method entails a detailed and intensive analysis of a single, self-
contained example of a broader phenomenon that is the focus of the research. When 
conducting a study, characteristics of the case are analyzed in extensive detail (Bryman & 
Teevan, 2005). Definitions and descriptions of what constitutes a case study for the 
purposes of research are varied. This is partially due to the variation in objectives, 
methods, and epistemological standpoints among differing disciplines (Thomas, 2011). 
The case study provides a foundation to generalize about a certain phenomenon by 
providing an in-depth analysis of the causes, nature, scope, and impact of a specific 
example of the phenomenon. Information from the analysis of the case is then examined 
and compared to other cases, to see if any new insights can be made regarding the 
phenomenon under study.  
 Thomas (2011) argues that case studies are “analysis of persons, events, 
decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied 
holistically by one or more methods. The case is an instance of a class of phenomena that 
provides an analytical framework within which the study is conducted” (p.513).  Simons 
(2009) offers the following definition of a case study: “an in-depth exploration from 
multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, 
institution, program or system in a “real-life” context” (p. 21). 
 The Quebec case is being used as the subject for this thesis because of how it 
encompasses a cogent example of CPSC. At the core of the Montreal case study is 
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CPSC, where a significant role was played by an organized crime group in bid-rigging 
and price-fixing by private sector companies that included bribes to public sector actors. 
Analyzing such a case can potentially provide knowledge of and insight into CPSC in 
this specific circumstance, which can be used as a basis for a limited extrapolation into 
CPSC. 
The main source of primary data for this thesis comes from the transcripts of the 
Charbonneau Commission of Inquiry (2012-2014), a provincially-charted government 
commission in Quebec mandated to investigate corruption in Montreal’s public sector 
contract tendering process. Much of the evidence collected by this inquiry came from the 
RCMP’s Operation Colisee, a police operation that investigated the Montreal Mafia and 
which used electronic audio and video surveillance to capture the Rizzuto crime family 
with private sector associates. The second main source of information collected by the 
inquiry was testimony from witnesses including police, construction industry insiders 
and known Mafia associates.  
Government commissions of inquiry have been used extensively in the U.S. and 
Canada to investigate organized crime and, in general, are considered a reliable and 
rigorous source of information when the commission is not overly politicized. In the 
United States at the federal level, there have been a number of special congressional and 
presidential commissions that have addressed organized crime, including the Kefauver 
Committee (1950-51), the McClellan Committee (1963), the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1965-69), and the President’s 
Commission on Organized Crime (1983-1986).  As Schneider (2018) notes, there have 
also been a number of government-appointed commissions in Canada addressing 
organized crime. In 1901, a judicial inquiry was held in Toronto that was charged with 
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investigating underground gambling and government corruption in the city.  Another 
judicial inquiry in Canada took place in Montreal and investigated vice and its 
enforcement in Montreal. Justice Louis Coderre conducted this inquiry in 1924 and 1925 
and documented the dozens of houses operating in the city’s red-light district. There was 
a judicial inquiry into the local vice industry and resulting police corruption that was held 
in Vancouver in 1928. Canadian judicial inquiries continued with the Commission of 
Inquiry into Gambling and Commercialized Vice in Montreal-which was held between 
1950 and 1953 under Justice Francoise Caron.  More recently, starting in the 1960s and 
continuing into the 1970s, the Quebec government held several commissions that 
targeted organized crime. These inquiries sought answers from powerful Montreal 
gangsters, including Vic Cotroni and Paolo Violi (Schneider, 2018, 525-527).  
The most prominent role of a government and judicial commission is to obtain as 
much information as possible on a criminal phenomenon to better understand its scope, 
nature, causes, and impact. Government crime commissions can be considered a valid 
source of primary data for scholarly research examining criminal activity and 
organizations. They are typically well resourced, have subpoena power, can compel 
accurate testimony through the threat of penalties for non-participation or perjury, and 
they often have the resources of the state at their disposal, including confidential law 
enforcement intelligence or investigative information as well as law enforcement and 
prosecutors on staff. Police and prosecutors also have a stake in ensuring information is 
accurate and collected in a rigorous manner. 
The United States Senate Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate 
Commerce, which was created in the early 1950s to investigate the growing influence of 
organized crime in America, was influential in setting the mold for future government 
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commissions investigating organized crime in the U.S. and Canada. Through televised 
hearings, the committee raised awareness of the problem of organized crime in that 
country. The committee’s findings also led to legislation aimed at controlling illegal 
drugs by expanding appropriations for the Narcotics Bureau and raised the priority of 
organized crime and inter-state investigations by federal, state and law enforcement 
(United States Senate Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce, 
1951).  
With that said, government commissions may also be a source of distorted 
information. According to Schneider (2018, xi) state actors – including politicians and 
civil servants, government commissions, and law enforcement agencies – “have used 
their role and powers to become highly influential in the social and political construction 
of organized crime. However, their views on [organized crime] may be biased and 
deliberately distorted (to help secure enforcement resources) or they may be influenced 
by broader ideologies that may bias data collection, analysis, and policies.” The 
Chairman of the afore-mentioned United States Senate Special Committee, Estes 
Kefauver, was accused of promoting exaggerated claims about the nation-wide scope of 
the Mafia in America partially to raise his national profile in his bid to be a candidate for 
U.S. president (Moore, 1974). A Royal Commission in Ontario headed by Justice Wilfred 
D. Roach in the early 1960s was created following accusations that prominent provincial 
politicians intervened to secure charters for the social clubs that were used for illegal 
gambling by Mafia-connected offenders. The result saw Justice Roach clearing 
government officials of corruption and even denied the existence of the Mafia in Canada.  
Some critics argued that Roach whitewashed the commissions' findings to take the 
pressure off the provincial attorney general and the Conservative government in Ontario, 
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which had been accused of corruption and failing to take sufficient action against 
organized crime in the province.  These criticisms led to another provincial commission 
in Ontario that was headed by Justice Bruce Macdonald, who contradicted Roach by 
concluding, “organized crime has existed in Ontario and in some cases still does, in 
varying degrees from time to time as conditions change” (Ontario Police Commission, 
1964, 117-118). In short, government commissions can be highly politicized and may not 
always be a reliable source of data for research. 
Due to these shortcomings, this research did rely on a critical analysis of the 
transcripts of the Charbonneau Commission of Inquiry, making sure to take into 
consideration any potential biases of the Commission as well as evidence and testimony 
provided by witnesses.  
Another limitation of this case study research is that Charbonneau Commission 
transcripts were only available in French. As such, they were translated into English 
using Google Translate. Machine translation is the application of computers and 
computer software to the translation of texts from one natural language into another 
(Hutchins, 1986: 15).  The computer-based translation is most often fully automatic 
translation, with no intervention from a human translator (Guerra, 2000).  
The language barrier was an obstacle for the thesis and the automated translation 
did not always produce comprehensible English-language sentences. While the literal 
translation is not as important as the over-arching information and themes discussed, 
caution must nonetheless be exercised as digital language translation software is not 
always accurate and has a hard time picking up nuanced meanings in the original 
language. Guerra had the following to say regarding limitations of MT: “We must, 
therefore, admit, from the very beginning, that MT does not produce perfect (or almost 
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perfect) translations. In order to obtain translations of that kind, we need a combination 
of both the human translators’ knowledge and the help MT programs offer; a co-
operation that is, therefore, indispensable to get the job done well” (Guerra, 2000, 22). 
MT (machine translation) will always be incapable of grasping the subtleties and nuances 
that a human mind can comprehend, or a human language can express. The reason for 
this is that MT is still unable to deal adequately with features of human language such as 
ambiguity, lexical mismatches, idioms, collocations and the like. Human translators may 
also find problems in dealing with those features; but, as a rule, they can tackle most of 
them adequately. Since translating is not just a matter of knowing formal vocabulary 
equivalents, the translator needs to know the culture and social context of both languages 
(Guerra, 2000).  
One of the most common problems in MT is that of ambiguity: when a word, a 
sentence, or expression has more than one meaning, the MT system may not have enough 
information about which one to choose, and therefore it might choose the wrong one.  
MT cannot always decipher these differences without adequate information, so this must 
be done with post-editing. In the case of this thesis, post-editing looks at English news 
media articles to support the information found in the transcription (Guerra, 2000).  
Idioms are problematic for MT (and sometimes for human translators as well). Idioms 
are expressions whose meaning cannot, as a rule, be completely understood from the 
meaning of its component words.  For most programs, common idioms are already 
inserted in the original semantic dictionary of that program; but still, there would be 
further problems in recognizing the idiom, since they are not generally fixed in form, due 
to variations or possible adjectival modifiers. Collocations are also difficult for MT to 
handle.  Collocations are phrases composed of words that co-occur. For example, a heavy 
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smoker is a person that smokes a lot, but a heavy student is not someone that studies a 
lot. These phrases are usually different depending on the language and thus, solely using 
MT for a translation such as this may not be appropriate (Guerra, 2000). 
Because of the limitations of the English language translation, and to ensure a 
critical analysis of the Commission’s findings, the research for this thesis also relied on 
other secondary sources. These secondary sources can be demarcated into the following 
categories based on how they were used for this study: (i) English news media that 
reported on the findings of the Charbonneau Commission, (ii) other English language 
sources that reported on the case study directly, and (iii) other secondary sources (books 
and studies) that reported on the case study and background issues, such as the Montreal 
Mafia.  
To address the limitations of machine translation (i.e., to help verify the veracity 
of the translation) this research relied on English news media sources that independently 
investigated and reported on accusations of corruption in the public contract tendering 
process as well as media reporting and analysis of the Charbonneau Commission’s 
findings, observations, and conclusions. English-language news media sources that 
reported on the Commission’s findings and directly on the case study itself included 
CBC News, The National Post, Global News, and The Montreal Gazette.  	
However, the news media has also been criticized for its superficial, simplistic, 
saturated, and sensationalized coverage of organized crime, not to mention a proclivity 
for ethnic and racial stereotyping. The media focuses on sensational stories to maintain 
and increase readership and viewership. Therefore, certain representations of events may 
be skewed or altered to keep generating profits for the news company (Bortner, 1984). 
Lyman and Potter (2014, 59) accuse journalistic accounts of providing “very little 
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substantive knowledge or analysis of organized crime” because it fails to cover “the 
complexity of organized crime and paints a simplistic picture of an entity that is at odds 
with the elegant complexities of the real illicit market and the organizational dynamics of 
real organized crime groups.” In short, “there exists a broad consensus that the media 
tend towards oversimplification, forms of selectiveness and hyperbole, focussing largely 
on individual pathologies and violence. Structural factors such as poverty, the political 
and social construction of crime, or the interface between the legal and illegal are given 
considerably less coverage across the various genres” (Rawlinson, 2012, 294).    
Given these critiques, the English news media articles used for this study were 
also critically analyzed not only to assess their consistency with the findings of the 
Charbonneau Commission Inquiry but also to detect bias and sensationalized reporting. 
This included comparing different English media-language articles that are reporting on 
the same story to assess the veracity of the information reported.  
Due to the Charbonneau Commission Inquiry being so recent, there have been no 
scholarly publications that reported on the inquiry specifically. There were several books, 
however, that looked at relevant issues, including the history of Canadian organized 
crime, the nature of Montreal Mafia, and the influence of the Rizzuto family in 
Montreal’s construction industry. Schneider’s (2009, 2018) research on organized crime 
in Canada were key sources for this study as they provide a description and analysis on 
the Montreal Mafia and its involvement in CPSC. The Final Report of the New York 
State Organized Crime Task Force identified how organized crime infiltrated the 
construction industry in New York City. Lee Lamothe and Adrian Humphreys book, The 
Sixth Family: The Collapse of the New York Mafia and the Rise of Vito Rizzuto (2014) 
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provides a detailed catalog of how Vito Rizzuto rose to power. Peter Edwards and 
Antonio Nicaso’s book, Bad Blood: The End of Honour (2015) was also used and 
provides a detailed history of the Rizzuto family as well. These are only a few of the 
secondary sources used to analyze the Montreal case. Other sources of information are 
revealed in greater detail in the literature review as well as the research findings and 
discussion and analysis sections of the thesis.  
In sum, while this research relied overwhelmingly on the Charbonneau inquiry 
transcripts as the main source of primary data for this study, the research also emphasized 
a triangulation of data from different sources (including those that reported on, 
interpreted, and analyzed the commission findings as well as other secondary sources 
such as news media, books, and studies) that reported on the case study directly. 
Bhatnager (2012, 2) describes the benefits of using multiple sources of data in research, 
“A key benefit of using multiple sources is that of data triangulation where a broad range 
of inquiries converges on the same set of conclusions. Construct validity (i.e., the extent 
to which a construct corresponds with variables used to measure it) is also enhanced as 
additional measures are generated through each investigation.” Using secondary sources 
(i.e., scholarly books and articles, the news media, true crime non-fiction) can also help 
in the critical analysis and corroboration (or refuting) of testimonies by witnesses that 
appeared before the Charbonneau Commission. There is no real way of knowing how 
truthful a witness is being and other sources may have to be used to verify information 
given in inquiries. Bhatnager (2012) explains the importance of triangulation of data 
when conducting case study research, “Gathering and analyzing evidence from multiple, 
as opposed to a single, source is recommended for enhancing the quality of case studies. 
P a g e 	|	19	
Corroboration of findings from more than one data source addresses the issue of 
construct validity as more than one measure is used in assessing issues of interest. 
Additional investigations and creativity in reconciling apparent contradictions are called 
for where inconsistencies in findings from different sources emerge” (Bhatnager, 2012, 
3). 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The goal of this section is to provide an overview of the literature pertaining to the 
salient issues addressed in this thesis, and which coalesce around the central theme of 
CPSC. This includes focusing broadly on organized crime-related corruption and 
racketeering generally, and more specifically within the construction industry. This 
literature review will also examine cases studies involving the infiltration of the 
construction industry in New York City and Toronto by Mafia groups. The purpose of 
these case studies will be to demonstrate the vulnerability of the construction industry to 
organized crime and the linkages of these past examples to the Montreal case study.  
Bid-Rigging and Price-Fixing 
Organized criminal activity within the construction industry that is most relevant to the 
Quebec case is collusive bidding, otherwise known as bid-rigging. According to the 
Competition Bureau of Canada (2015), “Bid rigging occurs when two or more persons 
agree that, in response to a call for bids or tenders, one or more of them will: not submit a 
bid; withdraw a bid; or submit a bid arrived at by agreement.” The process of bid-rigging 
typically involves competitors agreeing to artificially increase the prices of goods and/or 
services offered in bids to potential customers (Competition Bureau of Canada, 2015). 
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There are four common types of agreements according to the Competition Bureau of 
Canada (2015), that result in a pre-selected supplier winning the contract:  
• Cover bidding gives the impression of competitive bidding; however, suppliers 
agree to submit token bids that are usually too high.  
• Bid suppression or withdrawal is an agreement among suppliers either to abstain 
from bidding or to withdraw bids. 
• Bid rotation involves the pre-selected supplier submitting the lowest bid on a 
systematic or rotating basis.  
• Market division involves an agreement among suppliers not to compete in 
designated geographic regions or for specific customers.  
Price-fixing and bid-rigging can be facilitated through a number of measures. Corrupt 
officials in the agency tendering a contract, or in the firm bidding on a contract, can 
“sell” inside information about in-house estimates or about other bidders and their bids. 
Design specifications can be drawn in such a way as to favour certain contractors. 
Without the proper safeguards, corruption can be even easier to effectuate when non-
competitive bidding procedures are used, as in the awarding of emergency contracts 
(Goldstock, et. al., 1990).  
There are several common factors that could suggest that a call for bids or tenders 
may be a target of bid-rigging: 
• There are few bidders in the market that offer the good or service.  
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• Two or more proposals contain similar handwriting, typos, or mathematical 
errors. 
• Competitors’ bids are received together.  
• Over a series of awards, one bidder always wins, regardless of competition 
(Competition Bureau, 2015). 
The offence of bid-rigging is committed only if the person requesting the bids or 
tenders is not informed beforehand about the agreement made between the parties. Bid-
rigging results in several negative effects within an industry or region. It can serve to 
eliminate competition within a sector or region, increases the costs of contracts to 
government entities issuing public tenders, and harms the victimized companies’ ability 
to compete. Whether this occurs on government projects or in the private sector, these 
increased costs are ultimately passed on to the public and can also have a negative effect 
on the economy. 
Historical research shows that criminal groups have organized “price-fixing 
territories.” At the turn of the century America, Chinatown tongs (quasi-fraternal 
organizations that were also engaged in criminal activities) helped to enforce a scheme to 
raise prices among Chinese laundries in New York City. When dissident laundrymen 
tried to cut their prices or encroach on the territories of other Chinese laundries, Chinese 
businessmen and their allies in the tongs sent agents to “persuade” the dissidents to 
honour the unwritten code of competition. Racketeers even organized the ice business, 
vital before refrigeration, into price-fixing conspiracies (Hortis, 2014).  
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The following types of bid-rigging have been discovered in the construction 
industry: (i) predator bidding where construction companies conspire with each other to 
bid below prevailing fair market rates to drive away competition as typically, when 
competition is nonexistent or is lacking, prices are inflated; (ii) territorial bidding in 
which construction companies collude not to interact in competitive bidding in each 
other’s cities, country’s or other geographical areas but leave these to specific firms; and 
(iii) rotational bidding where construction companies take turns in obtaining contracts 
through low bidding. This process typically requires other firms to conspire to 
purposefully give inflated bids (Kelly 1999).  
The most common bidding crimes within the Quebec case were predator bidding 
and rotational bidding. (More on this topic will be discussed later in the thesis.) Public 
construction projects are more vulnerable to bid-rigging than private construction 
projects because governments are frequently required to issue contracts only after a 
competitive bidding process. Since government bodies generally must award contracts to 
the lowest responsible bidder, contractors can collude to decide on who the lowest bidder 
will be in advance. 
Organized Crime in the Private Sector  
In order to thrive, organized crime groups seek profitable enterprises. Because of this, 
organized crime groups make calculated moves into the private sector, which includes 
owning and operating legitimate businesses. Legitimate businesses controlled by 
individual organized criminal offenders and groups can be a way to generate profits in a 
legal market, but can also be used for other illegal purposes, such as money laundering. 
This section will provide general information on organized crime in the private sector as 
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well as explain the primary motivating factors as to why organized crime groups 
infiltrate private businesses.  
Several authors have analyzed organized crime from the perspective of an illicit 
enterprise whose motivations are like those of legitimate companies: the lure of profit 
and the desire to accumulate power. These motivations explain in part what drives 
organized crime to infiltrate the legitimate private sector industry. Schneider’s (2003) 
research on criminally controlled companies explains the primary reasons why organized 
crime groups infiltrate private businesses. “Bars, restaurants, and retail stores have long 
been popular investments for crime groups due to their use as headquarters, meeting 
places, ‘booze cans’, gambling halls, and to launder proceeds of their illegal activities” 
(130). Criminal groups in Canada and the U.S. continue to control or have interests in 
private business sectors as diverse as construction, real estate, waste disposal, 
entertainment, food production and distribution, garment manufacturing, automobile 
sales, legalized gaming, and telemarketing, to name just a few (Schneider, 2003).  
Allum and Siebert (2003, 121) support the information given above with their 
illustration on organized crime in the private sector:  
Why professional career criminals choose to diversify their activities and invest 
resources in legitimate businesses may be on account of at least three factors. 
First, illegal enterprises tend to be risky; therefore, as their wealth and incomes 
increase, criminal entrepreneurs may decide to reduce the overall risks they face. 
Second, capitalizing the profits of illegal enterprises is a difficult task: since 
bookkeeping is scarcely possible, and in any case records are not routinely 
audited even when they are kept to measure business activity, there rarely exists a 
ready market of buyers prepared to take over an illicit business, even with 
lucrative profit projections and even at a very reasonable sale price. The 
characteristics of illicit business ownership ordinarily preclude serious interest 
among prospective buyers. Given these realities, should a racketeer wish to pass 
on his wealth to his family, he may wisely choose to invest in other legal 
enterprises. (One has to imagine a successful gangster attempting to hand over an 
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illegal drug-trafficking business to his daughter to appreciate the difficulties.) 
Third, investment in legitimate businesses not only provides a shelter but also 
affords an image of respectability to a racketeer whose family may be stigmatized 
by the association with a criminal reputation. 
 
Anderson (1979, 77) describes six reasons for organized crime involvement in legitimate 
businesses:  
Profit. For persons in OC, profit provides motivation; not all members of OC are 
able to make respectable income from illicit activities … Diversification. A 
legitimate business provides the OC member with security of income. Although it 
may be subject to market and other business conditions, a legitimate enterprise is 
usually not a target of law enforcement effort. Transfer. Illegitimate enterprises 
are difficult, if not impossible, to transfer to dependents. Investing in legitimate 
enterprises such as a business or real estate ensures that an estate can be legally 
inherited. Services. An OC member with a legitimate business is in a position to 
act as a patron for a person in need of legitimate employment-for example, people 
on probation or parole or relatives he wants to shield from the stigma and risks 
associated with criminal enterprises. Front. A legitimate business can provide a 
front or a base of operations for a host of illegal activities: loansharking, 
gambling, and drug trafficking, to name a few. Taxes. A legitimate business can 
provide a tax cover, thereby reducing the risk of being charged with income-tax 
evasion. Funds from illegitimate enterprises can be mixed with those from the 
legitimate business, particularly if it is a cash business. 
For Alexander and Caiden (1986, 52-53), there are at “least three factors that 
explain racketeer diversification into legitimate business investments”: 
First, illegal enterprises have high legal and financial risks associated with them. 
The rational criminal entrepreneur, as his wealth and income increase, so will his 
diversity as to reduce the overall risks he faces. Second, it is, apparently, difficult 
to capitalize the profits of illegal enterprises. Briefly, the argument is that since 
the books are not auditable, there is, for example, not a ready market of buyers 
will to take over a numbers bank at a reasonable multiple of earnings. Moreover, 
the enterprise is a personal entity whose continued functioning is dependent on 
the ability of a new owner to retain the loyalty of participants in it. Hence, the 
racketeer, if he wishes to pass on wealth to his family, may choose to invest in 
other enterprises also. Third, investment in legitimate businesses not only helps 
deal with tax authorities but also provides a patina of respectability, which may 
be of increasing importance to the aging racketeer. 
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Albanese (1996, 244) argues, “In many cases of infiltration, the purpose is not to 
steal from the business until it is bankrupt. Instead, it makes more sense to misuse the 
business in a way that it can provide a steady source of illegal income without 
endangering its survival, i.e., using the golden goose without killing it.” Albanese (1996, 
243) says “…the infiltration of legitimate business generally occurs in one of two ways: 
(i) using a legitimate business as a “front” for primarily illegal activity (a scam), or (ii) 
“bleeding” a legitimate business of some of its profits through illegal means without the 
use of force and (hopefully) without causing it to fail (corruption or skimming).”  
At the Charbonneau Commission, Detective Constable Mike Amato of York 
Regional Police, whose jurisdiction included Woodbridge, Ontario testified that Mafia 
organizations around the world have infiltrated legitimate businesses. The commission 
heard from Amato that members of the ‘Ndrangheta who originated from Calabria, Italy, 
work as restaurateurs, trucking company executives, construction entrepreneurs, lawyers, 
and accountants and run banquet balls, nightclubs, and garden centers, among other 
things. Amato went on to state that working within or owning businesses in the 
legitimate private sector is part of a broader effort to legitimize the criminal offenders 
and integrate them into the local community to avoid suspicion. 
They’re integrated into the community and most people don’t even know who they 
are…they also donate to charity, raise money for political parties and take part in 
community services. It legitimizes your persona. It legitimizes your criminal past. 
It’s almost like absolving your sins…if you accept that {the Mafia} exists, you 
have to accept that public corruption exists…if there is numerous murders, if there 
is a lot of violence, if there is a lot of bombings, it attracts attention. It attracts 
attention from politicians, it attracts attention from the community, and it attracts 
attention from the police. You cannot build a successful criminal enterprise if you 
are continually being investigated and monitored by the police. If you stay under 
the radar, you are going to expand (Amato transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 
2012, 42). 
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The Caruana-Cuntrera crime group – a wing of the Rizzuto Mafia family that for 
a time was one of the world’s most prolific cocaine and heroin trafficking conspiracies – 
is another example of how organized crime infiltrates and uses the private sector to its 
advantage. Schneider (2003, 130) highlights the reasons as to why this criminal group 
became involved in the private sector:  
Companies established by the Caruana-Cuntrera group can be divided into two 
categories. The first consisted of companies that were used as fronts for 
international shipments of drugs. The RCMP in Montreal first became alerted to 
the Caruana-Cuntrera organization in 1984, when British Customs and Excise 
agency discovered a 250-kilo hashish shipment concealed in furniture sent by 
Shalimar Enterprises of Kashmir, India. British Customs took control over the 
shipment and controlled-delivered it to its destination, a warehouse in London 
rented by a company called Elongate Ltd, where two Canadian nationals of Sicilian 
origin were arrested. Police found that this pair was tasked with re-labelling cargo 
filled with hashish to be re-shipped to a Montreal company called Santa Rita 
Import-Export Ltd. The second category of companies were made up of those 
established expressly for money laundering purposes and many of these businesses 
were numbered companies based in Ontario and Venezuela that existed only on 
paper. The various shell and operating companies were also used to create an air of 
legitimacy for family member, which included providing business revenues and 
salaries. During the search of the offices of one of the companies controlled by 
Cuntrera family members, police discovered a payroll register for Much More 
Entertainment, another company controlled by the family. This document showed 




Schneider (2017, 384) writes: 
“In the quest to maximize revenues, the entry of organized criminals in the 
legitimate business world is frequently accompanied by illegal acts (extortion, 
corruption, intimidation, violence) that are meant to help them infiltrate, control, 
and maximize revenue from a particular legal business venture. This is essentially 
what business racketeering entails: using illegal means to infiltrate a legitimate 
business and/or market and to subsequently maximize revenues in said business 
or marketplace. In its goal of profit maximization, business racketeering may 
entail an attempt to dominate a legitimate industry or marketplace.”   
P a g e 	|	27	
 
As Lyman and Potter (2014: 163) put it, a concern stemming from business racketeering 
“is that organized criminals, by combining their illicit and licit businesses, will make it 
difficult if not impossible for legitimate businesspersons to compete with them.” This 
section will look to elaborate on organized crime involvement in the private sector by 
defining business racketeering and describing the process involved with taking over a 
business.  
Grennan and Britz (2006, 76) define racketeering as “Any criminal activity based 
on a system of extortion.” According to Schneider (2018, 369): “What makes business 
racketeering unique within the context of extortion is that companies and entrepreneurs 
are coerced into doing business with criminal offenders (through intimidation, violence, 
and blackmail), which sometimes means accepting them as partners in their business. 
Extortion, violence, and intimidation are first used to leverage the entry of criminal 
offenders into the business or industry and then are employed again against workers, 
competing businesses, or labour unions to maximize profits and market share for the 
criminally connected companies.” Von Lampe (2016, 77) defines business racketeering 
as “the creation or infiltration of businesses associations for the purpose of extracting 
payments from legal businesses in the form of membership fees and for the purpose of 
creating cartels in legal markets.”  
When the terminology first emerged in the mid-1920s, it referred to a collusive 
relationship between the legitimate private sector and the underworld (Smith, 1975, 66-
69). Rackets were defined as “criminal conspiracies of exploitation in which the 
conspiring factors are businessmen, certain types of labour union leaders, underworld 
forces, and politicians” (Hostetter & Beesley, 1929, 6).  
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 The nature of the relationship and balance of power between criminal racketeers 
and legitimate businesses may not necessarily remain the same over time. For example, 
the relationship may shift from the predatory exploitation of businesses by organized 
criminals to collusion. Organized criminals may be welcomed into a business or an 
industry as investors, as providers of illegal goods and services, as protectors, and as 
cartel organizers (Hill, 2003, 184). Edelhertz and Overcast (1993) support the above 
statement with the following illustration: “A large part of organized crime involvement 
in the legal economy does not involve victims, but rather the eagerness of business 
persons who see advantages in the collaborative contributions of organized crime 
figures” (151). 
To take over a business, criminal organizations do not need to control all of it; all 
that is required is to control key officers and the company's assets will then be accessible 
to the criminals. By investing funds in a business, criminal offenders can significantly 
influence an entire business sector (Allum & Siebert, 2003).  The proceeds of criminal 
activity can be used to assist their legitimate business and as a result, put their 
noncriminal competitors at a disadvantage. Criminal groups can attract additional 
customers to their business by providing access to illegal goods and services (Kelly, 
1999). If these additions do not help, consider the following:  the debt of a store owner, 
the financial problems of a garment manufacturer, a racketeer’s willingness to pay more 
than the market price for a restaurant or bar – any of these factors may lead to a racketeer 
acquiring control of a legitimate business (Alexander and Caiden, 1985). 
 The primary methods that racketeers use to successfully take control of an 
industry include violence, negotiating or collaboration, and labour racketeering. 
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Alexander and Caiden (1985, 57) describe the use of violence and intimidation in more 
detail below: 
One obvious method is intimidation on behalf of a single firm. Racketeers may 
choose to intimidate existing and potential competition of some firm they control, 
either through direct or hidden ownership. In the latter case, payments may be 
made to the racketeers from receipts that are not recorded by the entrepreneur (as 
is possible in many low-level distributive trades where receipts are primarily 
cash) or through payments to consultants, who are themselves racketeers. For 
example, the late Carlo Gambino, reputedly the leading mafia member during the 
1960s and early 1970s, apparently owned SGS Associates, which claimed to offer 
labour consulting services. Payments to the firm presumably were payments for 
racketeering services. Such services may have included intimidation of potential 
and actual rivals. 
Von Lampe (2016, 243) describes another example of business infiltration using 
violence. “A notorious example is that of South Boston gangster James “Whitey” Bulger, 
who at one point in time wanted to own a liquor store. He reportedly went to the owners 
of the store that he liked to own and under threat of death forced the owners to sell their 
business and to accept a price far below market value. Bulger then used the store as his 
base of operation and to claim that he had a legitimate source of income. Strong-arm 
tactics are commonly used by organized crime networks to force businesses to cooperate. 
Pace (1991, 150) describes strong-arm tactics in more detail below: 
Usually, the confederation will first try to “buy off” the business. They make the 
initial offer so attractive that it is difficult for the owner not to cooperate. If a 
cooperative agreement fails to materialize, a few threats against the owner’s 
family may bring concessions. If the owner will still not cooperate, mafia-
controlled distribution monopolies will not deliver services. For example, a 
restaurant depends on food supplies, garbage services, and miscellaneous services 
such as waiters, dishwashers, linens, and glassware. The loss of any of these 
services will bankrupt a business. As a last resort, the business may be picketed, 
burned out, bombed, or other strong-arm tactics such as beatings or kidnappings 
may take place. Often these actions take place without police knowledge. Even 
when brought to the attention of the police, nothing is usually done to protect the 
business or citizen.  
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An alternative to the use of violence and intimidation is trying to convince other 
companies to join in on a racketeering conspiracy to maximize profits. Alexander and 
Caiden (1985, 59) describe this process below: 
The members of the cartel might include all existing firms or only a large 
subgroup; that is a strategy decision that depends on perceived risks, such as the 
probability of non-member complaints or aggressive nonmarket expansion. The 
advantage of the cartel or conspiracy, especially if it includes all existing firms, is 
that there is little need for forceful intimidation. Firms must be persuaded to join 
the conspiracy, it is true, and that may involve the use of coercion. But coercion 
whose objective is to persuade an entrepreneur to join with colleagues in an 
arrangement that may, at least in the short run, increase his income is likely to be 
less disturbing than coercion whose objective is the elimination of an enterprise. 
Moreover, the conspiracy can be created without any disruption of customer 
relationships. Where the monopolist must move aggressively to take customers 
from rivals and then incur the disapprobation of sharp price increases once the 
rival is driven out, the cartel may leave each customer with his existing supplier. 
A cartel is less noticeable.  
Racketeers may also use a firm that they control to buy out any competitors or to make 
sure that they coordinate their actions with their firm to maximize its revenues 
(Alexander and Caiden, 1985).   
Business racketeering often overlaps with labour racketeering, which entails the 
infiltration and influence of labour unions and its directors by criminal offenders (Jacobs, 
2006). Labour racketeering can take many forms. First, racketeers can negotiate 
“sweetheart contracts” between businesses and unions in exchange for kickbacks.  
Under-the-table payments are made for agreements that favour the interests of the 
employer over those of the employees (Block & Chambliss, 1981, 78). Secondly, unions 
and their rank-and-file members can be exploited by the misuse and misappropriation of 
union funds. These schemes include giving union jobs to criminal offenders and 
associates (with or without the actual work) or inflated salaries for criminal offenders 
who have union jobs or positions in a union local. Labour racketeering also entails 
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diversion of funds from health, welfare, and retirement funds to corrupt union leaders 
and criminal offenders. In one case, criminals siphoned money from a Labourers 
International Union of North America health benefit, officially explaining it had been 
spent on “administrative costs” (Jacobs, 2006, 48).  Another example includes members 
of the Cosa Nostra receiving loans from a Teamsters pension fund to invest in and then 
illegally skim profits from casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada (Jacobs, 1994). An example of 
how labour racketeering can be used to influence legitimate businesses and entire 
industry sectors is evident with the A&P supermarket case in New York City. 
Representatives of two unions helped in the effort to convince stores to put inferior soap 
product on their shelves. When A&P refused a butchers’ union backed by the corrupt 
Teamsters, they threatened to go on strike (Demaris, 1986, 81).   
Business Racketeering by the Mafia in North America 
This section of the thesis describes in detail how the Mafia uses business racketeering. 
Cosa Nostra’s effectiveness in business racketeering is grounded in its long involvement 
in the private sector in North America. This involvement began with Black Hand 
extortions of Italian businesses and then was solidified by their influence over trucking 
and shipping companies used to transport illegal liquor during Prohibition. In subsequent 
years it infiltrated numerous businesses and industries in various North American cities. 
The 1986 President’s Commission on Organized Crime stated that in some parts of the 
U.S., Mafia groups controlled “segments of entire industries” (1986, pp. 1-7). According 
to Tenti, (2012, 45) “the mafia reputation deriving from the capacity to impose its own 
rules through violence is per se enough to drive [legitimate business] competitors away.” 
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Marine (2006, 218) explains how the moving and storage industry in New York 
City was used by the Mafia for racketeering and bid-rigging to infiltrate legitimate 
businesses.  
From 1964 to mid-1985, the leaders and other members of the Bonanno LCN 
family conspired with corrupt officials of Teamsters Union locals and otherwise 
legitimate businesses to control the moving and storage industry in metropolitan 
New York City. Pursuant to the scheme, the conspirators threatened businesses 
with labour strife unless they participated in their unlawful scheme to rig bids on 
government contracts for moving and storage. The LCN and labour union 
conspirators obtained unlawful payoffs from the proceeds of the rigged contracts. 
In exchange for the payoffs, the business received labour peace, lucrative 
government contracts, relaxed enforcement of union rules and contracts, and 
other benefits. 
 
Another industry that the Mafia controlled in New York through racketeering and bid-
rigging was the garment industry. Jacobs (1999, 135, 137) describes some examples of 
the infiltration of this industry below: 
Since, the 1920s, the LCN had been involved in the garment industry in 
metropolitan New York City through its influence over several unions, including 
the Teamsters Union, and LCN members’ and associates’ ownership of trucking 
businesses servicing the garment industry. Transportation via trucks of raw 
materials and manufactured products is essential to the garment industry. The 
LCN established a trucking cartel, which was able to fix prices and control which 
trucking companies were awarded lucrative contracts.  
In the late 1980s, Thomas Gambino, a capo with the Gambino LCN family, and 
his brother, who owned several trucking companies, dominated LCN’s interests 
in the garment industry. In 1990, the Manhattan District Attorney announced 
indictments of the Gambino brothers, asserting that they had imposed a mob tax 
on every garment shipped in New York City, reaping tens of millions of dollars in 
illicit profits. 
 
The following example illustrates how the Mafia used bid-rigging to infiltrate the 
waste industry. In 1989, it was determined through a US civil RICO lawsuit that since at 
least the 1950s, the Mafia controlled the waste hauling industry in metropolitan New 
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York City through an illegal cartel, involving an unlawful customer allocation 
agreement. Marine (2006, 220) expands on this: 
The cartel determined which carting companies would service particular 
customers and all the members of the cartel agreed to those allocations. The 
members of the cartel also rigged bids on public contracts through bribery of 
public officials and the LCN’s control of the labour unions. The LCN enforced 
compliance with the cartel’s decisions through the use of threats and violence. In 
return of the power and influence of the LCN, members of the cartel made 
periodic case payoffs to the Gambino and Lucchese LCN families. These 
unlawful arrangements eliminated virtually all competition from the waste 
hauling industry and led to consumers paying inflated prices for garbage disposal 
services.  
 
The above discussion demonstrates that for several years the Mafia in the U.S. 
exploited its corrupt ties to the Teamsters Union to facilitate their business racketeering. 
The President’s Commission on Organized Crime concluded in 1986 that since at least 
the 1950s, the Teamsters Union was “the most controlled union” by the Mafia 
(President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 1986, 89). The Teamsters stated that the 
Mafia dominated the Union by controlling the Teamsters International Union’s General 
Presidents, including James Hoffa, Frank Fitzsimmons, Roy Williams, and Jackie 
Presser. The Mafia had such significant control over the Union that it was able to 
fraudulently and unlawfully secure the elections of Roy Williams and Jackie Presser to 
the office of General President of the Teamsters Union to further their interests.  
The United States was not the only country that saw Mafia families use business 
and labour racketeering. There are also Canadian examples of how they infiltrated 
private businesses and unions. Some of the more prominent examples are illustrated by 
Schneider (2018, 385, 388): 
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The Montreal Mafia’s influence over labour unions in that city can be traced to 
the arrival of New York’s Bonanno family captain Carmine Galante in the early 
1950s. By 1954, Galante had extended his influence to Montreal’s legitimate 
businesses by investing in nightclubs, bars, and restaurants. He also brought in 
from New York City an ex-burglar named Earl Carluzzi to set up Local 382 of 
the Hotel, Restaurant and Club Employees’ Union, which allowed Galante to 
control the hirings and firings of all staff in these businesses while raiding union 
funds. While he headed to the Montreal Mafia, Vic Cotroni’s revenues from his 
investments in hotels, restaurants, and bars were bolstered by his influence over 
the same union (later re-named Hotel and Restaurant Employees International). 
Officials with the union could be relied upon to keep labour peace within the 
family’s hotel and restaurant businesses and to stir up troubles among the 
competition. In the early 1980s, Local 31 of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees 
International was barred from the Quebec Federation of Labour due to unethical 
conduct, which included ties to the Montreal Mafia (Schneider, 2018, 388).  
 
In 1981, three made members of the Hamilton wing of Buffalo’s Magaddino 
family -Antonio (Tony) Luppino, his brother Johnny, and Geraldo (Gerry) Fumo 
- were all convicted in connection with the fraudulent takeover of Tops 
Continental Meats of Hamilton. Tops was a small, family-run meat packing and 
pasta plant owned by an Italian immigrant named Domenic Returra. As part of 
his testimony in court, Returra said the accused first offered their services to 
collect money from delinquent accounts and eventually ended up controlling 60 
percent of the company. Returra’s troubles began when he mentioned to a 
salesman that he was having problems collecting money from his customers. 
Before long, he was paid a visit by the three men. Returra offered them ten cents 
on each dollar collected, but the men had grander ideas. Demanding to see his 
books, they told Returra that they were interested in buying the company and 
wanted a glimpse into its financial state. Afterward, they forced Returra to sign a 
contract that handed over shares in the company. Among the tactics used to 
persuade Returra to sign was a visit by Luppino’s brother-in-law, Paulo Violi, at 
the time the head of the Montreal Mafia (Schneider, 2018, 385). 
 
Corruption of and Racketeering in the Construction Industry by the Mafia 
This section of the thesis will describe how the Mafia uses corruption and racketeering in 
the construction industry. The Mafia has successfully exploited a variety of racketeering 
opportunities specifically within the construction industry in North America. Mafia 
families and individual members have attempted to take control of construction 
companies, used them to gain employment, used violence against uncooperative 
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construction firms, run protection rackets targeting specific companies, used construction 
companies to launder money, set up price-fixing and bid-rigging schemes for pubic 
contracts, and has infiltrated various labour unions connected to the construction industry 
(Goldstock, Jacobs, Marcus, Thacher, 1990).  
The Cosa Nostra extracts money from the construction industry by forcing 
contractors to place Mafia members, associates, or fictitious workers on their payrolls, 
meaning the construction industry has a vast array of jobs that provide organized crime 
figures with the ability to reward friends, crime syndicate members and associates with 
what seems to be legitimate income. Although illicit profits are important to organized 
crime groups utilising corruption, many racketeers lack legitimate sources of income. 
Having the financial records of being on-site for a construction project provides a 
legitimate cover for income tax purposes. 
Control of legitimate construction companies also provides organized crime 
groups with a valuable means of laundering money obtained in illegal activities. In 
addition, legitimate jobs allow racketeers to conceal their underworld reputation and 
offer convenient explanations for law enforcement enquiries (Goldstock et al., 1990).  
Through its control of construction companies, the Cosa Nostra can exploit their 
relationship over contractors to force them to purchase goods and services (such as 
window washing, security, carpeting, debris hauling, food wagon franchises, etc.) from 
favoured firms either controlled by or providing kickbacks to Mafia members (Goldstock 
et al., 1990).   
Benoît Dupont, Director of the International Centre for Comparative Criminology 
at the Université de Montréal, told the Charbonneau Commission that organized crime 
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“generally intervenes” in the private sector when “coercive measures (credible threats 
and attacks on physical integrity) are required against those who refuse to respect the 
informal rules in force among the various participants in the corruption scheme. It is not 
uncommon for organized crime to exploit this position to infiltrate the construction 
sector, because of the significant profits that can be made there, the money-laundering 
opportunities it opens up, and the low risk of being arrested or convicted”. 
The Mafia targets not only construction companies but also construction unions. 
For several decades the Mafia had significant influence in the construction industry and 
its unions, specifically the Labourers International Union of North America (LIUNA), a 
large international union that represents 700,000 labourers in the building trades in the 
United States as well as Canada (President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 1986, 
145-9, 217-32; Jacobs et al., 1999, 206-7). The Mafia’s control over the construction 
industry within America reached its peak in the early 1980s through an extortion and 
labour bribery scheme that was known as the “Club.” The club consisted of an 
arrangement of the “Commission” (the ruling body of the American Mafia) along with 
various concrete construction companies operating in New York City (President’s 
Commission on Organized Crime, 1986). According to Marine (2006, 221), the club 
used a combination of racketeering and a bid-rigging scheme to infiltrate the construction 
industry.  
The rules of the club were that only such construction companies as the 
commission approved would be permitted to take concrete construction jobs worth 
more than two million dollars in New York City; the commission would rig the 
bids to guarantee that the approved company would be awarded the contract. The 
Commission would guarantee ‘labour peace’ to the construction companies 
through its control of labour unions and the use of threats and violence. In turn, the 
company awarded the contract paid the commission two percent of the construction 
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contract’s price. In a related venture, companies that were awarded contracts under 
$2 million to pour concrete in New York City were required to pay one percent of 
the contract’s price to the Colombo LCN family. 
 
In Quebec, the history of construction unions has often been marked by episodes of 
violence, sometimes associated with the presence of organized crime. The Cliché 
Commission, which was established in the early 1970s after the destruction of the LG-2 
dam site in James Bay, confirmed that criminals had infiltrated some local unions in 
James Bay (Charbonneau Commission, 2017). In Quebec, it was more the investment 
funds managed by union leaders that attracted individuals linked to criminal 
organizations. These individuals sought capital to finance certain business ventures, and 
through a close collaborator, developed relationships with an influential leader of the 
largest construction union.  
 The Mafia has also been engaged in protection rackets targeting companies 
involved in the construction industry. Organized criminal groups create a need for the 
protection services they offer by using or threatening violence against contractors who 
refuse to pay. The Mafia often acts as a private protection service. These protection 
rackets are used for the client (construction company) to maximize profits and market 
share within the construction industry. This protection may take on various forms, such 
as reducing the risk of being cheated during business transactions and assistance in 
competing against rival companies (Asmundo & Lisciandra, 2008). Criminal 
organizations can also provide services related to arbitration and the enforcement of 
illicit agreements. A contractor participating in a collusion scheme obviously can’t go to 
court to complain about another Mafia member trying to obtain more than the agreed-
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upon number of contracts. In such situations, a criminal organization can play the role of 
arbitrator.  
In 1986, the President’s Commission on Organized Crime included investigations 
into New York City’s construction industry. The commission found significant evidence 
that “more than a dozen important construction locals in New York City have had a 
documented relationship with one or more of the New York Mafia families, often 
through the holding of union offices by Mafia members” (Kelly, 1999).  Evidence 
pointed to the fact that the production and pricing of concrete were permeated by bid-
rigging and price-fixing and carried out by a cartel that was associated with La Cosa 
Nostra. Studies by the New York State Organized Crime Task Force showed that four 
Mafia crime families in New York City acted as partners in construction industry crimes. 
The task force’s most important finding was that the structure of the construction 
industry allowed it to be criminally exploited (Kelly, 1999).  
 Construction companies hired members of the Mafia families in New York City 
to keep unions in control and to ensure costs were kept low (Kelly, 1999). For the 
foundation for most buildings, the main ingredient was ready-mix cement. In New York, 
Teamsters Local 282 delivered all ready-mix cement. On the job site, the Labourers 
International Union (LIU) represented the workers who handled and poured the cement. 
Ralph Scopo, a Mafia member in the Colombo crime family, controlled the LIU locals, 
while Teamsters Local 282 was controlled by two individuals who were tied to the 
Gambino and Genovese crime families.  In the 1970s, Castellano (the head of the 
Gambino Family at the time) had “arranged” for the consolidation of Manhattan’s ready-
mix cement businesses (meaning all of the Manhattan’s ready-mix cement businesses 
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were overlooked and controlled by one company; S&A concrete) (Kelly, 1999). The 
unions under Mafia influence, using the threat of labour strikes, were able to convince 
construction companies to use S&A as a source of concrete. As a result, by the early 
1980s, there was only one source for ready-mix cement in New York City and only six 
concrete construction companies could bid on the best construction jobs within the city’s 
five boroughs (Kelly, 1999). In short, the control of the concrete business in New York 
by the Mafia worked as follows: Any cement work priced over $2 million would only 
allow six construction firms to bid. All of them were previously hand-picked by the 
Mafia. In exchange for the privilege of bidding, the six companies had to pay the 
Colombo, Gambino, Lucchese, and Genovese crime family’s 2 percent on every contract 
they won. The families would then divide the money based on their agreements with 
each other (Kelly, 1999).  
Schneider (2009, 320) explains how the Toronto construction industry during the 
1960s and 1970s was vulnerable to the Mafia. “Much of the construction in Toronto’s 
postwar housing and commercial building boom was carried out by firms owned by 
Italian-Canadians, with the labour being chiefly provided by Italian immigrants.” For 
Paul Volpe, a Toronto-based member of Buffalo’s Magadino Mafia family, “this 
presented an opening to extort unions and construction firms while hiding behind 
contractors, supervisors, and immigrant labourers frightened into silence.” The result, 
according to a 1974 report by a Royal Commission that investigated violence and 
corruption in Ontario’s construction sector, was that between 1968 and 1975, “a sinister 
array of characters was introduced to this industry.” The final report of the Royal 
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Commission acknowledged that organized crime had infiltrated Toronto’s construction 
industry. 
By the 1970s Volpe and Natale Luppino began collaborating with Cesido 
Romanelli, the owner of several Toronto-area construction, drywall, and lathing firms. 
Romanelli would eventually hire Luppino.  Schneider (2009, 320) documents one of the 
ways in which Volpe and Luppino used racketeering in the Toronto construction 
industry: 
Luppino was used by Romanelli to intimidate unions representing the tradesmen 
working for him, not only to ensure union peace, but to help him gain control 
over unions themselves. Around the same time, Volpe began working for A. Gus 
Simone, business manager of Local 562 of the Lathers International Union. 
Simone was allied with the Toronto Building and Construction Trades Council, 
which at the time was backing five affiliated unions to organized concrete 
workers. Volpe and Luppino were brought in by Simone to “convince” the heads 
of other rival unions to join Simone’s cause, when Romanelli served as the “bag 
man” for a group of contractors who made payoffs to the corrupt Simone in 
return for a steady supply of quality workers and to ensure labour peace.  
Romanelli eventually would target Jean-Guy Denis, business manager of Local 124 of 
the Plasterers Union. Denis wanted to come to an agreement with Romanelli. However, 
Romanelli requested that Denis use pieceworkers for Ottawa jobs. Romanelli was 
involved in several large construction projects at the time and either wanted the union in 
his pocket or for Denis to use non-union workers.  Talks between the two broke down. 
Luppino and Zappia would then use forcible means to achieve what they wanted: 
Luppino and Zappia paid Denis a visit and demanded he set up a separate union 
and provide membership to people of Romanelli’s and Luppino’s choosing. Denis 
rejected their offer. At another meeting, Luppino offered Denis a bribe of five 
cents an hour for every hour worked by his seven hundred to eight hundred men 
if he would stay on the job and let someone else take over as head of the local. 
Again Denis turned Luppino down. Denis would testify before the Royal 
Commission that on the evening of January 8, 1973, two men forced their way 
into his house. He was not home at the time but his sixteen-year-old son was. The 
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men beat the teenager so savagely that he had to spend a week in the hospital with 
a concussion and internal injuries that required surgery. Jean-Guy, who fought in 
the Second World War, still would not give in and as a result his own life would 
be threatened several times (Schneider, 2009, 320). 
Luppino and Volpe would continue to use forms of labour and business racketeering to 
take over the Toronto construction industry: 
Luppino and Volpe also terrorized independent contractors and union leaders to 
force them to join with Romanelli and Simone. According to Toronto police 
records, between 1968 and 1972 there were 234 acts of wilful damage, twenty-
three acts of arson, fifteen assaults, and five explosions, as well as numerous 
thefts and break-ins at Ontario construction sites. Among the many acts of 
violence was the bombing of two lathing companies in 1972 and the shooting of 
Bruno Zanini, a union organizer and former labour reporter of the Toronto 
Telegram who was conducting a freelance investigation into labour racketeering. 
He told police that a man wearing a stocking over his head shone a light in his 
eyes in the parking garage of his apartment building and then fired two shots, one 
of which struck him in the leg. Acme Lathing Ltd. was twice bombed with 
dynamite and, on July 3, 1972, its office was strafed with automatic gunfire. 
Another company, Gemini Lathing Ltd., was also bombed. At the time the two 
companies were engaged in merger talks, which led police to believe that Cesido 
Romanelli, who also owned a lathing company, was trying to prevent the creation 
of a powerful competitor. Although neither the police nor the Royal Commission 
could prove it, Paul Volpe was hired to assure such a merger did not happen 
(Schneider, 2009, 320-321).  
 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH FINDINGS  
In 2012, former Montreal construction boss Lino Zambito described a province-wide 
system of corruption to the Charbonneau Commission, an inquiry created by the Quebec 
Government to investigate corruption in Montreal’s public works contract tenders. He 
became the first industry insider to testify about rampant collusion and corruption in the 
awarding of public works contracts in Montreal. Zambito attested to a cartel-like system 
in the awarding of sewer contracts. Under the scheme, a tightly knit group of 
construction companies colluded to determine who would submit a winning bid on a 
contract. Essentially this was a price-fixing scheme and different companies took turns 
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winning contracts (Global News, Nov. 14, 2014). The collusion also served to inflate the 
cost of public construction projects by up to 35 percent, according to the Charbonneau 
Commission. Funds from the public contracts were diverted to corrupt bureaucrats, and a 
political party named Union Montreal (Global News, Nov. 14, 2014). Three percent of 
city contracts’ value went through a middleman to Mayor Tremblay’s Union Montréal 
party and the other one percent was considered a “tax” by the city engineer who drew up 
the public-works contracts. Money and gifts were sent to other municipal bureaucrats as 
well, according to Zambito (Zambito transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 39).  
Funds from the public contracts were also diverted to members of the Rizzuto 
Mafia family in Montreal who brokered deals on who would win construction contracts 
and then took a cut from the winning contractor. According to Zambito, “everyone from 
building suppliers on up were aware of the system … people knew about it at the city. 
The business people knew about it. The suppliers knew it” (National Post, Sept. 27, 
2012). As a result of this collusion, Montreal was already a closed-market system when 
his company tried to bid on public construction contracts (National Post, Sept. 27, 2012).  
This section details the findings of research examining the criminal-private-
sector-corruption in Montreal’s public sector construction contract tendering process and 
the role of the Rizzuto Mafia family. This section begins with a discussion of the nature 
of the corrupt bid-rigging undertaken in the awarding of public sector construction 
contacts. Next, an overview of the Montreal Mafia is provided. This overview is focused 
on the period in which the Sicilian faction became dominant over the Calabrian faction, 
when Vito Rizzuto took over the reins of the family, and during the period covered by the 
Charbonneau Inquiry. The next section examines various aspects of business racketeering 
by the Montreal Mafia, as well as in the construction sector in Quebec. The 
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vulnerabilities of the construction industry will also be described to explain how 
organized crime infiltrated the industry.  
Overview of Corruption (Bid-Rigging) in Montreal’s Construction Sector 
The Charbonneau Commission uncovered numerous cases of private sector corruption in 
the construction industry, particularly in Montréal, Laval and Montréal’s North Shore. 
Testimony revealed instances where an engineering firm provided privileged information 
to a contractor so that it could win a tender by bidding low (Charbonneau Commission, 
2017). This example is just one instance of the bid-rigging exposed by the inquiry and 
other sources. The Charbonneau Commission (2017, 11) describes the various details of 
the bid-rigging that took place: 
The company chosen to win the bid solicitation notifies the complicit companies 
of the amount above, which they must bid. These complicit companies then 
submit bids of convenience, i.e., bids that cannot win the contract because they 
will not be the lowest. They may also submit bids that are not compliant with the 
specifications or requirements of the public contracting authority. It is obvious 
here that tendering processes whose award criterion is based on the lowest 
compliant tender produce readily foreseeable results that can be easily 
manipulated by a group of colluding companies. The mafia members can also 
refrain from responding to a call for tenders, leaving the way open for their 
previously designated accomplice.  The company chosen to win the contract 
compensates those that withdraw from the tendering process or submit bids of 
convenience by offering them subcontracts, supply contracts, or money. Members 
of the mafia can also share the market (by type of work, customer, or 
geographical area) and agree not to bid, at least competitively, in the markets 
assigned to other mafia partners. This is a case of “to each his market,” with 
competition reduced to a minimum.   
To organize the bid-rigging, the colluding companies reached an agreement before 
tenders are submitted. Communications between members of this collusion system 
included secret meetings and coded messages to inform conspiring companies of the 
threshold above which they must tender a bid to deliberately lose the bid. The frequency 
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of communications depended on the type of arrangement between the colluders. In 
systems based on territory sharing, communications may become less frequent once the 
ground rules had been established. In the case of one-time agreements, the actor wishing 
to organize the bid-rigging first had know the identity of the competitors interested in 
bidding on a given contract (Charbonneau Commission, 2017, 11). 
The Charbonneau Commission inquiry uncovered information on corruption 
within the public sector – including corrupt civil servants, politicians, and political 
parties – that facilitated the bid-rigging. Testimony from Gilles Surprenant, the city 
engineer for Montreal who oversaw the project budgets, had a significant influence in the 
tendering process. Surprenant organized meetings between construction companies and 
convinced them to work together to rig construction contracts. Surprenant would inflate 
prices on projects and then collect kickbacks on these projects (more than $700,00 over 
the years). Surprenant indicated he obtained a one percent cut from construction 
companies on the value of the contracts for his bid-rigging services. Another two and a 
half percent went to the Mafia (see below) and three percent to the Union Montreal 
political party. As Lino Zambito testified, after Surprenant had drawn up a contract for 
the winning bidder, the contractors would meet him to settle their accounts with cash in 
envelopes. Zambito estimated that he had paid the now-retired Surprenant between one 
and two hundred thousand dollars over the course of eight to ten years. The winning 
contractor would also bill the city for bogus “extras” once they had already begun to 
carry out their work. The money reimbursed for the phony extras would then be carved 
up, with 75 percent going into the pockets of the contractor and 25 percent to Luc 
Leclerc, retired city engineer whose role was to rig fake extras on construction contracts. 
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(The Globe and Mail, Oct. 18, 2012). Zambito also testified he took the two city officials 
on an all-expenses-paid golf vacation to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in 2002, after the two 
pressured him to do so. According to Zambito, Montreal city hall showed “willful 
blindness” to the apparent corruption. However, once the Quebec provincial government 
set up the anti-corruption police squad known as Operation Hammer in 2009, he noticed 
that several functionaries at city hall decided to retire (Globe and Mail, Oct. 18, 2012).  
Surprenant defended himself in his testimony by stating the following: 
I am not a villain. I am a bureaucrat who was corrupted. No one at the City of 
Montreal wanted a system like this. There was an established system and I was 
caught up in it. Corruption was an “open secret” at work, and one that no one 
seemed eager to stop. There was no initiative from our superiors to correct the 
situation…and no initiative on the part of [Montreal’s] executive committee 
(Surprenant Transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 71). 
 
Giuseppe Borsellino was also another key witness for the inquiry as he was 
president of Garnier Construction, which won millions of dollars in public infrastructure 
contracts. Borsellino supported the claims made by Zambito by contending that 
Surprenant was the organizer and overseer of rigging the tendering process, where he 
convinced chosen construction companies to work together to rig contracts. Borsellino 
argued that the contractors were the victims and not the orchestrators of corruption. The 
inquiry heard that Borsellino and two other major construction bosses had to pay the city 
thousands of dollars in cash from the 1990s on for what Borsellino described as “tips” 
(Edwards & Nicaso, 2015). Borsellino went on to state the following: “What I didn’t like 
is the power that those people [at the city] had acquired. It became apparent that [the 
contractors] were in a system we couldn’t get out of” (Borsellino transcript Charbonneau 
Commission, 2013, 259).  
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Borsellino was questioned further by Justice Charbonneau regarding the 
credibility of his testimony that stated Gilles Surprenant was the mastermind behind all 
of this. Borsellino replied to this by stating: “Yes” (Borsellino transcript, Charbonneau 
Commission, 2013, 174).  Borsellino continued to defend his position when stating he 
had never had any business dealings with anyone associated with organized crime: “I’d 
rather hand over the keys to my business than pay the Mafia. My parents came from 
Sicily.  [The Mafia] is something you hear about; you feel…it’s never clear” (Borsellino 
transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2013, 174). 
Overview of the Italian Mafia in Montreal (The Rizzuto Mafia Family) 
The Rizzuto’s ascendance in the Montreal Mafia began with Nicolo Rizzuto (Vito’s 
father). According to Edwards and Nicaso (2015, 16): 
Nicolo Rizzuto was a semi-literate, one-time South American chicken farmer who 
had managed to create a government within a government in Montreal. He had 
pulled himself from a relatively humble birth in Sicily through hard scheming, 
contacts, travel, innovation, good fortune, risk taking, marriage and murder. 
Despite running several construction-related companies, and even more 
politicians and police officers, Nicolo retained a certain common touch. When he 
collected money in a backroom of the Consenza Social Club in Saint-Leonard, he 
sometimes tucked a wad of cash into a sock for safekeeping. There, between a 
cheese shop and a tanning salon, mobsters sipped espresso, settled disputes, and 
accepted tributes from associates in the underworld and the world of ostensibly 
legitimate business…Even when things got rough, Nicolo maintained his ability 
to wink at the world, as though everything was under control. He courted the 
image of Mafia don and was seldom seen in public without a sweeping 
Hollywood-style fedora on his bald head. 
 
It was on February 1, 1954, that Nicolo arrived in Canada with his family at Pier 21 in 
Halifax.  By 1956, the Montreal city records listed Nicolo’s occupation as a “cement 
contractor” and soon he was a major player in Montreal’s construction world. It is 
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believed this success came because of the corruption and collusion schemes that Nicolo 
was using. As Edwards and Nicaso (2015, 18) write: 
He ran his own firm yet somehow borrowed $1,777.50 from a rival contractor, 
and he won a municipal contract despite not being the low bidder. His company, 
Grand Royal Asphalt Paving, was involved in bidding with the city of Montreal, 
winning a contract in January 1962 to make over Parc Masson. His paving firm 
also worked for the municipalities of Laval, Pierrefonds, and Saint-Leonard. The 
city of Jacques-Cartier (now part of Longueuil, on the south shore) was 
considered particularly corrupt, and Nicolo made money there too. 
 
His Grand Royal Asphalt Paving Company was very successful despite only 
receiving a limited number of contracts. In September 1966, Nicolo and his half-brother 
Liborio Milioto were officials with Franco Electric Inc., even though records show that 
they had no background in electric work at all (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015). By 1967, 
Nicolo was a partner in four construction-related firms and had secured construction 
work on the Expo 67 world’s fair in Montreal. When the Sicilian faction became 
dominant in the Montreal Mafia, he helped turn the criminal group into one of the 
biggest drug importing and traffickers in Canada. “They transformed the port of 
Montreal into the gateway to North America for hashish shipments from Pakistan and 
Lebanon and large heroin shipments from Sicily and Thailand. They sold most of their 
heroin in New York and New Jersey” (Edwards and Nicaso, 2015, 18). 
 
Shortly after arriving in Canada, Nicolo renewed contact with other Sicilian 
Mafiosi who had already relocated to Montreal and eventually became active in the 
Montreal Mafia under the leadership of Vic Cotroni and Paolo Violi. Vito Rizzuto would 
soon follow in his father’s footsteps. Vito had become a made member of New York’s 
Bonanno family sometime during the 1970s, but he was determined to be much more 
than simply the head of one of its crews. Rizzuto paid homage to his bosses in New York 
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and was sending millions of dollars in tribute annually, while patiently planning for the 
day that he would run his own autonomous family (Schneider, 2018).  
As Schneider (2018, 118) writes, “From an early age, Vito was groomed by his 
father to become a made member of the Mafia. During this time, Vito was learning the 
tricks of the trade from his father, who was a prolific international trafficker of heroin, 
cocaine, and hashish. Vito himself would later become one of Canada’s biggest drug 
importers and wholesalers.” In the late 1970s, Nick staged a coup that overthrew the 
Calabrian leadership of the Montreal Mafia (including the murder of Paolo Violi) and 
soon installed his son Vito as the head of the Bonnano Family’s Montreal crew. With 
Cotroni’s passing due to cancer, “the Rizzutos’ control over Montreal was complete. The 
rank-and-file members and associates of the Mafia quickly fell into line, easily flipping 
their allegiance and answering as smartly and respectfully to the Rizzuto's as they had to 
Cotroni and Violi” (Lamothe & Humphreys, 2014, 101). Vito would quickly become one 
of Canada’s most powerful and successful criminals. 
Sometime in the late 1980s or early 1990s, Vito broke off (officially or 
unofficially) from the Bonnano family and began his own Mafia family. According to 
Lamothe and Humphreys (2006: 208), “Few fully recognized the growing influence of 
the Sixth Family”— a title that alludes to the independence and power of the Montreal 
Mafia under the Rizzuto's by equating it with the five New York families. “Fewer still 
understood that what was once a small, outpost of subservient gangsters had grown into 
an independent and powerful entity that could hold its own in any underworld on any 
continent.”			
 As the leader of the Montreal Mafia, Vito evolved into what Nicaso and Lamothe 
(2005: 44) called the “epitome of the modern global gangster.” In addition to drug 
P a g e 	|	49	
trafficking, the Montreal Mafia was accumulating a fortune through a maze of lucrative 
gambling and bookmaking operations that generated hundreds of millions of dollars a 
year. Rizzuto also expanded his gaming interests to include video lottery terminals, 
which were fast becoming the most lucrative form of gambling in Quebec. He had 
outposts and cells strategically placed throughout Canada and abroad and was forging a 
global organized criminal conglomerate that would surpass the reach, wealth, and power 
of any of the five New York families. While the Montreal Mafia may have only had 20 
or so made members, Rizzuto could count on hundreds of associates around Canada and 
the world (Schneider, 2017). In its 2001 annual report on organized crime, Criminal 
Intelligence Service Canada (2001: 57) asserted that the Rizzuto family “remains one of 
the most influential and powerful criminal organizations in the Montreal area, exerting 
extensive influence over other criminal organizations operating in Montreal.”  
He forged ties with Mafia families in Sicily and the U.S., ’Ndrangheta clans in 
Canada and Italy, the Hells Angels, the West End Gang (which had significant influence 
over Montreal’s marine ports), and South American cocaine suppliers.  As Peter Edwards 
writes, under Rizzuto, the Montreal Mafia was transformed from a neighbourhood-based 
group that “mediated community disputes” to a “multi-national drug trafficking 
conglomerate” (Edwards, 1990: 177). Over the many years of its existence, the business 
of the Montreal Mafia took part in a diverse range of serious, profit-oriented criminal 
activities. This included both predatory and consensual illegal activities, as well as 
providing illegal and legal goods and services. Consensual criminal activities include 
gambling, liquor smuggling, bootlegging, loansharking, drug trafficking, and 
prostitution. Its predatory crimes include protection rackets, muscle-for-hire, theft and 
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fencing of stocks and bonds, mass-marketing fraud, stock market manipulation, and 
counterfeiting.  
Business Racketeering by the Montreal Mafia 
Business racketeering by the Montreal Mafia began under the leadership of the original 
don Vic Cotroni who, along with other made members and associates, controlled a 
number of legally incorporated businesses in Montreal, which were used to carry out 
both legitimate and illegitimate commerce. These businesses operated in such industries 
as construction, food wholesaling, hotels, restaurants, bars, ice cream parlours, vending 
machines, and hotels.  
According to Edwards (1990, 6), the Montreal Mafia’s reach into legitimate 
businesses in Quebec was long. “It was possible to bite into a pizza, every ingredient of 
which had been supplied by businesses run by Cotroni or his associates. And if you 
wanted spumoni ice cream for dessert, you were again enriching the Cotronis. During 
Canada’s centennial year, Cotroni enterprises managed to monopolize fast-food contracts 
at Expo ’67 allowing Cotroni to fill thousands, perhaps millions of stomachs from across 
the world with diseased hot dogs.” Cotroni, Paolo Violi, and associates like Armand 
Courville gained a monopoly over the sale of Italian ice creams in the north end of 
Montreal through force and intimidation. One witness before a 1970s Quebec provincial 
crime commission testified there were only two firms making Italian ice cream in the 
Montreal area, “and the second wasn’t allowed to sell it because Violi didn’t want it to.” 
Outside of these semi-legitimate interests, there is no indication that the Cotroni decina 
attempted to monopolize criminal activities in Montreal. In fact, it was counterproductive 
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to do so because of the so-called patron-client tradition, in which the Mafioso tolerates 
freelance criminals in their jurisdiction as long as they pay a tax (Schneider, 2018, 198).  
 The corrupting influence of the Cotroni Mafia crew also extended to labour 
unions in Quebec and they had particular influence over the Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees International. Vic Cotroni used union officials not only to ensure peace 
within the family’s own hotel and restaurant businesses, but also to try to stir up union 
dissent in competing businesses. Police once observed Frank Cotroni sharing drinks with 
union officials and when Cotroni associate Claude Faber came to Toronto; Local 75 of 
the union was billed for his room, meals, drinks, and closed-circuit movies (Schneider, 
2018, 199). Violence is also used by the Montreal Mafia to protect its commercial 
interests and its power. Many of their businesses were established (and prospered) 
through the liberal use of intimidation and violence against competing businesses. This 
allowed Cotroni and other members and associates to control the distribution of various 
foodstuffs that were distributed to local restaurants and stores. Intimidation and violence, 
in fact, serve a number of purposes for the Mafioso: to protect his kin and territory, to 
sustain his criminal activities, to ensure secrecy and obedience, and as a means to gain 
and reinforce respect, honour, and power (Schneider, 2017).  
Business Racketeering in Montreal’s Construction Industry  
The Charbonneau Commission investigated the power and role of the Mafia, and 
specifically Vito Rizzuto, in the construction industry and public sector contract 
tendering. The Montreal Mafia did not have to invest much in construction and real-
estate deals. Nonetheless, it gained a significant profit by the time the projects were 
completed. The industry was considered a low-risk investment that reaped a significant 
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reward. This section examines five aspects of business racketeering by the Montreal 
Mafia in the construction sector in Quebec:	(i) infiltration of and control over individual 
companies, (ii) control of, or hegemony over the construction industry, (iii) use of 
intimidation and violence, (iv) involvement in the price-fixing conspiracy (provision of 
mediation services), (v) exacting pizzo from construction companies and (v) labour 
racketeering. 
Infiltration of and Control Over Individual Companies 
The Montreal Mafia infiltrated the construction industry in multiple ways. It either 
founded, invested in, took over, or coerced companies into either engaging in criminal 
activities such as the bid-rigging from which they took a cut, or paying a pizzo. The 
takeovers often occurred when companies in financial difficulty turn to “alternative” 
financing sources. Testimony at the Commission Inquiry, for instance, revealed that a 
heavily indebted land decontamination company fell under the control of individuals 
linked to the Mafia. These individuals targeted a family business that needed capital to 
upgrade its equipment. Realizing that he was losing control of his business, the owner 
attempted to reject the Rizzuto representative. He then became the victim of threats, 
intimidation, theft, and mischief. The same man infiltrated another masonry company by 
demanding commissions of 5 percent and then 10 percent of the value of contracts. He 
convinced the owner to buy a competitor’s business with cash. His aim was to create a 
dominant Mafia presence in the masonry industry (Charbonneau Commission, 2017). 
The second way the Mafia infiltrated the construction industry was to avoid direct 
investments or active participation in the industry through mob-controlled companies 
and, instead, ran a protection racket that forced companies to pay a tax and/or provide a 
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cut of any contract as part of the bid-rigging collusion system. This infiltration was part 
of a broader system in which the Mafia provided various services to the companies, 
including protection and mediation, which they would claim justified the payment of 
taxes. Eric Vecchio, a Montreal police officer, testified that Rizzuto and other mobsters 
were never front-line players with a direct financial stake in the construction or real 
estate sector. Rather, they stayed on the sidelines, acting as consultants and deal-brokers 
while they picked up a piece of the profits. “Organized crime (takes) a profit from the 
construction industry,” Vecchio said. “In the end, they don’t really get involved, they 
don’t invest any of their own money, but they take away a consultant’s or arbiter’s fee” 
(Vecchio transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 162).  
Control of (Hegemony Over) the Construction Industry 
Infiltrating and/or influencing individual companies were part of a broader effort to 
increase influence and hegemony over the industry as a whole, including hegemony in a 
particular region. Territorial control or control of an industry is often an essential element 
in business racketeering and is motivated by the maximization of profits. This helps 
explain the motivation of the Montreal Mafia to infiltrate the construction industry 
(Charbonneau Commission, 2017).  Influence and control of the industry and territory 
were facilitated by the afore-mentioned company takeovers, protection rackets, and 
financing. Testimony before the Commission revealed Rizzuto associates sought to 
control individual companies and influence the construction industry in a certain territory 
through intimidation and acts of violence.  
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Use of Intimidation and Violence 
A major theme revealed by The Commission was how the Mafia used intimidation to 
further their racketeering within Quebec’s construction sector. Milioto himself was 
accused of using intimidation to remove competing businesses from Montreal’s sidewalk 
construction industry. This helped a small group of entrepreneurs from Sicily maintain 
control. Witness Martin Dumont claimed Milioto once threatened to bury him in one of 
his sidewalks. Gilles Theberge’s (former director at excavation firm) testimony also 
confirmed Nicolo’s violent methods within the industry: “I was once informed by Nicolo 
Milioto that windows broken at a neighbor’s home were meant as a warning for me. 
Milioto told me the intention was to break my windows — but the guy got the wrong 
house." On the eve of a bid deadline, I would sometimes get calls in the middle of the 
night, with no one talking at the other end of the line” (Theberge transcript, Charbonneau 
Commission, 2013, 183). At the end of the 2000s, the owner of two construction 
companies in the Abitibi region operated with the consent of the Rizzuto Mafia family 
and used intimidation and violence to eliminate competing companies. One competitor 
was unable to complete a paving job because the criminal contractor had threatened its 
suppliers. The latter also burned the building and garage of a second paving company to 
prevent it from completing a contract. Around 2010, the head of a criminal network 
based in the Eastern Townships owned a company specializing in the installation of 
culverts. To remove his competitors, he asked accomplices to burn down pipe suppliers. 
A company that suffered nearly $1 million in damages saw its insurance premiums rise 
sharply. For several months, no competing company dared to bid on the same tenders as 
the criminal contractor (Charbonneau Commission, 2017). 
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Francesco Del Baso, an alleged lieutenant in the Rizzuto crime family, had 
allegedly made threatening calls to Martin Carrier, the head of a company that works on 
tiles, marble, granite, and ceramics for commercial buildings in Quebec City, to 
discourage him from bidding on a tender in the Montreal ceramics sector (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2017). Carrier bid on and won a lucrative contract at a Montreal university 
in 2003 that a Montreal-based competitor, Francesco Bruno, had expected to win as part 
of a small circle of construction firms that rigged government contracts with the 
oversight of the Mafia. The contract was awarded to Carrier’s firm in mid-January 2004. 
A few days later, while driving his daughter to a guitar lesson on a Saturday morning, his 
mobile telephone rang. The caller would not identify himself but stated the following: 
“We would like it if you don’t come here (Montreal) anymore to work,” he told Carrier. 
“The next time you won’t be leaving.” Carrier would learn only in 2006 after a major 
anti-Mafia operation that the caller was Francesco Del Balso. An investigator for the 
Charbonneau corruption inquiry was told that the phone call was made on orders from 
Nicolo Rizzuto Sr. Del Balso called again a month later in what Carrier described as a 
brief, one-sided conversation: “You didn’t listen. You were warned. It’s over,” Carrier 
was told. Carrier continued with his profession after this and still bid on contracts. 
Eventually, Carrier ended up receiving a terrifying piece of correspondence at his office: 
a pink envelope with a card inside. It was a condolence card. Written inside was an 
unsigned message: “Dear friend, if you continue to bid (on contracts) in Montreal, this is 
the kind of card that we will be sending to your family.” 
Giuseppe Borsellino, the owner of Garnier Construction testified that he was 
severely beaten by three men in 2009. When asked why he thought this beating occurred, 
Borsellino believed it was related to a construction project or unpaid debts. Borsellino 
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admitted he did not report the attack to the police.  Prosecutor Simon Tremblay offered 
two theories as to why this beating may have taken place: One was that Borsellino’s 
actions might have forced a top official in the city’s public works department to resign 
when it was learned that Borsellino had paid the official’s way to Italy. The second 
theory was that Borsellino didn’t pick Raynald Desjardin’s (a top associate of Rizzuto 
family) construction firm, Energie Carboneutre, for decontamination work at one of the 
construction sites. Borsellino did not elaborate on the beating any farther but did admit 
he had once been a political contributor. However, he claims he halted his donations in 
the late 2000s. When asked on this, Borsellino explained that his actions were not ethical 
(Borsellino transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2013). 
Involvement in the Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Provision of Mediation Services) 
One of the ways that the Montreal Mafia consolidated its influence over the construction 
industry was to involve itself in the price-fixing conspiracy. To justify their cut of the 
contracts, members of the Mafia, including Vito Rizzuto, provided mediation for 
disputes between members of this collusion system. It also used its power and influence, 
disguised as mediation, to keep companies not involved in the price-fixing conspiracy 
from bidding on contracts. Conspiring companies made use of mediation services to 
avoid incriminating themselves by appealing to the police or the justice system to 
arbitrate disputes linked to illegal collusion (Charbonneau Commission, 2017). Rizzuto’s 
role as a mediator and how this illustrates his self-anointed traditional Mafia role as a 
broker or patron to his clients is discussed and examined in more detail later in this 
thesis. 
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Exacting a Pizzo from Construction Companies 
 A former construction boss delivered testimony to the Commission about a system of 
corruption in the industry that saw him pay Canada's most powerful Mafia family a 2.5 
percent cut on public contracts. Lino Zambito told Quebec's corruption inquiry about a 
cartel-like operation lording over the construction industry in the province. He said he 
had no choice but to participate in this corruption. He described a system that drove up 
the cost of public works. According to Zambito, only certain companies were allowed to 
bid for public contracts. They would set their prices artificially high and they would 
reach a group decision on who would submit the lowest bid. Then they took turns 
winning contracts, he said. He claimed that when it was all said and done, the Montreal 
Mafia claimed a percentage. Zambito said the following: “as far as his own company was 
concerned, that fee was a 2.5 per cent share of the value of a sewer project, paid to the 
once-dominant Rizzuto family” (Zambito transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 
115). Zambito shrugged off a suggestion from an inquiry lawyer that he was paying 
protection money: "I saw it as more of a business. Entrepreneurs made money and there 
was a certain amount owed to the Mafia” (Zambito transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 
2012, 109). Zambito said he knew where the money — delivered through a middleman 
— ultimately wound up. The Montreal Mafia used this money as a so-called or pizzo of 
up to 30 percent on the construction industry in the province. “It was effectively a tax — 
a cut that was given to make sure things went well,” (Vecchio transcript, Charbonneau 
Commission, 2012, 162) said Vecchio, who described the cut as a way to get protection, 
to buy peace or gain the influence of certain individuals. “It’s clear the people who were 
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paying this tax believed this — or they wouldn’t be paying it” (Vecchio transcript, 
Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 162). 
The RCMP’s Operation Colisée, which targeted the critical activities and 
members of the Montreal Mafia, found that several construction contractors frequented 
the Consenza Social Club, the unofficial headquarters of the Montreal Mafia. When Vito 
was sent off to prison in the U.S., his father became more active in the collusion scheme 
and was repeatedly seen on police surveillance video, rubbing elbows with certain 
construction company owners and managers, counting cash, and stuffing the money in 
his socks. Nicolo collected Vito’s cut while the latter was in jail in the United States. 
Sixty-four-year-old construction executive Nicolo Milioto (known as “Mr. Sidewalk”) 
made frequent cash deliveries at the social club, which police and the Commission 
alleged was the proceeds of the pizzo provided by a winning construction company. 
Milioto was known as “Mr. Sidewalk” because of the large number of Montreal sidewalk 
contracts his company Mivela Construction, was awarded. Milioto, who police alleged 
was an associate of the Rizzuto family, was picked up by RCMP cameras visiting the 
Consenza Social Club, 236 times in two years. Milioto admitted to taking money from 
Zambito and delivering it to Nicolo Rizzuto Sr. but claims he was simply making a 
delivery and didn't know what the money was for. Milioto has also admitted to having 
friendships with members of the Rizzuto family, who hail from the same small village in 
Sicily where he was born. He told the commission that he had no business dealings with 
the Mob, but he had received a loan from Rizzuto Sr. because it was easier than going to 
the bank. Milioto’s testimony reveals this information in more detail: "I don’t pay 
interest. That could be a reason. It’s easier," (Milioto, 2013, 153). Milioto stated this as 
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he was questioned on why he shoved a stack of cash into his sock after it was handed to 
him by Rizzuto Sr., which was caught on video by police surveillance during Operation 
Colisee. Milioto advised he brought cash to the Cosenza, but said it was only for one of 
two reasons: He was delivering it for Zambito or it was cash collected for the social club. 
Milioto later changed his testimony and advised the commission that the money may 
have been given to him for the construction of his house or for the marriage of his 
daughter (Milioto, 2013, 153). 
Labour Racketeering  
The Charbonneau Commission attempted to investigate the links between the Montreal 
Mafia and officials with the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ), 
the province’s largest and most powerful labour union officials. With six hundred 
thousand members and billions of dollars’ worth of investments in its pension fund, the 
FTQ was Quebec’s largest labour federation and a major player in the province’s 
construction world. FTQ-Construction negotiates collective agreements in the 
construction industry’s subsectors (residential, industrial, commercial and institutional, 
civil engineering, and roadwork). Several individuals linked to the Mafia sought to 
obtain access to the union’s pension fund investments. To do so, they established a 
relationship with Jean Lavalee, the general manager of the construction division of the 
FTQ. Mafia members asked Lavlaee to pressure his colleagues to fund some of their 
projects, which included the following: a land decontamination company, properties 
including a strip club, a hotel tableware company, and a marina. The electricians’ 
retirement fund run by the president of FTQ-Construction also invested in the 
construction of a residential building in which all units were purchased by members of 
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the Montréal Mafia, union leaders and a major construction contractor (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2017).  
The testimony given by Ken Pereira revealed that a prominent Montreal Mafia 
associate known as Jocelyn Dupuis introduced himself as the “boss” of the general 
manager of FTQ-Construction and that he had come up with a plan whereby he and his 
accomplices would take control of the union by ousting the then-president. Pereira 
testified that FTQ management was aware that Jocelyn Dupuis, the former head of the 
construction wing, had ties to Raynald Desjardins, a close associate of Vito Rizzuto. 
Pereira also accused Dupuis of being close to Normand (Casper) Ouimet, a Hells Angels 
member who has been accused of involvement in 22 murders, among other criminal 
activities. “The Hells are with us. The Hells are part of FTQ- (Construction),” Pereira 
quoted a colleague as saying. Dupuis made little effort to hide his ties to both the Hells 
Angels and the Montreal Mafia, according to Pereira, and the FTQ president Michel 
Arsenault was well aware that Dupuis was close with Desjardins (Canadian Press, Oct. 
2, 2013). In the November 2008 union elections, Dupuis allegedly called on members of 
the Hells Angels to ensure that his candidates won all the leadership positions. The 
ultimate goal was to gain access to the boards of directors of the Solidarity Fund and its 
real estate arm. This resulted in a rival candidate quitting the race after a show of force 
by the Hells Angels (Charbonneau Commission, 2017).  
The Montreal Mafia’s racketeering in the construction industry was multifaceted 
and used taking over individual companies, violence, intimidation and mediation to do 
so, as well as operating protection rackets, collaborating in price-fixing (bid-rigging) 
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schemes, exacting pizzo from winning contractors involved in the collusion and labour 
racketeering.   
Vulnerabilities of the Construction Industry to the Montreal Mafia 
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain the vulnerability of the construction 
industry to organized crime. The Charbonneau Commission revealed the weaknesses 
exploited by some bidders to manipulate the public contract awarding process. These 
vulnerabilities include the large size of the industry, low level of skills among some 
labourers (which facilitates entry of criminal offenders and associates), and the financial 
vulnerability of small companies. 
The size of the public sector construction industry in terms of contracts and the 
amount of money to be made makes it a lucrative target for criminal infiltration. In 2013, 
in Quebec alone, approximately $48 billion was spent on public and private construction 
contracts. Public contracts valued at more than $7 billion are awarded annually through 
competitive bidding. According to Mike Amato, an officer with the York Regional 
Police Criminal Intelligence Service, criminal organizations have clearly understood the 
potential for enrichment represented by public contracts (Charbonneau Commission, 
2017). 
Some types of construction work do not require a skilled workforce or the use of 
advanced technologies, and this facilitates penetration by criminal offenders who have 
few legitimate marketable skills. The Commission observed that the influence of persons 
linked to organized crime is more evident in low-skill industries such as sidewalk 
construction, paving and the installation of culverts than in sectors requiring more in-
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depth knowledge, such as engineering. According to a police census conducted in 2010, 
75 percent of Hells Angels members owned companies in industries that did not require 
advanced expertise, including construction (Charbonneau Commission, 2017).  
Given the nature of the industry, it may be difficult for public authorities to 
identify the presence of organized crime. The Régie du bâtiment du Québec (RBQ) is a 
key player in this respect since the licenses it administers are “the gateway to the legal 
economy in the construction industry” and a bulwark against the infiltration of organized 
crime. In 2013, there were more than 40,000 holders of licenses issued by the RBQ. The 
Building Act authorizes the RBQ to refuse to issue a license or to suspend or cancel a 
license if it finds that the licensee is lending his name to another person. Detecting the 
presence of frontmen among tens of thousands of licensees is not an easy task, however. 
This offence does not carry personal penalties for the individuals who act as front men, 
or for those who benefit from the scheme. Huguette Labelle and Paul Lalonde, 
representatives of Transparency International Canada, noted that it is often difficult to 
identify the beneficial owners of businesses, whether they are in Canada or elsewhere. 
Organized crime takes advantage of this situation, and companies may fall under its 
control without the knowledge of authorities (Charbonneau Commission, 2017).  
Construction firms that sometimes have difficulty borrowing money from 
traditional financial institutions may be tempted to obtain the funds they need more 
quickly through the black market and criminal lenders. These lenders are often called 
loansharks and can afford to grant or guarantee riskier loans since they have ways to 
ensure repayment beyond regular legal limits. They are therefore able to offer 
entrepreneurs financing services, which can be an attractive factor in the industry. An 
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example of this phenomenon was presented during the Commission’s hearings regarding 
a project to convert a derelict warehouse in Old Montréal into a luxury residential 
building. After filing a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and an 
application under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the contractor and the 
developer received help from the Rizzuto clan. The Mafia godfather used his network of 
contacts to find new sources of funding. Members of his family made excellent profits in 
return.  
The Commission notes furthermore the problem of delays in the payment of 
contractors’ invoices by public contracting authorities. This creates a lack of liquidity for 
contractors who, with insufficient financial resources, may be tempted to resort to non-
traditional sources of financing (Charbonneau Commission, 2017). Some sectors of the 
construction industry, such as masonry, include a great many small companies. These 
companies often do not have permanent premises, their situation is precarious, and they 
have little financial room to manoeuvre. They are generally more susceptible to 
infiltration by organized crime as they have limited assets or security to offer, which 
considerably impedes their ability to obtain financing. Organized crime can use them to 
launder money, or simply target them for extortion and intimidation. The Commission 
found that a member of a Mafia-type criminal organization infiltrated two small masonry 
companies. This individual had little trouble gaining access using threats and gang 
insignia (Charbonneau Commission, 2017). 
Finally, it can be argued that the construction industry in Quebec is vulnerable to 
the Italian Mafia specifically because so many owners and managers in the industry are 
Italian in heritage. This includes many first-generation Italian immigrants who are 
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already well experienced in the demands and dangers of the Mafia. Italian Mafiosi also 
capitalized on familial connections and other interpersonal relationships with Italian 
industry insiders. Some of the contractors and industry representatives’ accused of 
serving as intermediaries between the Mafia and the industry were from the same town or 
region of Sicily as members and associates of the Rizzuto family. As Schneider writes in 
his analysis of the involvement of the Cosa Nostra in Toronto’s construction sector in the 
1970s, “Much of the construction in Toronto’s postwar housing and commercial building 
boom was carried out by firms owned by Italian-Canadians, with the labour being chiefly 
provided by Italian immigrants. For opportunistic ethnic Italian criminals this presented 
an opening to extort unions and construction firms while hiding behind contractors, 
supervisors, and immigrant labourers frightened into silence” (Schneider, 2009, 320). 
Conclusion: Research Findings 
According to Charbonneau, “a culture of impunity” was evident throughout Quebec’s 
public construction sector in which organized crime, political figures and bureaucrats, 
political parties, unions and entrepreneurs all worked to skim public funds for illicit ends. 
Both the Italian Mafia (in particular, the Rizzuto crime family) and outlaw motorcycle 
gangs (specifically, the Hells Angels) infiltrated the construction industry in Quebec, 
gaining access to public and private contracts and influencing private companies and 
union pension funds (Charbonneau Commission, 2017).  
The level of corruption in public and private sectors in Quebec provided an entry 
point for the Montreal Mafia, which had long been involved in the construction industry 
in Montreal, Ontario and U.S. The Charbonneau Commission report noted how the 
Rizzuto family helped a limited number of construction firms collude to determine who 
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would be the winning bidder on a particular government construction contract. The 
collusion resulted in price-fixing that increased the costs of the contract to the 
government while guaranteeing a cut of the contract for the Montreal Mafia. 
Charbonneau said that witnesses testifying to the commission “revealed that the Mafia 
had infiltrated Quebec’s construction industry. Cartels formed to prevent other 
companies from bidding on public contracts. Construction company owners revealed 
they were victims of threats, intimidation, and assaults. Certain members of organized 
crime attempted to take control of legitimate companies to launder dirty money derived 
from illegal activities.” (Charbonneau Commission, 2017, 17) The commission also 
learned that the province’s largest trade union, FTQ-Construction, “solicited individuals 
tied to the Mafia and Hells Angels, who wanted to gain access to the FTQ’s finance and 
investment arm, its real estate arm, and the province’s union of electrical workers. These 
individuals had close ties with FTQ Construction’s director general, as well as its 
president” (Charbonneau Commission, 2017, 19).  
Chapter Three: Research Findin 
Introduction 
In 2012, former Montreal construction boss Lino Zambito described a province-wide 
system of corruption to the Charbonneau Commission, an inquiry created by the Quebec 
Government to investigate corruption in Montreal’s public works contract tenders. He 
became the first industry insider to testify about rampant collusion and corruption in the 
awarding of public works contracts in Montreal. Zambito testified about a cartel-like 
system in the awarding of sewer contracts. Under the scheme, a tightly knit group of 
construction companies colluded to determine who would submit a winning bid on a 
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contract. Essentially this was a price fixing scheme and different companies took turns 
winning contracts (Kelly, 2014). The collusion also served to inflate the cost of public 
construction projects by up to 35 percent, according to the Charbonneau Commission. 
Funds from the public contracts were diverted to corrupt bureaucrats, and a political 
party named Union Montreal (Kelly, 2014). Three percent of city contracts’ value went 
through a middleman to Mayor Tremblay’s Union Montréal party and the other one 
percent was considered “tax” by the city engineer who drew up the public-works 
contracts. Also, smaller percentages and gifts were sent to municipal bureaucrats 
according to Zambito.  
Funds from the public contracts were also diverted to members of the Rizzuto 
Mafia family in Montreal who brokered deals on who would win construction contracts 
and then took a cut from the winning contractor. According to Zambito, “everyone from 
building suppliers on up were aware of the system … people knew about it at the city. 
The business people knew about it. The suppliers knew it” (Banerjee, 2012). As a result 
of this collusion, Montreal was already a closed-market system when his company tried 
to bid on public construction contracts (Banerjee, 2012).  
This section details the findings of research examining the criminal-private-
sector-corruption in Montreal’s public-sector construction contract tendering process. 
The analysis of the Montreal construction scandal can potentially contribute to a greater 
understanding of the causes and nature of corruption within Quebec. This case study can 
also help nurture a better understanding of the role of organized crime (and more 
specifically the Montreal Mafia) in this corruption by gathering relevant empirical 
evidence (from the Charbonneau commission and other sources) and by applying the 
afore-mentioned analytical frameworks.   
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With the current case under study, criminal activity was found in all phases of the 
construction industry within Montreal; engaged in by private and public workers alike. 
Extensive extortion was used against builders and contractors. The Charbonneau 
Commission officials also expressed amazement at the extent of collusive agreements 
among contractors and suppliers, and documented racketeers using their control over 
construction companies to extort large payments from builders and contractors by 
threatening to withhold labour unless payments were made.  The similarity between these 
conditions and the conditions presented in the literature on New York City’s construction 
industry shows how deeply rooted corruption and the construction industry’s crime 
problems are within North America.  
In order to fully understand the link between organized crime and private-sector 
corruption in Quebec, it is important to first discuss the key issues of the case, most 
notably the private sector corruption and the role of the mafia in this corruption. 
According to the testimony before the Commission, four main types of infiltration by 
organized crime were observed in Quebec during the years covered by the Commission’s 
mandate: (1) infiltration of companies and industry sectors; (2) control of territories; (3) 
the provision of mediation and intimidation services; and (4) access to a trade union’s 
investment capital (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). The vulnerabilities of the 
construction industry will also be described to explain how organized crime infiltrated 
the industry. 
3.1.1 Key Findings (Overview on Private Sector Corruption) 
The Commission uncovered numerous cases of private sector corruption, particularly in 
Montréal, Laval and Montréal’s North Shore. The testimony also revealed instances 
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where an engineering firm provided privileged information to a contractor so that it could 
win a tender by bidding low, but then increase its profits with claims for extras made 
possible by “unbalancing the statement,” where the quantities entered in the statements 
are simultaneously underestimated and overestimated (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). 
This example is also known as bid rigging. The Charbonneau Commission (2015, page 
number) describe the various ways in which bid rigging can take place: 
The company chosen to win the bid solicitation notifies the complicit companies 
of the amount above which they must bid. These complicit companies then 
submit bids of convenience, i.e., bids that cannot win the contract because they 
will not be the lowest. They may also submit bids that are not compliant with the 
specifications or requirements of the public contracting authority. It is obvious 
here that tendering processes whose award criterion is based on the lowest 
compliant tender produce readily foreseeable results that can be easily 
manipulated by a group of colluding companies. The mafia members can also 
refrain from responding to a call for tenders, leaving the way open for their 
previously designated accomplice.  The company chosen to win the contract 
compensates those that withdraw from the tendering process or submit bids of 
convenience by offering them subcontracts, supply contracts, or money. Members 
of the mafia can also share the market (by type of work, customer, or 
geographical area) and agree not to bid, at least competitively, in the markets 
assigned to other mafia partners. This is a case of “to each his market,” with 
competition reduced to a minimum. 
To organize bid rigging, the colluding companies must obviously have reached an 
agreement beforehand. The schemes relate to the communications between the members 
of a collusion system: secret meetings and coded messages to inform the accomplices of 
the threshold above which they must tender. The frequency of communications depends 
on the type of arrangement between the colluders. In systems based on territory sharing, 
communications may become less frequent once the ground rules have been established; 
a tacit understanding between the partners perpetuates the collusion system. Systems 
based on a distribution of market share involve more frequent exchanges, however. In the 
case of one-time agreements, the actor wishing to organize the bid-rigging must know the 
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identity of the competitors interested in bidding on a given contract (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2015, p xx). 
The second type of scheme is aimed at closing the market. To prevent one or 
more companies outside the mafia from participating in a call to tenders, and thus 
jeopardizing the effectiveness of the collusion agreement, colluders must resort to 
schemes designed to eliminate or discourage competition. Other possibilities include a 
member of the mafia who has a commercial relationship with a competitor refusing to 
sell that company the materials (or lease the equipment) it needs for its bid or offering 
them at an exorbitant price, leaving the competitor either unable to submit a bid or unable 
to bid at a competitive price. Meanwhile, the mafia member sells the same product at a 
discount to his accomplices (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). 
3.1.1.1 Infiltration of companies and industry sectors  
The mafia enters construction industry markets mainly by taking over existing 
companies. These takeovers may occur when companies in difficulty turn to “alternative” 
financing sources that are controlled by criminal groups.  
Testimony revealed that a heavily indebted land decontamination company fell 
under the control of individuals linked to the mafia. These individuals targeted a family 
business that needed capital to upgrade its equipment. Realizing that he was losing 
control of his business, the owner attempted to reject the Rizzuto representative. He then 
became the victim of threats, intimidation, theft, and mischief. The same individual 
infiltrated another masonry company by demanding commissions of 5% and then 10% of 
the value of contracts. Through his union contacts, he obtained competency cards that he 
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subsequently sold to employees. He convinced the owner to buy a competitor’s business 
with cash. His aim was to create a mafia in the masonry industry (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2015). 
3.1.1.2 Control of territories  
Territorial control or control of an industry is an essential element in business 
racketeering. The desire to exercise greater control over a territory and its economic 
activities may therefore be one of the motivations of organized crime to infiltrate the 
construction industry (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). The testimony revealed two 
cases of criminal individuals who sought to control a sector of the construction industry 
in a certain territory, notably through intimidation, including acts of violence.  
At the end of the 2000s, the owner of two construction companies in the Abitibi 
region operated with the consent of the Rizzuto’s and used intimidation and violence to 
eliminate competing companies. One competitor was unable to complete a paving job at 
Val-d’Or because the criminal contractor had threatened its suppliers. The latter also 
burned the building and garage of a second paving company to prevent it from 
completing a contract. Around 2010, the head of a criminal network based in the Eastern 
Townships owned a company specializing in the installation of culverts. To remove his 
competitors, he asked accomplices to burn down pipe suppliers. A company that suffered 
nearly $1 million in damages saw its insurance premiums rise sharply. For several 
months, no competing company dared to bid on the same tenders as the criminal 
contractor (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). 
3.1.1.3 Mediation and intimidation services  
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Organized crime also infiltrated the construction industry by offering certain services to 
companies that were participating in illicit agreements. These services mainly involved 
resolving disputes between members of a collusion system or maintaining collusion by 
intimidating outside firms seeking access to a market. A clear example of this was when 
contractors paid a 2.5% pizzo on contracts obtained from the City to a mafia-type 
criminal organization (Charbonneau Commission 2015).Participants obviously made use 
of such intermediaries to avoid incriminating themselves by appealing to the police or the 
justice system to arbitrate disputes linked to illegal collusion (Charbonneau Commission, 
2015). 
The RCMP’s Operation Colisée (police operation that specifically investigated 
the Montreal Mafia) found that several construction contractors frequented a social club 
that was the headquarters of the Sicilian Rizzuto clan. Sixty-four-year-old construction 
executive Nicolo Milioto (founding member of Mivela construction) and known as “Mr. 
sidewalk”, made frequent cash payments there. Milioto was picked up by RCMP 
cameras visiting the Consenza Social Club 236 times in two years. Considered a close 
friend of the mafia, this individual used intimidation to remove businesses from the 
sidewalk market, which was limited in Montréal to a small group of entrepreneurs from 
Sicily. Milioto stated the following in his testimony: “I’m not a member of organized 
crime, I’m a member of a company, Mivela construction, that Ifounded…to make a life 
for my family. Because I did a favor for someone you suggest is the head of the Mafia, 
you’ve brought down 45 years of work I did for my family”. (). Milioto 
denied testimony that he was responsible for collecting a 2.5 percent "tax" payable to the 
Mob from Montreal-area construction entrepreneurs who won city contracts. Milioto 
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explained the following in his testimony: “You suggest that I’m a member of the Mafia. 
It never crossed my mind. A member of the Mafia doesn’t work 70 hours a week. I’ve 
worked two jobs to provide for my family. I am not a part of organized crime”. (). 
 
Milioto's name has come up in the testimony of numerous witnesses who have 
appeared before the commission. The RCMP described Milioto as the intermediary 
between the industry and organized crime. Milioto admitted to taking money from 
Zambito and delivering it to Nicolo Rizzuto Sr., but claims he was simply making a 
delivery and didn't know what the money was for. Milioto has also admitted to having 
friendships with the Rizzuto family, who hail from the same small village in Sicily where 
he was born. He told the commission that he had no business dealings with the Mob, 
but he had received a loan from Rizzuto Sr. because it was easier than going to the bank. 
Milioto’s testimony reveals this information in more detail: "I don’t pay interest. That 
could be a reason. It’s easier," (). Milioto stated this as he was questioned on why he 
shoved a stack of cash into his sock after it was handed to him by Rizzuto Sr. This 
incident was caught on video by police surveillance during Operation Colisee. Milioto 
advised he brought cash to the Cosenza, but said it was only for one of two reasons: He 
was delivering it for Zambito or it was cash collected for a social club. A video was 
presented to Milioto that revealed him taking cash from Rizzuto. Milioto explained this 
by stating the following: “Mr. Rizzuto could have asked me to do him a favor and gave 
me $100 or $200 …. It’s possible he gave it to me to do an errand — buy something for 
him. I don’t remember why he gave me money. Was it the time he loaned me money? I 
don’t remember” ().Milioto later changed his testimony and advised the commission that 
the money may have been given to him for the construction of his house or for the 
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marriage of his daughter. However, he later admitted that the timing of these events did 
not line up with the date of the video recording, which was December 24, 2004. Milioto 
went on to explain that it could have possibly been a loan. Commission prosecutor Sonia 
LeBel questioned Milioto on this: “Instead of going to a bank, you went to see Mr. 
Rizzuto, known godfather of the Montreal Mafia, at the Consenza which is their meeting 
place, to borrow $25,000 and put it in your socks, is that right?” ().Milioto defended 
himself by stating that he couldn’t remember what happened exactly as it had taken place 
8 years ago (at that time). When asked further about his dealings with the Mafia, Milioto 
stated the following: “I have no idea what the Mafia is," Milioto said. "Is it someone who 
kills? Someone who steals? Someone who traffics drugs? I don’t know” ().Milioto’s 
vague responses have elicited some heated exchanges between the witness and 
Commission prosecutor Sonia LeBel. The following is an exchange between the two: 
 
You don’t talk about business with Mr. Rizzuto. You don’t know what he does 
for a living. You don’t know how he makes his money. You don’t know why Mr. 
Zambito was giving him money. You don’t know why Mr. Zambito had to … 
you don’t know what the Mafia is. The ‘pizzo’ is an urban legend as far as you’re 
concerned. You can borrow from the bank. You don’t talk about anything when 
you’re playing cards, but you trust him enough to borrow $25,000. You are 
president of a company that does [$8] million in business but you want to save a 
couple bucks in interest, is that what we’re to understand? (LeBel, 2012,) 
 
Milioto responded by simply stating the following: “You’re sitting down. The money’s 
there. You ask, ‘Can you loan me $25,000 for two or three months?' It’s like a favor. You 
see, I did a lot of favors for them, errands and things” ().  
 
Testimonies also revealed that Francesco Del Baso (lieutenant of the Rizzuto 
crime family) made threatening calls to Martin Carrier (the head of a company that works 
on tiles, marble, granite, and ceramics for commercial buildings in Québec City) to 
P a g e 	|	74	
discourage him from bidding on a tender in the Montréal ceramics sector (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2015). Carrier bid on and won a lucrative contract at a Montreal university 
in 2003 that a Montreal-based competitor, Francesco Bruno, had expected to win as part 
of a small circle of construction firms that rigged government contracts with the 
oversight of the Mafia. The contract was awarded to Carrier’s firm in mid-January 2004. 
A few days later, while driving his daughter to a guitar lesson on a Saturday morning, his 
mobile telephone rang. The caller would not identify himself but stated the following: 
“We would like it if you don’t come here (Montreal) anymore to work,” he told Carrier. 
“The next time you won’t be leaving.” Carrier would learn only in 2006 after a major 
anti-Mafia operation that the caller was Francesco Del Balso. The Montreal Mafia told an 
investigator for the Charbonneau corruption inquiry that the phone call was made on 
orders from Nicolo Rizzuto Sr. Del Balso called again a month later in what Carrier 
described as a brief, one-sided conversation: “You didn’t listen. You were warned. It’s 
over,” Carrier was told. Carrier continued with his profession after this and still bid on 
contracts. Eventually, Carrier ended up  
receiving a terrifying piece of correspondence at his office: a pink envelope with a card 
inside. It was a condolence card. Written inside was an unsigned message: “Dear friend, 
if you continue to bid (on contracts) in Montreal, this is the kind of card that we will be 
sending to your family.” 
Giuseppe Borsellino testified that he was severely beaten by three men in 2009. 
When asked why he thought this beating occurred, Borsellino believed it was related to a 
construction project or unpaid debts. Borsellino admitted he did not report the attack to 
the police.  Prosecutor Simon Tremblay offered two theories as to why this beating may 
have taken place: One was that Borsellino’s actions might have forced a top official in 
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the city’s public works department to resign when it was learned that Borsellino had paid 
the official’s way to Italy. The second theory was that Borsellino didn’t pick Raynald 
Desjardin’s (top associate of Rizzuto family) construction firm, Energie Carboneutre, for 
decontamination work at one of the construction sites. Borsellino did not elaborate on the 
beating any farther but did admit he had once been a political contributor. However, he 
claims he halted his donations in the late 2000s. When asked on this, Borsellino 
explained: “It was not ethical” (). 
The Rizzuto clan also had close relationships with several contractors active in 
the residential construction industry. It provided mediation services between contractors 
involved in the project to convert a building in Old Montréal into luxury condominiums. 
The mafia also had links with the head of one of the largest groups of construction 
companies in Quebec. Vito Rizzuto and his son Nick frequented this individual’s 
restaurant in Laval and contacted him via intermediaries, in an apparent effort to outwit 
police surveillance. RCMP investigators witnessed this corporate leader hug the head of 
the Montréal mafia. One contractor reported that Vito Rizzuto mediated a dispute over a 
collusion agreement for the Acadie roundabout contract (Charbonneau Commission, 
2015). 
3.1.1.4 Access to a trade union’s investment capital  
The Charbonneau Commission attempted to investigate the social links between FTQ 
officials and Vito Rizzuto by questioning Ken Pereira (union boss of FTQ construction). 
With six hundred thousand members and billions of dollars’ worth of investments in 
Solidarity Fund, the FTQ was Quebec’s largest labour federation and a major player in 
the province’s construction world. At the time of the inquiry, Quebec had a unionization 
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rate of 39.9 percent, compared with 31.5 percent for Canada as a whole. The rate was 27 
percent in Britain and 12 percent in the USA. The significance of this is that there were 
plenty of dues to collect and invest into in Quebec (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015). Several 
individuals linked to the mafia sought to infiltrate the construction industry by obtaining 
access to the investment funds of the Solidarity Fund and its real estate arm (SOLIM). To 
do so, they established a relationship with the general manager of FTQ-Construction 
(Jean Lavalee), whom they asked to pressure his colleagues to fund some of their 
projects (a land decontamination company, properties including a strip club, a hotel 
tableware company, and a marina. The electricians’ retirement fund run by the president 
of the FTQ-Construction also invested in the construction of a residential building in 
which all units were purchased by members of the Montréal mafia, union leaders and a 
major construction contractor (Charbonneau Commission, 2015).  
The testimony given by Ken Pereira revealed that a prominent Montréal mafia 
figure known as Jocelyn Dupuis introduced himself as the “boss” of the general manager 
of FTQ-Construction and that he had come up with a plan whereby he and his 
accomplices would take control of the union by ousting the then-president. In the 
November 2008 union elections, the director general of FTQ-Construction (Dupuis) 
called on members of the Hells Angels to ensure that his cohorts (Dupuis-backed 
candidates) won all the leadership positions.  Dupuis built a relationship with the Hells 
Angels by rebuilding the Chambly strip club after it was burned down. The Chambly 
strip club was owned by a Hells Angels associate. Dupuis was then spotted at Hells 
Angels’ wet t-shirt parties and socialized with Normand (Casper) Ouimet of the Hells 
Angels’ Trois-Rivieres chapter. The goal in those elections was to gain access to the 
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boards of directors of the Solidarity Fund and its real estate arm. This resulted in a rival 
candidate quitting the race after a show of force by the Hells Angels (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2015). Pereira went on to state that Dupuis was very open about his social 
connections. On Dupuis’s wall was a photo of union organizer Giovanni Bertolo, who 
was a former drug trafficker for Vito Rizzuto. Pereira was eventually able to break into 
an FTQ accountant’s office and took six months’ worth of expenses filed by Dupuis. 
Pereira stated he was offered a Mercedes for his silence, but he declined (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2015). 
 Vulnerabilities of Construction Sector 
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain the vulnerability of the construction 
industry to organized crime. The Charbonneau Commission revealed the weaknesses 
exploited by some bidders to manipulate the public contract awarding process. These 
vulnerabilities are as follows: (i) size of the industry, (ii) required skill needed to become 
involved, (iii) difficulty to detect, (iv) financial vulnerability, and (v) natural 
susceptibility to violence.  
The size of the industry makes it an attractive target. In 2013, in Quebec alone 
approximately $48 billion was spent on public and private construction contracts. Public 
contracts valued at more than $7 billion are awarded annually through competitive 
bidding. This does not include smaller contracts awarded by mutual agreement. 
According to Mike Amato, an officer with the York Regional Police Criminal 
Intelligence Service, criminal organizations have clearly understood the potential for 
enrichment represented by public contracts (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). 
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Some types of construction work do not require a skilled workforce or the use of 
advanced technologies, and this facilitates penetration by organized crime. The 
Commission observed that the influence of persons linked to organized crime is more 
evident in low-skill industries such as sidewalk construction (Montréal), paving (Abitibi) 
and the installation of culverts (Eastern Townships), than in sectors requiring more in-
depth knowledge, such as engineering. According to a police census conducted in 2010, 
75% of Hells Angels members owned companies in industries that did not require 
advanced expertise, including construction (Charbonneau Commission, 2015).  
Given the nature of the industry, it may be difficult for public authorities to 
identify the presence of organized crime. The Régie du bâtiment du Québec (RBQ) is a 
key player in this respect, since the licenses it administers are “the gateway to the legal 
economy in the construction industry” and a bulwark against the infiltration of organized 
crime. In 2013, there were more than 40,000 holders of licenses issued by the RBQ. The 
Building Act authorizes the RBQ to refuse to issue a license, or to suspend or cancel a 
license, if it finds that the licensee is lending his name to another person. Detecting the 
presence of front men among tens of thousands of licensees is not an easy task, however. 
This offence does not carry personal penalties for the individuals who act as front men, 
or for those who benefit from the scheme. Huguette Labelle and Paul Lalonde, 
representatives of Transparency International Canada, noted that it is often difficult to 
identify the actual owners of businesses, whether they are in Canada or elsewhere. 
Organized crime takes advantage of this situation, and companies may fall under its 
control without the knowledge of authorities. For example, the environment department 
analyst responsible for the file of a company specializing in the rehabilitation of 
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contaminated lands was unaware of the existence of an operating agreement between that 
company and another one owned by individuals close to the mafia (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2015).  
Construction firms that sometimes have difficulty borrowing money from 
traditional financial institutions may be tempted to obtain the funds they need more 
quickly by contacting members of organized crime. The latter often have access to 
parallel networks, private lenders or non-bank financial institutions. In addition, they can 
afford to grant or guarantee riskier loans, since they have ways to ensure repayment 
beyond what is provided for by law. They are therefore able to offer entrepreneurs 
financing services, which can be an attractive factor in the industry. An example of this 
phenomenon was presented during the Commission’s hearings regarding a project to 
convert a derelict warehouse in Old Montréal into a luxury residential building. After 
filing a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and an application under the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the contractor and the developer received help 
from the Rizzuto clan. The mafia godfather used his network of contacts to find new 
sources of funding. Members of his family made excellent profits in return. The 
Commission notes furthermore the problem of delays in the payment of contractors’ 
invoices by public contracting authorities. Payment terms can average four months. This 
creates a lack of liquidity for contractors who, with insufficient financial resources, may 
be tempted to resort to non-traditional sources of financing (Charbonneau Commission, 
2015). Some sectors of the construction industry, such as masonry, include a great many 
small companies. These companies often do not have permanent premises, their situation 
is precarious, and they have little financial room to manoeuvre. They are generally more 
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susceptible to infiltration by organized crime as they have limited assets or security to 
offer, which considerably impedes their ability to obtain financing. Organized crime can 
use them to launder money, or simply target them for extortion and intimidation. The 
Commission found that a member of a mafia-type criminal organization infiltrated two 
small masonry companies. This individual had little trouble gaining access using threats 
and gang insignia (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). 
Throughout the Commission’s hearings, witnesses reported cases of vandalism, 
theft, arson, bombings, intimidation, threats and physical assaults. When workers leave 
construction sites at the end of the day, equipment and materials are often left on the 
premises, which are sometimes located in sparsely populated areas where they are 
subject to minimal surveillance. All of this makes them vulnerable to vandalism. 
Permanent facilities, such as offices or warehouses, may also be targeted, as occurred in 
the case of culvert pipe suppliers in the Eastern Townships that the head of a criminal 
network tried to force into bankruptcy. The Commission observed that in Val-d’Or, a 
paving contractor, who was also a highly placed criminal in a narcotics ring, succeeded 
in restricting competition in the business through violence and intimidation. A member 
of organized crime who was associated with a decontamination company demanded that 
a competitor close his business. In the Eastern Townships, a couple of culvert 
entrepreneurs who were associated with an organized criminal network used arson to 
force a competitor into bankruptcy. These acts of violence can be effective, at least in the 
short term. According to one witness, paving prices in Val-d’Or were 30% higher than in 
a neighbouring town, mainly due to the control of a criminal contractor (Charbonneau 
Commission, 2015). 
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To conclude, the vulnerabilities within the construction industry are plentiful. 
Perhaps the biggest vulnerability was that many of the labourers and business owners in 
the construction industry were Italian. This made it easy for the Italian mafia to establish 
connections and relationships with these people because they could relate to their shared 
cultural backgrounds and experiences.  
3.2 Brief Overview of the Italian Mafia in Montreal (The Rizzuto Mafia 
Family) 
The Rizzuto’s pursuit for power started with the life of Nicolo Rizzuto (Vito’s father). 
Nicolo’s importance to the criminal underworld in Montreal is illustrated below by 
Edwards & Nicaso (2015, 16): 
Nicolo Rizzuto was a semi-literate, one-time South American chicken farmer who 
had managed to create a government within a government in Montreal. He had 
pulled himself from a relatively humble birth in Sicily through hard scheming, 
contacts, travel, innovation, good fortune, risk taking, marriage and murder. 
Despite running several construction-related companies, and even more 
politicians and police officers, Nicolo retained a certain common touch. When he 
collected money in a backroom of the Consenza Social Club in Saint-Leonard, he 
sometimes tucked a wad of cash into a sock for safekeeping. There, between a 
cheese shop and a tanning salon, mobsters sipped espresso, settled disputes, and 
accepted tributes from associates in the underworld and the world of ostensibly 
legitimate business…Even when things got rough, Nicolo maintained his ability 
to wink at the world, as though everything was under control. He courted the 
image of Mafia don and was seldom seen in public without a sweeping 
Hollywood-style fedora on his bald head. 
 
It was on February 1, 1954, that Nicolo arrived in Canada with Vito at Pier 21 in Halifax. 
Not long after this, the Montreal city records list had Nicolo’s occupation as a “cement 
contractor” in 1956. By 1958, he was a major player in Montreal’s construction world. It 
is believed this success came because of the corruption and collusion schemes that 
Nicolo was using. This is illustrated by Edwards & Nicaso (2015, 18): 
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He ran his own firm yet somehow borrowed $1,777.50 from a rival contractor, 
and he won a municipal contract despite not being the low bidder. His company, 
Grand Royal Asphalt Paving, was involved in bidding with the city of Montreal, 
winning a contract in January 1962 to make over Parc Masson. His paving firm 
also worked for the municipalities of Laval, Pierrefonds, and Saint-Leonard. The 
city of Jacques-Cartier (now part of Longueuil, on the south shore) was 
considered particularly corrupt, and Nicolo made money there too. 
 
The success of his Grand Royal Asphalt Paving did not appear to line up with the 
much smaller number of government contracts for projects like sidewalks and sewer 
repairs in those years. Also, of suspicion, in September 1966, Nicolo and his half-brother 
Liborio Milioto were officials with Franco Electric Inc., even though records show that 
they had no background in electric work at all (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015). By 1967, 
Nicolo was a partner in four construction-related firms and had secured construction 
work on the Expo 67 world’s fair in Montreal. It was through the business that Nicolo 
eventually became introduced to Paolo Violi and Vic (The Egg) Cotroni (Nicolo’s mob 
counterparts and individuals who were a part of the Calabrian Mafia faction). Nicolo’s 
success continued to rise as he began expanding the members in his clan. Nicolo Rizzuto 
began sponsoring many Agrigento residents to move to his new city, expanding his 
financial base too, bringing heroin to Montreal by boat and then transporting it to New 
York by car. The 1960s was also a time of mass migration out of Sicily’s Agrigento 
province. Nicolo became reacquainted with members of the Cuntrera-Caruana clan, who 
were originally from Siculiana, just twenty-four kilometers from Cattolica Eraclea 
(where Nicolo was born and raised). This clan was known as the Siculiana crime family, 
and Nicolo was sponsoring members to come to Montreal to expand his workforce and 
empire.  
 It was through these sponsorships that Nicolo hosted Tommaso Buscetta in 1969. 
Buscetta was an important Mafia figure as he had helped set up the Sicilian Mafia 
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Commission, which ruled upon disputes between members. His associates included top-
level New York mob figures Charles (Lucky) Luciano and Joe Bonanno (Edwards & 
Nicaso, 2015).  During his time in Montreal, Buscetta picked up on tensions between 
Nicolo Rizzuto and Paolo Violi. Nicolo advised Buscetta that he had been “called for an 
appointment” of the Montreal decina, a branch of the Bonanno crime family, that was 
headed by Vic Cotroni and Paolo Violi. Nicolo believed the meeting would be a ploy to 
murder him.  The history between these two individuals is illustrated below by Edwards 
& Nicaso (2015, 22): 
Nicolo and Violi had been rivals in the old decina of Vic (The Egg) Cotroni, back 
when Vic the Egg was the Canadian branch plant manager for the Bonanno 
family of New York. Nicolo could barely stomach being under Vic Cotroni in the 
Montreal mob pecking order, and when Cotroni promoted his fellow Calabrian 
Violi above Rizzuto, Nicolo responded with a haughty grandeur. The prospect of 
being under two Calabrians was too much to countenance. He didn’t just disobey 
Violi; he refused even to acknowledge his existence. Tensions were so high 
between Paolo Violi and Nicolo that Giuseppe Settescasi, head of the Agrigento 
crime family, travelled to Montreal in 1972 to mediate, with no success.  Later 
that year, when Violi could Nicolo’s insolence no longer, he asked the Bonannos 
for permission to kill him. The Bonannos initially balked, then relented. Wise to 
the conversation happening behind his back, Nicolo slipped away to Venezula, 
where he could bide his time and extend his contacts. 
 
Once Nicolo started settling in Venezuela at the end of 1972, he became involved 
in the drug trafficking business with the Cuntrera-Caruanas.  Nicolo and his associates 
worked their way into the country’s economic and political life, to the point where the 
American Drug Enforcement Administration intelligence noted that president Carlos 
Andres Perez attended the wedding of a Cuntrera Caruana clan member (Edwards and 
Nicaso, 2015).  Even though Nicolo was in Venezuela, his criminal empire continued to 
grow: 
It wasn’t the product but the profit that mattered, and they also smuggled powered 
milk into Venezuela. Importing powered milk was illegal and profitable, and they 
seized the opportunity to make extra money. Tommaso Buscetta also spent much 
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time with Nicolo in Venezuela throughout the 1970s. Police believed the pair was 
involved together in a business called Brasil Italian Import, which was a front for 
narcotics trafficking. Perhaps Nicolo’s most lucrative business at the time was a 
cattle-breeding ranch called Granaderia Rio Zapa in the Venezuelan state of 
Barinas, near the Colombian border. His partners there included Salvatore 
(Cicchiteddu) Greco, head of the Commission of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and a 
close associate of senior members of the Gambino crime family of New York 
City. Conveniently-especially for cattle ranch-Granaderia Rio Zapa had its own 
private airstrip (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015, 25). 
 
Nicole stayed in Venezuela for six months and a day at a time, which he thought was 
long enough to excuse him from having to pay taxes to Canada for the money he was 
making in Venezuela. Through the Rizzuto’s growing criminal enterprise in Venezuela, 
they were also able to obtain documents from Aruba that stated their money had been 
legally won in a casino there.  Edwards and Nicaso (2015) explain the significance of 
this: “Aruba was a popular spot for the Mafia, as it was close to the northern shores of 
Columbia and Venezuela. It also attracted thousands of tourists, who made it easy to get 
lost in the crowds and profitable to set up businesses such as hotels and casinos to grab 
the money visitors were all too happy to throw away” (26). It wasn’t long after the 
Rizzuto’s became established in Venezuela that Paolo Violi was killed back in Montreal 
on January 22, 1978. Edwards and Nicaso (2015) highlight the significance of this 
event… “the evening one of Nicolo’s men put a shotgun to the back of Paolo Violi’s 
head. That murder came at 7:32 p.m., a time marked with a floral tribute at Violi’s 
funeral. That pull of the trigger, as Violi sat playing cards with supposed friends at the 
Reggio Bar at 5880 Jean-in Saint Leonard, marked the culmination of the Violi’s feud 
with Nicolo and the beginning of the Rizzuto family’s era at the top level of Canadian 
organized crime”(27). 
The destruction from the Rizzuto family would not end there. Killings ordered by the 
Rizzutoscontinued with the slaying of Violi’s consigliere Pietro (Zio Petrino, “Uncle 
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Pete”) in 1976. The Rizzutos were still in Venezuela a year later when Violi’s brother 
Francesco was shot dead in the office of his Montreal import-export business. The last 
major shot fired in the war between the Rizzutos and the Violis came in 1980, with the 
sniper slaying of Rocco Violi. With business taken care of, the Rizzutos would make 
their way back to Montreal and their power would continue to grow with Vito’s 
increasing involvement with criminal operations.  
 Vito’s influence in the criminal underworld was assisted early on by a man named 
Raynald Desjardins (trusted associate of Nicolo). Vito met Desjardins through Nicolo’s 
contacts. Edwards & Nicaso (2015) explain the relationship the two had: “They had 
known each other since the early 1970’s, and within a decade Desjardins was like a 
younger brother to Vito…Back then, Vito and Desjardins brought in literally tonnes of 
hashish from Lebanon and Spain through Newfoundland and then washed the profits in 
Swiss banks. For at least a decade, the terms “loyal” and “right-hand man” precisely 
described Desjardin’s relationship to Vito” 
 (33).Vito and Desjardins were also partly responsible for what was known as the “Pizza  
Connection”.  Lamothe & Humphreys (2014, 98-99) explain how this helped grow the 
profits of the Rizzutos and organized crime: 
Despite the seemingly interminable delays, the mob had secured Montreal in time 
to allow the Sicilian expatriate clans on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border to 
put the final pieces together in what would become the Pizza Connection. This 
drug-smuggling and distribution enterprise brought in high-quality heroin that 
had been processed in clandestine laboratories in Sicily. Much of it was 
channeled through Canada and sent on to New York, where it was distributed 
through storefront retailers, many of them pizzeria owners for whom the 
restaurants were legitimate fronts that hid their criminal activity. The billion-
dollar Pizza Connection would go on to eclipse the famed heroin rings of the past, 
including French Connection. And, like its antecedent, it was really a system of 
intersecting, meandering routes that at once competed and complemented each 
other. 
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The end of the Rizzuto-Violi feud brought two major changes that helped Vito grow in 
the criminal underworld. The first was it helped Vito return to Montreal from Venezuela. 
The second was an increase in drug activity and profits for Rizzuto (Lamothe & 
Humphreys, 2014). The above statements are further supported by an internal Canadian 
police intelligence report from 1990: 
After the Paolo Violi murder, the Sicilians took the dominant role in Montreal. 
The Sicilians quickly and quietly began a large drug importing operation.  They 
transformed the port of Montreal into the gateway to North America for hashish 
shipments from Pakistan and Lebanon and large heroin shipments from Sicily and 
Thailand. They sold most of their heroin in New York and New Jersey (). 
 
Desjardins would continue to help Vito by helping him forge ties with the Hells Angels 
Motorcycle Club and French-Canadian Gangs.  Rizzuto would establish many 
connections with various groups during this time. This is outlined by Lamothe & 
Humphreys (2014): “If the changing of the guard was slow to manifest itself on the 
streets of Montreal, it was strikingly evident elsewhere. The Rizzutos were active with 
major Sicilian Mafiosi, South American drug lords and leading New York gangsters in 
the years immediately after Violi’s murder. The Sixth family seemed content to 
concentrate on building its international infrastructure, shoring up its networks and 
conducting private business until Montreal was formally cleared for them” (100).  
 
More and more people started following Vito after the passing of Violi and 
Cotroni. The changing dynamics of relationships that Vito helped shape is illustrated 
below: 
With Cotroni’s passing, the Rizzutos’ control over Montreal was complete. The 
rank-and-file members and associates of the Mafia quickly fell into line, easily 
flipping their allegiance and answering as smartly and respectfully to the Rizzutos 
as they had to Cotroni and Violi. Leslie Coleman, for instance, had been a young 
enforcer for Luigi Greco in the 1950s and was “inherited” by Violi when Greco 
died. After the deaths of Violi and Cotroni, Coleman was frequently seen flexing 
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his muscles besides members of the Rizzuto organization. Similarly, Joe 
DiMaulo, who was such a close and personal part of Violi’s inner circle that Violi 
asked him to represent the entire Montreal organization in meetings with the 
Bonanno leadership in New York, seemed just as content to ply his trade under 
the Rizzuto banner. Most surprising to many, even the remnants of the Cotroni 
family bowed to Nick and Vito Rizzuto (Lamothe & Humphreys, 2014, 101). 
 
Desjardins also helped Vito with running vending machine businesses in the 1980s and 
had made considerable money from this as well as jukeboxes in the 1960s.  Income was 
easy to hide from Revenue Canada, as these operations were cash driven (Edwards & 
Nicaso, 2015).  Vito and Desjardins continued to work together as illustrated by Edwards 
& Nicaso (2015, 34):  
Vito and Desjardins clicked on a business level. In 1984 they were seen together 
in Milan, organizing the importation of 3.5 tons of hash. Their schemes only got 
bigger. In 1987 police believed the pair were organizing a 30-tonne shipment…as 
a team, Vito and Desjardins flooded the country with drugs by air as well as by 
water. In May 1989, they were behind the flying in of five hundred kilos of 
cocaine from Columbia. Their ongoing relationship was certainly a profitable 
one. 
 
Desjardins became the highest-ranking Quebecois in the Montreal mob, but he was still 
considered an outsider to the Italian Mafia. For all his support given to Vito, he remained 
a junior partner to Vito. Eventually, the partnership would end with Desjardins taking the 
fall in a massive cocaine-smuggling plot that sent him to prison for a decade. Despite 
this, Vito’s status continued to rise in the criminal underworld: “Vito simply carried on 
with a string of new right-hand men, including his childhood friend Valentino Morielli 
and lawyer Joseph Lagana. Like Desjardins, they eventually went to prison for their 
dealings with Vito, while Vito kept gliding along. Soon the media was calling Vito “The 
Teflon Don,” a moniker first used for John Gotti, boss of New York’s Gambino crime 
family, back when he seemed impossible to convict” (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015, 35). 
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Although the Rizzutos were gaining considerable power and influence in the 
criminal underworld, there were still a few obstacles in the way. Johnny (Pops) Papalia (a 
prominent mafia figure in Ontario) was shot and killed by a man named Ken Murdock. 
Papalia was named as a key Canadian under the wing of the Buffalo mob. Less than two 
months after Papalia’s murder on May 31, 1997, his lieutenant Carmen Barillaro was also 
shot dead by Ken Murdock. Neither killing was directly traced to Vito. Vito’s role and 
relationship to the murderers is explained in the following manner: “In the late nineties, 
Vito was seeking to cut links to the American La Cosa Nostra and create a Canadian-
Based Mafia that was no longer an appendix of the US organization. On October 22, 
1997, four months after the Papalia murder, Vito met with fifteen men he considered 
loyalists in a Woodbridge restaurant, including Murdock’s one-time boss, Passquale (Pat) 
Musitano of Hamilton” (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015, 105). Musitano and his younger 
brother Angelo were charged with two counts each of first-degree murder for the Papalia 
and Barillaro hits. Vito’s name was left out of the court proceedings. Other bodes that fell 
dead in Ontario included Papalia’s close friend Enio Mora of Toronto. These deaths 
opened more opportunities for Vito to do business in Ontario.  This statement is 
explained by Edwards & Nicaso (2015): “The removal from the scene of Papalia, 
Barillaro and Mora certainly helped Vito create more space for his own independent 
crime family in Canada, free from the stumbling Bonanno family of New York. While 
politicians in Vito’s home province talked for generations about separation from English-
speaking Canada, Vito was making his own version of Quebec independence a reality, 
except he wanted to take Ontario with him. And the Bonannos were in no position to 
resist his inter-provincial power play” (105). 
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Because of the actions described above, Vito called a meeting at a north Toronto 
restaurant in January of 2001. Invited guests included a broad cross-section of Mafia 
groups, including members of the Ndrangheta (Toronto based clans of the Calabrian 
Mafia), the Gambino crime family, the Buffalo mob and local Sicilian mobsters. This 
meeting was utilized to further criminal operations and showcased the 
mediator/brokerage role that Vito always took on: 
Vito recognized a power vacuum in the Toronto area, and he was going to fill it 
with help from associates. He had clearly broken away from the Bonanno crime 
family and wanted to go from being a strong player in Ontario to the province’s 
dominant force. It went without saying that no one person at the table had to the 
power to stop him. Vito pushed into Ontario, setting up an ecstasy ring in the 
Toronto, Mississauga, Bolton and Barrie areas and hydroponic marijuana grow 
operation on a farm outside Barrie. At the same time, Vito oversaw the formation 
of a high-tech gambling ring that worked through video rental stores, bookies 
with portable computers and gas stations and took in some two hundred million 
dollars’ worth of sports bets per year in Hamilton, Ottawa, the GTA and Montreal 
for wagering on professional football, basketball and hockey, US college sports 
and horse racing (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015, 111). 
 
The above events and criminal operations described helped Vito become a prominent 
figure in the world of organized crime. Vito helped orchestrate the shipment and 
reception of narcotics that would bring considerable profit to the Rizzutos. It was through 
Vito’s connections and his role as a broker that helped him infiltrate organized crime 
across Canada and the United States.  
 
3.3. The Italian Mafia’s Role in Corruption 
The Montreal Mafia did not have to invest much in construction and real-estate deals. 
Nonetheless, it gained a significant profit by the time the projects were completed. 
The Charbonneau Commission has been investigating the power and role of the Mafia in 
the major real-estate deals and the role-played by Mafia boss Vito Rizzuto. Vito Rizzuto 
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was in jail for much of the era covered by the inquiry. There are no concrete accounts of 
him ever taking a cut of construction companies' profits. However, his late father, Nick 
Sr., was repeatedly seen on police surveillance video, rubbing elbows with certain 
construction contractors, counting cash, and stuffing the money in his socks. His son, 
Nick Jr., worked in the construction industry before he was gunned down in 2009.  An 
inquiry investigator testified about organized crime activities regarding the construction 
industry in Montreal. The industry was considered a low-risk investment that reaped a 
significant reward. Eric Vecchio, a Montreal police officer, claimed Rizzuto and other 
mobsters were never front-line players with a direct financial stake. Rather, the Rizzuto’s 
stayed on the sidelines, acting as consultants and deal-brokers while they picked up a 
piece of the profits. “Organized crime (takes) a profit from the construction industry,” 
Vecchio said. “In the end, they don’t really get involved, they don’t invest any of their 
own money, but they take away a consultant’s or arbiter’s fee” (Banerjee, 2014, The 
Toronto Star, p.1).  
 The Charbonneau Commission inquiry uncovered more information on the 
corruption case when testimonies revealed that Gilles Surprenant (the city engineer for 
Montreal) obtained a one percent cut from construction companies on the value of the 
contracts for his bid-rigging services. Another 2 and a half percent went to the Mafia and 
3 percent to the Union Montreal party. Surprenant himself oversaw the project budgets, 
and as Lino Zambito testified, the price tags grew over the years. After Surprenant had 
drawn up a contract, contractors would meet him to settle their accounts with cash in 
envelopes. Zambito estimated he had paid the now-retired Gilles Surprenant between one 
and two hundred thousand dollars over the course of eight to ten years. Entrepreneurs 
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would also bill the city for bogus “extras” once they had already begun to carry out their 
work. The money reimbursed for the phony extras would then be carved up, with 75 
percent going into the pockets of the entrepreneur and 25 percent to a now-retired city 
engineer (Peritz, 2012, The Globe and Mail). Zambito also testified he took the two city 
officials on an all-expenses-paid golf vacation to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in 2002, after 
the two pressured him to do so. According to Zambito, Montreal city hall showed 
“willful blindness” to the apparent corruption. However, once the Liberal government set 
up the anti-corruption police squad known as Operation Hammer in 2009, he noticed that 
several functionaries at city hall decided to go on retirement (Peritz, 2012, Globe and 
Mail).  Surprenant defended himself in his testimony by stating the following: 
I am not a villain. I am a bureaucrat who was corrupted. No one at the City of 
Montreal wanted a system like this. There was an established system and I was 
caught up in it. Corruption was an “open secret” at work, and one that no one 
seemed eager to stop. There was no initiative from our superiors to correct the 
situation…and no initiative on the part of {Montreal’s} executive committee (). 
 
Overall, Surprenant pocketed about $706,000 in kickbacks between 2000 and 2008, plus 
another $25,000 under the table between 1995 and 2000 in the form of handouts from 
entrepreneurs (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015).  
Giuseppe Borsellino was also another key witness in the inquiry as he was 
president of Garnier Construction. Borsellino’s company had won millions of dollars in 
public infrastructure contracts. Borsellino supported the claims made by Zambito by 
stating that Gilles Surprenant (city works engineer) was the prime mover of the 
corruption. Borsellino argued that the contractors were the victims and not the 
orchestrators of the corruption. The inquiry heard that Borsellino and two other major 
construction bosses had to pay the city thousands of dollars in cash from the 1990s on for 
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what Borsellino described as “tips” (Edwards & Nicaso, 2015). Borsellino went on to 
state the following: “What I didn’t like is the power that those people {at the city} had 
acquired. It became apparent that {the contractors} were in a system we couldn’t get out 
of” (). Justice Charbonneau responded to this testimony by stating: “There are limits to 
my credulity. So, you’re telling me the great mastermind behind all of this was Gilles 
Surprenant, when he was thirty years old?” (). Borsellino replied to this by stating: “Yes” 
().  Borsellino continued to defend his position when stating he had never had any 
business dealings with anyone associated with organized crime: “I’d rather hand over the 
keys to my business than pay the Mafia. My parents came from Sicily.  {The Mafia} is 
something you hear about; you feel…it’s never clear” (). 
3.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, Vito Rizzuto was never directly linked to any of the criminal-private-sector-
corruption that has been discussed throughout the case. However, he has been linked to 
his associates (construction entrepreneurs and city officials) through testimonies given 
throughout the inquiry. Vito Rizzuto, the godfather of the Montréal mafia, offered his 
services as a mediator with the view of benefitting himself. He had a certain aura about 
him, which enabled him to ensure that everyone followed his directions. As investigator 
Éric Vecchio described it, “Mr. Rizzuto sells his credibility to make deals, sells the 
possibility of finding a resolution to the dispute.” On learning of the likelihood of a 
$115-million suit against property developers, Rizzuto spontaneously inquired of his 
contacts whether he shouldn’t offer his services as arbitrator in the dispute. Furthermore, 
“this is tangible proof … that organized crime takes the biggest cut when there is a 
dispute, and not when things are going well. Organized crime infiltrates situations that 
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are litigious.” (45) (Charbonneau Commission, 2015). Vito Rizzuto used his influence 
and social connections to persuade city officials to do his bidding and rig construction 
contracts to profit the mafia. This was seen most prominently when Vito’s lieutenant (Del 
Baso) made threats towards construction entrepreneurs to stop bidding on contracts. It 
was also seen when the Rizzuto’s had Jocelyn Dupuis work with the Hells Angels to 
attempt to overthrow FTQ leadership in favour of somebody who would support the 
bidding of the Rizzuto family. Although Vito was not directly implicated in the case, it is 
clear from the evidence above that Vito acted as a broker/patron to the criminal-private-
sector-corruption within the construction industry. More on this topic will be discussed 
below.  
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to better understand the CPSC at the heart of the corrupt public works 
construction contract tendering process in Montreal, and the roles played by Mafia 
members, this thesis will draw on the work of Carlo Morselli and his criminal network 
analysis framework (Morselli, 2009) as well as Joseph Albini’s patron-client model 
(Albini, 1971). Together, the two theoretical models can help explain the emergence and 
persistence of CPSC in the Montreal case study by analyzing the role of organized crime 
and a traditional Mafia family in particular, in perpetuating this bid-rigging conspiracy 
by examining the brokerage and patron role played by Vito Rizzuto and other members 
of the Mafia within the context of a criminal network.  
The two theoretical frameworks are applied to this case study to understand the 
bid-rigging conspiracy as a criminal network and the brokerage and patron roles played 
by members of the Montreal Mafia and Vito Rizzuto specifically. This thesis argues that 
Vito Rizzuto envisioned his role of the Mafioso in very traditional terms – as a broker 
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and a patron within a criminal network, which was on full display in his role in the bid-
rigging conspiracy and influence in the construction and real estate development sectors 
specifically. The two models are compatible because they both view Italian organized 
crime as a networked or syndicated organizational structure. 
Morselli’s Criminal Network Analysis and the Role of the Broker  
Morselli examines specific organized crime conspiracies (e.g., organized auto theft by 
the Hells Angels) as a criminal network (Morselli, 2009). Central to these networks are 
"brokers" who brings all the major players together. Morselli’s network model views 
organized crime as a dynamic business-like process as opposed to a static, hierarchical 
structure. In recent years scholars have been discovering that organized crime consists of 
diverse networked structures that are flexible and adaptable. This includes not only 
chronic and serious criminals, but also various professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, 
airport officials, maritime port workers, politicians) that assist with specific functions 
within this network. It is these actors who facilitate the criminal actions of the more 
central participants in the network (Morselli, 2010; Abadinsky, 2007).   
An important development regarding organized crime has been the emergence of 
criminal networks that have abandoned all traditional restrictions on memberships, such 
as ethnicity or nationality. Various scholars have supported this information, including 
the following: Schneider (2017), Albanese (2015), Kleemans (2014), Bielopera and 
Finklea (2012), and Hignett (2012).  Now, the only criterion for an individual who wants 
to join the criminal network is the ability to contribute to the accumulation of profits 
(Schneider, 2009).  The following statements made by the Criminal Intelligence Service 
Canada (CISC) supports this point: 
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Law enforcement is identifying crime groups that are based on temporary 
alliances of individual criminals who merge their particular skills to better 
achieve success in specific criminal enterprises. Once a specific criminal venture 
is completed, these individuals may continue to collaborate on further criminal 
activities, or the group may dissolve. Although the individuals may go their 
separate ways, they sometimes reform into new groups based on the skill 
requirements of new criminal opportunities. The nature and success of such 
networks are largely determined by individual characteristics and skills among 
those who act as their component parts (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 
2006, 6).  
 
Where critical skills are necessary to facilitate criminal activities are absent 
within a criminal group, skilled outsiders are recruited or exploited to provide this 
service. The individual may be considered an outside contractor or part of the 
criminal network (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2009, 13). 
 
Criminologist James Finckenauer (2005, 65) writes that most contemporary organized 
crime conspiracies are “loosely affiliated networks of criminals who coalesce around 
certain criminal opportunities. The structure of these groups is much more amorphous, 
free floating and flatter, and thus lacking in a rigid hierarchy.” 
Schneider (2017, 139) summarizes the basis of the network model: 
The network model does not view organized crime as made up of monolithic 
hierarchically structured organizations or kinship-based clans, but as a loosely 
knit, fluid network of like-minded criminal entrepreneurs, none of whom has any 
long-term authority over others. A network model of organized crime views the 
patterns of relationship among the offenders as symmetrical business partnerships 
based on complementary areas of specialization that contribute to one particular 
deal or a series of ongoing criminal conspiracies. In a network, the structure of 
the relationship among the offenders is not defined by power, but by the 
particular function that the individual performs in the criminal conspiracy and/or 
by a financial investment made by a “business partner” in that venture.  
 
 
As organized crime involves multiple actors and is often loosely structured, 
including many small networks (Morselli, 2010), network analysis is a useful tool for 
determining the structure of organized criminal conspiracies. Network analysis can be 
beneficial in explaining how various offenders could be a part of the same criminal 
organization but may never actually meet.  
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Morselli’s network analysis offers a rigorous analytical framework to identify and 
analyze the structure of organized criminal conspiracies and includes many concepts and 
measures that can be applied to various organized criminal settings. “Network analysis” 
integrates direct and indirect criminal contacts and includes facilitators of crime and not 
just the orchestrators of criminal operations (Morselli, 2010). This means that the 
framework takes an analytical look at each person within a network on every level and 
not just the top position. Everyone from low-level associates loosely linked to criminal 
operations, all the way to the family mob boss, is considered for relevance within 
network analysis. More importantly, network analysis looks at how connections are 
formed between associates and the important role that central figures – called “brokers” – 
play within a criminal network. 
Bouchard & Morselli (2014, 297) sum up the network model as follows: “In 
short, organized crime (or a criminal market) is largely a resource pooling process that is 
built around individuals who are connected (or socially embedded) with each other in 
various ways beyond co-membership in a criminal organization.”  
Just because a network is built around being flexible and lacks formal 
organization does not mean that the network cannot be centralized around specific 
individuals. The extent to which a network revolves around one or a small group of 
individuals has been consistently the first step in most social network analyses (Morselli, 
2009).  As mentioned, Morselli views the so-called broker as being central to organized 
criminal networks.  For Morselli, a broker is an individual (or small group of individuals) 
whose role is to become the core of a network. This individual or individuals often 
identify others that are to take part in the conspiracy (based on their skills, resources or 
connections), connect those in the network, and provides direction to those in the 
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network. Because a criminal network is not hierarchical, the broker is not necessarily the 
head or leader; instead one can use such analogies as the glue that holds everyone and 
everything together or the hub to which all spokes in the wheel are connected at the 
centre. 
Morselli’s (2010, 16) notion of the ‘broker’ is not just restricted to criminal 
networks but are central to many types of organizations: 
There is growing evidence in research on legitimate organizations that key players 
do not maintain authoritative roles, but brokerage positions that bring flexibility, 
integration, and creativity to the ensemble of an organization and that benefits the 
individuals occupying such positions (16). 
 
A broker is positioned between disconnected others within a network. These 
disconnected others may occupy different hierarchical roles within an organization 
or they may be members of different organizations that come together for a given 
operation (16). 
 
Morselli (2009, 16) goes on to explain how brokers benefit from their position 
within a network and how they benefit others in that network: 
People in such a position maintain a competitive edge because they control the 
information asymmetries that make up entrepreneurial networks. Participants on 
either side of the brokerage position rely on the broker for indirect access to 
resources beyond their reach. The broker is pivotal within such a social 
configuration and profits from the reliance of others. In turn, the group that 
emerges around the broker benefits overall because the broker extends the 
collective venture to wider reaches and a greater variety of opportunities. Thus, 
brokerage positioning is capital for both the collective and participants occupying 
such positions. 
 
Morselli and Roy’s (2008) research into an organized auto theft (“ringing”) 
conspiracy in Montreal emphasizes the role and importance of the broker to criminal 
networks. Morselli and Roy (2008) concluded that the “ringing” operation was a loosely 
structured network. The data they drew upon came from a law enforcement task force in 
Quebec that was in operation between 1993 and 2005 and which targeted stolen cars that 
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were resold domestically or exported through the Port of Montreal for resale in other 
countries. The study divided the crime’s organization into five stages: (i) the theft of the 
vehicle, (ii) storing (concealing) the stolen vehicle, (iii) physically modifying the vehicle, 
(iv) forging vehicle registration numbers and forms, and (v) exporting or reselling the 
vehicles domestically. Morselli and Roy (2008, 91) summarize the findings of the study: 
Within each of these phases, numerous individuals were involved as part of the 
larger network, all of whom operated more-or-less as independent contractors 
(professionals and amateurs) applying their particular expertise and available 
resources. The thieves who stole the cars were separate from those who modified 
the vehicles, who in turn were detached from individuals who obtained blank 
vehicle registration forms from the registration bureau of Quebec. The forms 
were subsequently completed (fraudulently) by other individuals while another 
group took care of dispatching the vehicles to foreign and local buyers. 
 
This study shows that even though the network model is decentralized, it has a 
centralized component that is essential for the network to function. This central 
component is that of the broker. The brokers identified in this study connected the 
various components and participants in the criminal ringing network. Morselli and Roy 
(2008, 91) explain the significance of the broker in this study. “The stolen-vehicle 
ringing operations studied here were centralized and resilient because they contained 
brokerage features that increased the degree of flexibility for achieving the collective 
goal. Removing the main brokers would have decreased this flexibility to the extent that 
each crime script no longer would be functional.” Examining criminal operations from a 
network perspective allows for the management of complex investigative data containing 
plenty of individuals, events, and countless interactions, while also providing the visual 
and analytical tactics that lead to an evidence-based understanding of the overall 
structure of a criminal network and the positioning of a variety of key participants within 
that network. The case study above showed that criminal networks are generally shaped 
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for flexibility, making them resilient to law-enforcement targeting and intervention 
(Morselli, 2009).  
Morselli's work has not been applied to business racketeering or CPSC. However, 
case studies of criminal networks by Morselli have demonstrated the framework’s 
applicability to different types of group or inter-group interactions within illegal markets 
and organized crime. Likewise, this analytical model can potentially contribute to a better 
understanding of CPSC, and, less broadly, the Quebec case study, by (i) examining the 
bid-rigging conspiracy and those involved as a criminal network and (ii) addressing the 
question of the extent to which the Montreal Mafia members – and Vito Rizzuto– played 
the role of the broker in this network as conceptualized by Morselli. 
Albini’s Patron-Client Model and the Role of the Patron4.2.4 Morselli and the notion 
of ‘Flexible Order’ 
The most important aspect of the network model is the notion of ‘flexibility’ (Morselli, 
2009). Flexibility is important due to the ephemeral and uncertain environment that is 
often associated with organized crime. A ‘network’ consists of connected members that 
wish to stay or drop out of the conspiracy at any given time depending on the operation. 
Therefore, a network is sustained even though fixed and finite organizational forms 
therein may disperse over time. Networks are complex settings that are only determined 
by the social interactions that take place between individuals or groups within that 
network. Morselli defines these interactions as “flexible order” (Morselli, 2009). The 
idea around flexible order is that there is common ground to be found in the interactions 
between individual and collective interests. Essentially, the network is a self-organizing 
structure that is driven and determined only by the emergent behaviour of its parts. These 
parts or “nodes” within the network may include a variety of actors, subgroups, clusters, 
and even hierarchies that are absorbed into the overriding network structure (Morselli, 
2009).	The social network’s attraction is the flexibility that it gives to its members. This 
flexible order can be seen with the collaboration between the Rizzuto’s’, construction 
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entrepreneurs, city officials, and city engineers because of the beneficial price-fixing 
contracts that were being won and the “tax” that was given to city officials (Morselli, 
2009).  
The patron-client model was first proposed by sociologist Joseph Albini 
(1971). Albini argued the patron-client model is well suited to an analysis of 
Italian-American organized crime. In his 1971 book American Mafia: Genesis of 
a Legend, Albini explicitly dismisses the notion of Cosa Nostra being a 
nationwide, formal organization, arguing that this claim has been found on 
insufficient evidence and contradictory assumptions (Albini, 1971, 254). 4.3.1 
Introduction 
The study of patron-client relationships is reported in a vast body of literature as well as 
in a wide variety of cultures and social settings. Sociologist Joseph Albini has found the 
framework for the patron-client relations model specifically well suited to an analysis of 
organized crime. In his 1971 book American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, Albini 
explicitly dismisses the notion of Cosa Nostra being a nationwide, formal organization, 
arguing that this claim has been found on insufficient evidence and contradictory 
assumptions (Albini, 1971, 254). Albini drew on informants from among law 
enforcement and the underworld to present an alternative view, pertaining primarily to 
the case of Detroit and centering on the concept of “syndicated crime”. Syndicated crime 
in Albini’s terminology is “the provision of illegal goods and services by criminals who 
are flexibly organized in ways that depend upon the specific type of activity and the 
specific societal context”. Albini drew from these findings to determine that powerful 
individuals in criminal networks do not exercise equal power, and therefore patron-client 
relationships develop between the criminal network and legitimate members of society 
(Albini, 1971).   
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Rather than complex formal organizations, then, patron-client relations 
perspective views criminal networks as loosely structured and informal relationships 
which function because each participant is interested in furthering his/her own personal 
needs. Albini (1971) states that since patron-client, friendship, and business relationships 
are constantly changing, attempts at charting or assigning boundaries to the number and 
specific types of relationships is impossible. 
Instead he defines patrons and clients as: “Patrons are those who can offer protection or 
business opportunities while they, in turn, may be the clients of other patrons 
themselves” (Albini, 1971, 223).  Albini argues that this system is adaptable to the 
fluidity of syndicated crime, whereas “a rigidly structured organization would only serve 
as a detriment to efficient syndicate activity” (Albini, 1971, 284). Albini (1971, 288) 
explains the structure of a criminal syndicate as the following: “An Italian-American 
criminal syndicate consists of a system of loosely structured relationships functioning 
primarily because each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare.” Albini 
concluded that since patron-client, friendship, and business relationships are constantly 
changing, attempts at assigning limits or boundaries to the number and types of 
relationships are impossible (Albini, 1971).  
Wolf (1966, 16-17) describes the role of the patron: “The patron provides economic aid 
and protection against both the legal and illegal exaction of authority. The client, in turn 
pays back in more intangible assets-for example, esteem and loyalty. He may also offer 
political or other important support, thus making the relationship reciprocal”. In its 
simplest form a patron-client relationship may be defined in the following manner 
according to Schmidt (1977, 20): “Vertical dyadic alliance, i.e., an alliance between two 
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persons, of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an 
ally someone superior or inferior to himself. The superior member of such an alliance is 
called the patron, and the person with less power the client”. Schmidt (1977, 20) also 
adds: “In these relationships patrons and clients are in many ways dependent on each 
other. Each party at any time can supply the other with something that they cannot 
normally obtain on their own. In most circumstances, the favours that patrons do for their 
clients are material, while clients usually provide to their patron the expenditure of labour 
and effort”.  
Abadinsky (2007, 8) supports the above information with the following statements on the 
role of the patron: 
The member of the American Mafia, acting as a patron, controls certain resources as well 
as strategic contacts with people who control other resources directly or who have access 
to such persons. The member-as-patron can put a client in touch with the right people. He 
can bridge communication gaps between the police and criminals, between businessmen 
and syndicate-connected union leaders; he can transcend the world of business and the 
world of the illegitimate entrepreneur. He is able to perform important favours and be 
rewarded in return with money or power.  
There is a network surrounding the patron, a circle of dyadic relationships orbiting the 
OC member in whom most clients have no relations with one another except through the 
patron. The patron needs a great deal of time to manage his network adequately, develop 
and maintain contacts, provide services, enhance power and income, and keep well 
informed. Organized crime members do not usually have to maintain conventional 
schedules, so they are free to “hang around”, to pick up and disseminate important 
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information. An OC patron may dominate a particular geographic area or industry. He 
will have available a network of informants and connections-for example, with the police 
and other officials, as well as with specialized criminal operatives such as papermen 
(persons who convert stolen “paper”, such as stocks, bonds and checks, into cash), 
torches (professional arsonists), muscle-men or leg breakers, and enforcers (Boissevain, 
1974, 8).  
 He is in a position to fence large amounts of stolen goods-he can truly “get it for you 
wholesale”-or to lend out various amounts of money at usurious interest-loansharking. 
He will act as a center for information (providing targets for professional burglars, for 
example), “license” criminal activities (for example, enable a high-stakes dice game to 
operate), and use his position to assist criminals in linking up specialized operations (for 
example, finding a driver for a robbery or hijack team). He can provide stolen firearms 
and autos and other items necessary for conventional criminal activity…Criminal 
activities in his territory that are not under his patronage are “outlaw” operations whose 
participants act without his grace. If they are arrested, he will not intervene; if their 
activities conflict with those under his patronage, police raids or violence will result. 
The patron acts as a power broker between the client and the wider society, both 
legitimate and illegitimate. To sum it up, patronage systems stress the importance of 
“personal and interpersonal relations, quasi-groups, networks, and power relations” 
(Roniger & Eisenstadt, 1980). The patron-client framework is distinguished by its 
countless informal and fluid relationships that relate together with the primary purpose of 
furthering their own personal goals (Liddick, 1999). In its simplest form a patron-client 
relationship may be defined as an alliance between two persons, of unequal status, power 
P a g e 	|	104	
or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior 
to himself. The superior member of such an alliance is called the patron, and the people 
with less power the client (Schmidt, 1980).   
 
The broad context for this model is his notion of “syndicated crime, which refers 
to “the provision of illegal goods and services by criminals who are flexibly organized in 
ways that depend upon the specific type of activity and the specific societal context” 
(Albini, 1971, 254). Powerful offenders involved in syndicated criminal activities 
develop relationships with criminal associates outside the network as well as other 
members of society (politicians, criminal justice officials, labour leaders businesspeople, 
etc.) who may further the goals of the criminal enterprise but who also benefit financially 
from the relationship (Albini, 1971).  
Based on his research, Albini argues the ongoing criminal operations of the 
Italian-American Mafia family involve a loose system of power, interpersonal and 
“business” relationships built around a central symbiotic relationship between the 
“patron” and a “client.” At the vortex of the patron-client relationship is the capo, which 
is the head of the family. The capo acts as a patron to his family and associates. The capo 
is the centerpiece of a network of family and business relationships. As time goes on, the 
patron starts to dominate a network of individuals in a specific geographic area.  
Schneider (2018, 137) continues to describe the role of the capo in more detail:  
The capo, and the Mafiosi more generally, is a provider of services, 
especially for those who can’t or won’t turn to the government. The role 
of the capo is to help ensure the welfare and security of his family, 
friends, and associates, such as putting up start-up capital to assist new 
enterprises, handling the flow of graft money to politicians, regulating the 
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use of violence, and resolving disputes (Albini, 1971; Gambetta, 1993; 
Hess, 1973). Thus, a particularly important role of the capo is to serve as 
an intermediary, whether it is a commercial agent who brings legitimate 
businessmen or criminals together to make a deal, a political power broker 
who helps friends get elected to public office, or a mediator who arbitrates 
a conflict between two parties. 
 
The capo is surrounded by members of the crime family to whom he acts as a 
patron (and receives a monetary tribute from each).  In addition to this, each member of 
the Mafia family is given a great deal of independence regarding money-making ventures 
for the family.  The capo creates his own network of clients, which include his own crew 
of made members as well as associates and others who are external to the family. The 
external clients may come from a wide spectrum of society, including associates of the 
family, other independent criminal offenders, businessmen, politicians, union leaders, 
judges, and law enforcement officials. The overall purpose of the patron-client 
relationship is to create a wide variety of connections stemming from the Mafia family, 
which is essential to carrying out criminal operations that will turn out profitable.  Albini 
(1971) argues that the continuity of a criminal syndicate lies in its amorphous quality: “If 
a powerful syndicate figure is incarcerated, all that has really been severed is his position 
as a patron to his clients. If it so happens that another individual is in a position to 
assume this role, the clients may continue in the enterprise” (285).  
 Albini’s depiction of the Mafia family and the intermediary role played by the 
Mafioso, and the capo, in particular, is rooted in similar conceptualizations of their roles 
in the history and traditions of the Sicilian Mafia. As Schneider (2018, 157-158) writes: 
According to Inciardi (1975), the principles behind the Mafia as a 
subculture and the word itself comes from Sicilian historical and literary 
works and denotes a state of mind, a style of behaviour, a cultural pattern, 
and a way of life. Specifically, the word Mafia is Sicilian-Arabic in its 
origins and is derived from terms meaning “to protect and to act as 
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guardian; a friend or companion; to defend and preserve; power, integrity, 
strength” (Inciardi, 1975: 112–13). Various definitions of the word that 
began surfacing in nineteenth-century Italy included superlatives that 
reflected the traditional ideals of manhood and manliness: power, 
superiority, bravery, bravado, boldness, self-confidence, revenge, respect, 
honour, and vainglory. In turn, the meaning and ideals of the word were 
personalized and embodied in the Mafioso, who is known and admired for 
his ability to protect and provide essential services to his kin, his friends, 
and his associates because he is a man of respect and a man of honour 
(Ianni & ReussIanni, 1976: 45). He is able to get things done and defend 
himself and his kin because he has friends and associates who will rally to 
his aid.  
 
Hess (1973) notes that the Mafioso succeeds because he commands a 
partito, a network of relationships whereby he acts as an intermediary or a 
broker. As the centre of this network, he views himself as a padrone 
(patron) to his clients. In this role, he is a provider of services, especially 
for those who cannot or will not turn to the government for help (Albini, 
1971; Gambetta, 1993; Hess, 1973). He plays the part of a middleman 
who brings legitimate businessmen or criminals together to make a deal, a 
political power broker who helps friends get elected to public office, and a 
mediator who arbitrates a conflict between two parties. “He acts as a 
guarantor so that persons who do not trust one another can transact 
business with a significant degree of confidence; this refers to legitimate 
entrepreneurs and, most particularly, the illegitimate, persons who cannot 
turn to the police or courts to remedy their grievances” (Abadinsky, 2013: 
111). Cesare Mori, who was appointed by Italian dictator Benito 
Mussolini to root out Mafia organizations in the 1920s, wrote that a 
Mafioso is in a position of power to provide “protection where the state is 
unwilling or unable; arbitration services superior to those available from 
local judges, especially to the poor person who cannot afford a lawyer, or 
for those whose justice is of a social, not a legal, nature—the pregnant 
daughter whose seducer refused to marry.” The Mafioso, and, in 
particular, capo mafioso (the head of a Mafia family), “can put it all right 
and his services are speedy and final” (Mori, 1933: 69). In short, as 
Abadinsky (2013: 111) puts it, the Mafioso is “a provider of protection 
broadly defined.” 
 
When the word Mafia is used as a noun, it denotes an organization—an 
unofficial, unrecognized, and secret system of government headed by 
unelected yet influential men who seek to control a particular jurisdiction. 
And much like a legitimate government, the Mafioso applies a tax to any 
transaction he brokers or is carried out in his jurisdiction. Put another 
way, as a padrone, he expects the payment of a tribute—either cash or a 
material possession—from the members of his Mafia family and other 
constituents. 
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More contemporary research into the organized crime in the U.S. supports Albini’s 
conception of syndicated crime and the relationships among offenders that characterize 
the Cosa Nostra in the U.S. For Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1972), the ongoing criminal 
operations of the Italian-American Mafia family involve a loose system of power and 
“business” relationships and thus require a middleman who becomes a patron to others 
by providing the right contacts, influence, and criminal opportunities. Over time, the 
patron comes to dominate a network of individuals in a geographic area (Ianni and 
Reuss-Ianni, 1983). Their research was based on observations and informal interviews 
they had conducted with members of an Italian-American Mafia family over a period of 
several years. The patron-client model as conceptualized by Ianni & Reuss-Ianni (1972) 
is depicted in the graphic below. 
 





In organized crime networks, patron-client relationships appear to operate at 
several levels, so that a patron in one relationship may be a client in another. Kinship, 
friendship, and contractual business relationships complicate the system of interaction 
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even further so that variations in patron-client relations are numerous. Those patrons with 
the greatest power may not involve themselves in illegal entrepreneurship, political 
office, or union positions. Instead, they focus solely on the distribution and brokerage of 
informal power, completely independent of institutional or formal authority (Burkolder, 
1976). Among organized criminals, it is power and the occasional use of private violence 
and coercion, which characterizes exchange relationships in patron-client networks, 
through which organized crime mediators channel the distribution of resources.	While the 
patron-client model was developed primarily to describe Italian-American organized 
crime, it also appears to have some relevance to other organized crime groups. For 
example, members of outlaw motorcycle gangs or Chinese triads are known to have an 
extensive network of associates whose criminal activities revolve around a particular 
member (e.g., Block 1979; Reuter 1983; Potter and Jenkins 1985). 4.3.3 Breakdown of 
the Patron-Client Model 
 To be successful according to the patron-client model, each member of OC from 
the boss down to a soldier must display interest and talent. Acting as a patron does this. 
When a social exchange relationship becomes unbalanced within a network, this is where 
we see a patron-client relationship really start to form. Independent criminal operatives 
that are not part of a criminal network may be forced to pay tribute to the patron for 
protection from violence that the OC member can inflict or cause to be inflicted. 
Professional criminals who may not necessarily be a part of the OC group may pay 
financial tribute to an OC patron, indicating respect for the patron’s power. This allows 
network members to secure vital information and assistance and ensures other 
independent criminals will not put their operations in jeopardy (Abadinsky, 2007). 
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Vincent Sicilian (1970, 55) provides an example of this information. He and his gang 
held up a card game that was under the patronage of the Genovese Crime Family in New 
York-a “connected game”. And he was summoned: 
When we got to the café and those big shots started laying down the law and 
telling us we knocked over one of their games, butter wouldn’t melt in my mouth. 
I told them I was careful to ask if the game has any connections, and the other 
guys agreed that nobody had any idea in the whole world that the game had any 
connections. The way we always put it (the way you still put it) is that we didn’t 
know they were ‘good people,’ which is like saying the guy is an American or an 
official part of some organization. Not an outlaw. 
To conclude and summarize the patron-client structure, Albini sees organized 
crime as a formation of criminal patrons who exchange information and connect with 
government officials to access a network of operatives for the client’s economic and 
political support. The roles of the client and patron fluctuate, depending on the 
organization, and combinations can be formed, dissolved, and re-formed with new actors. 
This theoretical framework is explained in specific detail below: 
Organized crime groups resemble a simple social organization or social-exchange 
network in the community. The power of organized crime is found in the 
organizational qualities of loose structuring, flexibility, and adaptability. 
Organized criminals have strategic contacts with persons who control various 
resources. Key organized crime figures occupy focal points in social-participation 
networks that interconnect private and public-sector organizations and licit and 
illicit enterprises. Organized criminals occupy intersections and are critically 
positioned facilitators in complex social relationships that permit clients to deal 
with the larger society. A social network of connections with the police, public 
officials, and other criminal operatives is at the criminal’s disposal. An organized 
criminal has sufficient contacts to provide coordination and to locate specialized 
talents and services necessary for criminal entrepreneurship. Persons involved in 
organized crime and its operations in this web of social participation are not, in 
many cases, directly a part of the organization.  The structure of the relationship 
varies considerably with each participant (Lyman & Potter, 2011, 48). 
 
At the center of each organized crime unit is the boss (capo). He or she is assisted by an 
underboss (sottocapo) and a counselor (consigliere). Surrounding the boss are his clients, 
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the captains (capo regime). Orbiting around each captain are his clients, the lowest 
ranking members who have been formally initiated into the family.  The members’ act as 
patrons to non-member clients. Each unit is tied to other families throughout the country 
by the capo, whose sovereignty is recognized by the other bosses.  
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS  
This chapter breaks down the research findings to explore the roles played by Vito 
Rizzuto in Montreal’s construction sector. This will be followed by an analysis of these 
roles as viewed through Morselli’s criminal network model and Albini’s patron-client 
model, focusing on the extent to which Vito played the role of the broker and patron 
respectively. While both theoretical models indicate the potential of multiple brokers and 
patrons operating in a criminal syndicate, this section will focus primarily on Vito 
Rizzuto and the various services he provided and roles he played in the construction 
sector in Montreal, for which he and senior members of his family would be 
compensated. For the sake of analysis, these roles can be demarcated as follows: (i) 
arranging financing for construction projects, (ii) choosing a contractor for a project, 
including the winning bidder for a rigged contract and (iii) resolving conflicts.  
Arranging Financing for Construction Projects 
Vito was known to invest his own money – in particular, the proceeds of his criminal 
activity into construction projects – a partial goal being to launder the proceeds of crime. 
Indeed, Rizzuto saw himself as a financier and frequently became involved in criminal 
activities, such as drug trafficking, or semi-legitimate endeavours in the construction 
industry by finding the much-needed capital (Schneider, 2017, 199). He would inevitably 
reap a very profitable return from the investment. Eric Vecchio, an inquiry investigator 
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told the Charbonneau inquiry that Montreal Mafia members generally did not invest their 
own money in construction or real estate projects (Vecchio transcript, Charbonneau 
Commission, 2014, 50). Reporting on his testimony at the Commission, CBC News 
(March 12, 2014) wrote,  
The Mafia usually didn't invest their own money in construction or real-estate 
deals, but they still walked away with a profit when the projects were finished … 
An inquiry investigator testified about organized-crime tactics when it came to the 
construction industry — a low-risk investment that reaped plenty of reward. Eric 
Vecchio said Rizzuto and other mobsters were usually never front-line players with 
a direct financial stake. Instead, they stayed on the periphery, acting as consultants 
and deal-brokers while they picked up a piece of the profits. "Organized crime 
takes a profit from the construction industry," Vecchio said. "In the end, they don't 
really get involved, they don't invest any of their own money, but they take away a 
consultant's or arbiter's fee." 
 
One example of Vito’s work as a financial broker occurred during the 
development of a condominium project in Montreal. Unlike his father, Nick Jr. (Vito’s 
son) became directly involved in developing real estate projects with real estate 
developer Tony Magi. The two attempted to turn an old refrigerated warehouse into a 
massive condo near the Jacques-Cartier Bridge on 1000 de la Commune Street. RCMP 
wiretaps from the Operation Colisée investigation captured conversations in which Vito 
Rizzuto attempted to salvage the project when Magi risked not being able to finish it 
because of financial problems. “Beginning in 2002, some of Magi's partners urged 
Rizzuto to get involved. The Mafia boss saw an opportunity to make money in the role of 
arbiter, with many of the conversations focusing on negotiating between partners, finding 
financing and ensuring the project is completed” (CBC News, March 12, 2014). 
According to Edwards & Nicaso, 2015, 39, the investors “didn’t seek Vito’s money. Vito 
had moved beyond simply pumping money into a project to launder his drug proceeds. It 
was his arbitration skills among investors and contractors that were needed to keep the 
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project moving. For Vito, it was an obvious opportunity.” Indeed, Vito expected a 
significant cut of any revenue from deals he brokered. One police wiretap picked up 
Vito’s reply to an investor complaining about the financial direction of the project. “If we 
can get somebody who can help him out either by finance, private finance or finding 
finance for him to continue the project, he’s willing to give us half the project. You get 
it?” (Edwards and Nicaso, 2015, 40). Edwards & Nicaso (2015, 40) explain the results of 
having Vito act as the broker in this case: 
“For his efforts as a silent, controlling partner of the condo development, Vito 
charged 6 percent of monies paid in deals he negotiated. He was also allowed to 
buy five units there for a combined total of one dollar. Those condos, which had 
cost just twenty cents each, were then sold for $1.7 million. After taxes, Vito 
netted $1.6 million, a tidy profit even by his standards.”  
 
To summarize, Vito fulfilled his role as a broker/patron in this example by organizing and 
arbitrating meetings with investors. Vito was “brokering” deals so that his clients could 
continue construction projects with the right financing. This directly relates to Morselli’s 
notion of the broker because the purpose of the broker is to connect people within a 
network.  
Choosing a Contractor for a Project (including the winning bidder for a rigged 
contract) 
The Charbonneau Inquiry concluded that Rizzuto would often determine which 
construction firm would be the winning bidder on a municipal contract.  Rizzuto did this 
by influencing members of the bid-rigging cartel of construction firms to agree to take 
turns presenting the best offer.  The company chosen to win the bid notified the complicit 
companies of the amount it would propose and the other companies were then told to 
submit bids of convenience (i.e., bids that could not win the contract). Vito would often 
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choose who the winning bidder would be. He also compensated companies that 
conspired to submit an uncompetitive bid or chose to withdraw from the tendering 
process by offering them subcontracts, supply contracts, or money. Vito also helped to 
organize the bid-rigging cartel by designating a dominant company in a particular 
municipal construction sector (e.g., sidewalks, roads, etc.), and to make sure other 
companies did not tender bids that were competitive with the chosen dominant one 
(Charbonneau Commission Report, 2017, 11).  
To prevent one or more companies not part of the bid-rigging conspiracy from 
participating in a call to tenders the colluders resorted to schemes designed to eliminate 
or discourage competition. For example, a member of the Montreal Mafia who had a 
commercial relationship with a non-colluding company would refuse to sell or lease that 
company the materials or equipment it would require or offer them at an exorbitant price, 
leaving the company either unable to submit a bid or unable to bid at a competitive price. 
Meanwhile, the Mafia member sells the same product at a discount to those in the bid-
rigging cartel (Charbonneau Commission, 2017). 
Through his involvement in the construction sector, Vito also helped to chose 
subcontractors for contracts. Plumbing, electrical, hardwood flooring and other various 
tasks could be assigned to other firms with whom he had a relationship. Because of 
Vito’s status, he expected the work to be done at a considerable discount (Edwards & 
Nicaso, 2015). 
While Vito saw himself as a mediator, the Montreal Mafia did not shy away from 
using intimidation and violence to dissuade those from bidding on contracts and 
P a g e 	|	115	
disrupting his bid-rigging cartel. Martin Carrier, a construction entrepreneur from 
Quebec City provided the following testimony to the commission: 
 
I received multiple threats after making the mistake of bidding for work in 
Montreal. I got a phone call at home in 2004, the first of two, from a man with a 
heavy Italian accent. I reported the initial phone call to police near Quebec City. 
The RCMP later came to visit and told me they'd recorded the call. They said the 
caller was Francesco Del Balso — a top member of the Rizzuto crime family, an 
enforcer who operated the clan's construction racket. …Later I received a 
condolence card by courier at my office. It was the kind of sympathy card sent to a 
grieving family after a death. The printed side of the card said: "Sincerest 
condolences.'' In neat handwriting, on the other side, the card read: "Dear friend, 
stop bidding in Montreal. If not, your family will receive a card just like this one. 
Final warning.'' While there was never any physical harm inflicted on me, I became 
more careful about the kind of contracts I bid on (Carrier transcript, Charbonneau 
Commission, 2012, 133). 
 
To conclude, Vito organized bid-rigging by convincing cartel members to win through 
rotational bidding, meaning each person got a turn at winning a contract and willingly 
dropped out of the competition when asked to do so. This relates to the broker/patron 
framework because Vito was providing financial security to his contractors. It was 
also through this bid-rigging scheme that Vito was connecting different contractors in 
the network together. The sole purpose of the broker/patron role according to Morselli 
and Albini’s framework is to provide security to those in the network so that the 
criminal network continues to expand and prosper.  
Resolving Conflicts 
As an underground arbitrator and financial broker in the construction sector, Vito often 
provided conflict resolution or problem-solving services including mediating disputes 
between contractors or solving financing problems. As already discussed, Vito was 
called in to problem solve the financial problems being experienced by his son and 
partner Tony Magi in their condo development project by attracting other investors. 
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Lino Zambito testified to the commission that Rizzuto became directly involved 
in a dispute over who should win a bid for renovating Montreal’s Acadie roundabout 
road contract. Zambito described a meeting prompted by a dispute over a contract with 
another member of the cartel. “When I arrived at that meeting, I was surprised to see Vito 
Rizzuto, the reputed head of Canada's Sicilian Mafia. Rizzuto was called in as a 
mediator. When Rizzuto suggested that perhaps he didn't have the expertise necessary to 
complete the contract in question, he backed out and let his competitor win” (Zambito 
transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 195).  
Vito acted as a patron/broker here because like mentioned above, he mediated 
who would win construction contracts.  This is directly linked to the patron/client 
framework as Albini stated that a particularly important role of the patron is to act as an 
intermediary between parties. Vito in this example was both brokering deals on what 
construction company would win and making sure violence didn’t break out by 
regulating the rotation of bidders. 
 
Vito as a Broker and a Patron  
The overlap between the two theoretical models makes it difficult to determine whether a 
particular role played by or service offered through the Montreal Mafia and Vito Rizzuto 
specifically can be classified as brokerage or patronage. For the purposes of analysis, this 
thesis does not necessarily make a distinction of whether one role falls into a particular 
category or not. Based on Morselli’s criminal network analysis and Albini’s patron-client 
framework, Vito Rizzuto can be seen as both a broker and a patron.  
With that said, while a patron and broker share roughly the same roles in a 
criminal network (bringing parties together, making deals protecting their clients, 
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mediating conflict), it can be argued that when applying the two theoretical models to 
Vito Rizzuto and his role in the construction sector, the traditional Mafia “patron” aspect 
greatly influenced his role as a broker.  
Much of this influence comes from the asymmetrical power relations between 
Rizzuto, the powerful Mafiosi, and others (including other family members, associates, 
those in the bid-rigging cartel, etc.). In other words, unlike a traditional neutral broker or 
mediator in legitimate transactions, the Mafiosi assume a significant level of 
asymmetrical power over his "clients.” A similar comparison can be made with 
Morselli’s conception of a broker in a criminal network. While the broker is a central 
figure in a criminal network, the power relations between actors in such a network are 
more symmetrical compared to a hierarchical criminal organization. This was not the 
case with Vito Rizzuto who wielded great power over others, which is consistent with the 
traditional conceptualization of the Mafiosi who is viewed as a man of honour who 
wields great power and uses that power to build a criminal network. 
Another aspect of Vito’s services that highlight the importance of his role as a 
traditional Mafia patron is his fee-for-services approach. As discussed, he often 
demanded a fee for specific services he rendered. This differs from the role of the 
criminal network broker who generally does not charge a fee to others in the criminal 
network, but instead takes a cut of the profits from a particular revenue-generating 
criminal activity. While Rizzuto would also take a cut of the revenue of a legitimate or 
illegitimate project, it was his fee-for-services approach that influenced him as a criminal 
network broker. In reference to his role in the condo redevelopment project spearheaded 
by his son and Tony Magi, CBC News summarized testimony delivered at the inquiry as 
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such: “Rizzuto saw the opportunity to make money as an arbiter and many of the wiretap 
conversations involve negotiating between partners, finding financing and ensuring the 
project was completed” (CBC News, March 13, 2014). On learning of the likelihood of a 
$115-million suit against a property developer, Rizzuto inquired of his contacts whether 
he shouldn’t offer his services as arbitrator in the dispute. According to the Charbonneau 
Commission (2017, 45), “this is tangible proof … that organized crime takes the biggest 
cut when there is a dispute, and not when things are going well. Organized crime 
infiltrates situations that are litigious.” 
Vito’s role in the construction sector should also be seen as part of a broader 
revenue-generating criminal activity long practiced by the Sicilian Mafia in both Italy 
and North America: the protection racket. This extortion is much more characteristic of 
Albini’s conception of the patron compared to Morselli’s conception of the broker. In 
effect, the Montreal Mafia operated a protection racket in the construction sector by 
charging a pizzo for services rendered whether their “clients” wanted these services or 
not. The implicit argument is that Vito was “protecting” by maximizing their revenues by 
helping to organize construction contracts in the bid-rigging cartel or avoiding labour 
problems or other unfortunate circumstances that may befall his clients.  
With Vito controlling the activities of different bidder groups and racketeers 
preying on the industry, he could assure contractors that they would only have to pay off 
once for a specified result, that the amount to be paid would be “reasonable” and that 
“services” paid for would be delivered without any interruptions or distractions. This role 
was not altruistic in nature; it served the Rizzuto’s interest to have stable relationships 
with a profitable industry. The Cosa Nostra’s capacity for violence and its influence in 
both the legitimate world and underworld makes its construction specialists more 
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“effective” at conciliation, dispute resolution and expediting projects than most lawyers, 
mediators, labour relations or construction consultants. Where the Cosa Nostra can 
regulate the groups of competitors or racketeers who control components critical to 
production, delivery, and installation of a necessary supply (concrete), it can bring 
predictability and stability to this process that could otherwise be frequently disrupted by 
competitors. (Goldstock, Jacobs, Marcus, Thacher, 1990). 
As per traditional extortion rackets, the Montreal Mafia used intimidation and 
violence if arbitration or mediation failed. This was evident with Elio Pagliarulo. Elio 
was a former pastry-shop owner and onetime close friend to the Catania family, who are 
construction magnates with high-ranking Mafia ties. Pagliarulo shares anecdotes about 
the Mafia’s brutal business methods: 
I was running a loansharking business on the side with Paolo Catania. However, I 
had a spectacular falling out with his friends a few years ago. I owed them money 
after a business deal went wrong. When I did not pay right away, I was kidnapped 
for three hours and beaten up. My face and teeth were so badly damaged that I 
needed facial-reconstruction surgery. Funeral flowers were also sent to my family 
home as a signal to pay up. The Catanias would never accept losing money 
(Pagliarulo transcript, Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 25). 
 
 The distinction between the two theoretical models as applied to this case study 
can also be gleaned by applying Ianni’s (1974) conception of the two basic forms of 
relationships among organized criminal offenders. Vito’s brokerage role can be viewed as 
“entrepreneurial,” where the bond among offenders was less personal and more 
determined by business interests. The goal of the brokerage role for Vito was to keep 
projects moving so that everyone involved in the criminal operation makes money. As a 
broker, Vito also arranged for financing of construction projects. In contrast, Vito’s 
patron role can be seen as more “associational” in the sense that he is trying to help and 
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even provide protection to and ensure the welfare and security of his clients. In turn, as a 
man of honour he is expected to receive not just respect but also reciprocating favours 
and services, and even monetary tribute from his clients. This was exemplified by the 
“tax” or pizzo charged to construction companies (including those who won rigged bids) 
that was delivered in cash to the Consenza Social Club. 
Schneider (2017, 194) argues that the patron-client model is applicable to the 
Montreal Mafia as a whole (and predates the rise of power of Vito).  This is especially 
true in the relationships between senior members of the Mafia and its “clients” in that the 
former saw themselves as a patron to their many associates and partners both inside and 
outside the criminal group: 
At the centre of these relationships was the capo decina — Vic Cotroni, Paolo 
Violi, and Vito Rizzuto — who all considered themselves a patron to their 
constituents, brokering business transactions, connecting buyers with suppliers, 
providing protection, and mediating disputes if they arose. The power of the 
Cotroni decina bosses to mediate disputes and dispense justice and protection was 
documented at the Quebec Police Commission hearings in the 1970s. Because of 
his clout and reputation, Paolo Violi was called on to intervene in disputes which 
had no connection with the criminal activities of his family. People outside the 
criminal world went on their own to ask for Violi’s help (Schneider, 2017, 194). 
 
Violi settled these disputes in the traditional manner of the Mafia underworld, 
substituting his ‘justice’ for that of legal institutions. In a discussion with high-ranking 
members of the Sicilian Mafia on April 22, 1974, Violi himself defined the obligations of 
a Mafioso. Speaking to Pietro Sciarra, he said, “Uncle Petrino, we’re here to do the 
thinking, to arrange things for this one and that one … and our job, all the time, is to 
straighten things out … ” (Quebec Police Commission Inquiry on Organized Crime, 
1977a: 65). Violi also expected that he would be accorded the power and respect 
consistent with the stature of a man-of-honour. As journalist Pierre Beauregard wrote on 
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November 21, 1975, “The all-powerful Paolo Violi is party to all the plots, shares in all 
the rackets, and draws profits from all the criminal acts that take place within the reach of 
his long arm” (as cited in the Quebec Police Commission Inquiry on Organized Crime, 
1977a: 59). Violi was a mafioso in the classical sense in that he lived a modest life, 
believing that it was not wealth, but respect and honour that defined the worth of any 
man. In one conversation with his like-minded father-in-law Giacomo Luppino, a Mafia 
head in Hamilton, both complained about how the American Mafia, with its emphasis on 
making money, had lost the “old country ways of operation” and conflicted with the 
traditional ways of the Mafiosi (Schneider, 2018, 177). Paolo Violi could be particularly 
violent, especially if someone did not display the respect he believed he deserved. As 
Schneider (2009, 201-202) describes: 
Violi personified Edwards and Nicaso’s characterization of the Mafia’s “twisted 
concept of honour.” As a man of honour, the Mafioso “cannot stand the slightest 
offence and reacts violently when a sgarro (insult) is done to him. A man of honour 
knows he is capable of exercising violence in such a way that he frightens others 
into giving him deferential treatment.” In other words, it does not matter to the 
Mafioso how he obtains honour or respect; it could be forcibly extracted through 
threats, intimidation, extortion, revenge, or violence. In this regard, habitual 
criminals like Violi and other Mafiosi “feel the need to call themselves ‘Men of 
Honour,’ much the way those with the worst body odour in Elizabethan times often 
wore the most perfume” (Edwards & Nicaso, 1993: 2, 7). 
As a traditional Mafia patron, Vito emphasized his role as an arbitrator helping 
his clients solve problems and make money. Charbonneau Commission investigator Eric 
Vecchio called Vito a "man of compromise" who was more interested in mediating than 
relying only on violence. As CBC News (March 12, 2014) reported, 
The investigator said Rizzuto's ability to keep everyone happy explains his long 
reign in local organized crime. He had a reputation for being able to bring together 
different criminal groups — bikers, street gangs and the Mob — under one roof. 
"Mr. Rizzuto always made sure there was enough cake for everyone to have a 
slice," Vecchio said. "Obviously, he never talked about how big the piece each one 
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would get." The investigator said Rizzuto's ability to keep everyone happy explains 
his long reign in local organized crime. He had a reputation for being able to bring 
together different criminal groups — bikers, street gangs and the Mob — under one 
roof. "Mr. Rizzuto always made sure there was enough cake for everyone to have a 
slice," Vecchio said. "Obviously, he never talked about how big the piece would be 
that each one would get."4.3.4 Sicilian Context for this model  
 
The traditional patron-client relationship can be seen when looking at the Sicilian and 
Greek communities. In his study of organized criminal groups in New York City, Francis 
Ianni (1974) identified two basic forms of relationships among individuals involved with 
organized crime. The first is “associated networks”, which are formed based on personal 
relationships among its members.  Examples of these personal relationships are shared 
ethnicity or kinship. The second type follows an “entrepreneurial model”, where the 
bonds formed among offenders are less personal and are determined more by business 
interests. For Francis Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1972), the ongoing criminal operations of 
the Italian-American mafia family involve a loose system of power and “business” 
relationships and thus require a middleman who becomes a patron to others by providing 
the right contacts, influence, and criminal opportunities. Over time, the patron comes to 
dominate a network of individuals in a geographic area (Francis Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 
1983). The study was based on observations and informal interviews Francis Ianni had 
conducted while socializing with members of the Italian crime family over a period of 
several years. Ultimately, Ianni and Reuss argued that organized crime cannot be 
explained by reference to a formal organization alone. While Ianni acknowledged 
formalization in the organization of the legal and illegal businesses a crime family runs, 
the crime families themselves they saw as “traditional social systems” that had not been 
rationally created for specific purposes (Ianni & Reuss-Ianni, 1972, 108). 
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OC groups must continue to use sophisticated means to avoid being monitored by 
law enforcement. One of the ways in which OC groups have been avoiding detection and 
prosecution for so long is through decentralizing their organization and moving away 
from a patrimonial control. Moore (1987): highlights this important point and supports 
Albini’s statement on the patron-client model above: “A highly centralized organization 
“tends to make the enterprise too dependent on the knowledge and judgement of the top 
management and wastes the knowledge and initiative of subordinate managers who know 
more about their own capabilities and how they fit into a local environment of risks and 
opportunities” (53). Decentralization in organized crime can be advantageous for both 
business and security reasons. Albini (1971) argues that the syndicate’s real power lies in 
its amorphous quality: “If a powerful syndicate figure is incarcerated, all that has really 
been severed is his position as a patron to his clients. If it so happens that another 
individual is in a position to assume this role, the clients may continue in the enterprise. 
The alternative is to find a new patron-boss-or to develop their enterprises” (285).The 
difference between the traditional patrimonial organization and the patron-client model is 
that patrimonial organizations center around families, and other close-knit personal 
networks. The emphasis in this group is on traditional relationships that demonstrate 
emotional connections between people. In contrast to this, the patron-client model has 
personal ties that are weaker, less ritualized, and emotionally demonstrative; in place of 
all of this is an allegiance to a set of abstract rules and positions (Abadinsky, 2007). 
Overall, patron-client networks are less ceremonious and personal.  
4.3.5 Patron-Client Model in Other OC Cases   
Some researchers have found the patron-client relations theoretical framework 
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specifically well suited to an analysis of organized crime. For example, Anton Blok, 
Henner Hess, and Pino Arlacchi have specifically applied the notion of patronage and 
clientelism to the appearance of the mafiosi in post-feudal Sicily (Albini, 1971).   
In organized crime networks, patron-client relationships appear to operate at 
several levels (patron-client clusters in the form of pyramids), so that a patron in one 
relationship may be a client in another. Kinship, friendship, and contractual business 
relationships complicate the system of interaction even further so that variations in 
patron-client relations are numerous. Those patrons with the greatest power may not 
involve themselves in illegal entrepreneurship, political office, or union positions. 
Instead, they focus solely on the distribution and brokerage of informal power, 
completely independent of institutional or formal authority (Burkolder, 1976). Among 
organized criminals, it is power and the occasional use of private violence and coercion, 
which characterizes exchange relationships in patron-client networks, through which 
organized crime mediators channel the distribution of resources. 
4.3.6 Patron-Client Relationships Beyond Organized Crime  
The study of patron-client relationships (outside of the realm of organized crime) stresses 
the importance of personal and interpersonal relations, quasi-groups, networks, and 
power relations who channel the flow of societal resources. The study of patron-client 
relations stresses the importance of individuals who relate together with the primary 
purpose of furthering their own personal goals (S.N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger, 
1980).  Schmidt (1980, 108) views the relationship as the following: “In these 
relationships patrons and clients are in many ways dependent on each other. Each party at 
any time can supply the other with something that they cannot normally obtain on their 
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own. In most circumstances, the favours that patrons do for their clients are material, 
while clients usually provide to their patron the expenditure of labour or effort”.  
The actual shapes of patron-client relationships exist in many forms, including 
instrumental friendships and patron-client clusters. Instrumental friendships are 
characterized by balanced reciprocity and minimization of affect or emotion (Burkolder, 
1976). In most patron-client relationships the patron has several patron-client ties that 
can be described as a patron-client “cluster” or “clientele.” The patron naturally seeks to 
expand his clientele, as this makes him/her more powerful. Sometimes clienteles become 
“pyramided” upon one another. A patron-client pyramid or hierarchy develops when a 
client acts in his own right as a patron to sub-clients or when a patron is himself a client 
of a patron above him (Burkolder, 1976). In modern patron-client relations, 
intermediaries or brokers act as a link between national and local systems (Burkolder, 
1976).  Perhaps the full significance of patron-client relations as complex social 
arrangements is expressed best by S.N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger (1980, 49): 
“Patron-client relations denote, in their fullest expression, a distinct mode of regulating 
crucial aspects of institutional order: the structure of the flow of resources, exchange and 
power relations, and their legitimation in society”. 
Vito’s role as a patron extended beyond the role traditionally played by a broker 
by using his power, influence and resources to do favours for friends and associates. In 
one case, Vito helped an associate when someone stole a Cadillac Escalade SUV of one 
of the project’s investors, who had left it near a Dorval restaurant on May 29, 2003. A 
police wiretap picked up the investor’s call to Vito. The investor had told Vito that the 
Escalade was less than two weeks old, but he only cared about the briefcase inside. The 
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following are conversations between Vito and his associates that are illustrated by 
Edwards & Nicaso (2015, 40): 
Is there any way of tracking or knowing what happened” the investor asks 
Rizzuto. It’s the briefcase inside it. It’s killing me”. Vito immediately calls Frank 
Arcadi. “They stole a friend of mine’s truck-a Jewish guy,” Vito tells his street 
boss. “See what you can do to find this truck. He is not interested in the truck; the 
bag is what interests him. 
 
The Cadillac was located before noon of that day and the thief was provided $3,500 for 
his co-operation in the matter. The vehicle along with the briefcase was returned to the 
investor without further issue. The thief could keep his life and the investor received 
what he wanted. 
Rizzuto was immensely respected in Quebec’s criminal underworld and he 
extended his mediation and conflict resolution services to matters involving other 
organized crime groups. His power so unchallenged that he was credited with playing a 
major role in persuading the leaders of the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine 
motorcycle clubs to negotiate a truce to their bloody war in Quebec. Most notably, as 
documented by Edwards and Nicaso (2015, 191): 
It wasn’t that long ago that Vito had been the one who would settle disputes to 
preserve the common interests of criminal enterprise and keep police at bay. It 
was Vito who urged Mom Boucher of the Hells Angels to talk with the Rock 
Machine in September 2000. That push came when Vito heard that tough anti-
gang legislation was in the works, after the near-fatal shooting of reporter Michel 
Auger. Boucher met with leaders of the Rock Machine on neutral ground in a 
conference room at the Palais de Justice. Then they made their truce public by 
breaking bread in a crowded and trendy Crescent Street restaurant in the city’s 
downtown on October 8, 2000. The move was designed to quell public fears 
about organized criminals. Veteran crime reporter Claude Poirier and a 
photographer from the Quebec tabloid Allo Police were summoned to record the 
Thanksgiving feast that included Boucher and Rock Machine leader Frederic 
Faucher, and about twenty of their lieutenants. Vito was the unseen hand behind 
the public relations move. 
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Rizzuto reportedly once stated to Montreal police officers Nicodemo Milano and Franc 
Guimond that he was the only one who could keep the peace among the city’s criminal 
underworld: “You should go after the street gangs, not me. They are the ones who would 
create trouble… You will rue the day that I leave Canada. You will see what will happen 
when I leave Canada” (Edwards and Nicaso, 2015, 59). (His words would be prophetic 
given the escalation in violence that engulfed Montreal’s criminal underworld, which 
targeted his Mafia family specifically, following his incarceration in the U.S. and his 
subsequent death.) 
As a patron, Vito assiduously cultivated a network of “clients” in both the 
legitimate and criminal underworlds through both business and personal relationships, 
which often centred around golf, a game Vito frequently played.  This is evident by Luc 
Leclerc’s testimony: “I took a number of trips, including a golf vacation with Vito 
Rizzuto. Vito was charming and a funny travel companion” (Leclerc transcript, 
Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 200).  Former Montreal city engineer Gilles Surprenant 
also testified to the Commission that he “golfed a few times with reputed Mob boss Vito 
Rizzuto, including during a weeklong tropical golfing getaway” (Surprenant transcript, 
Charbonneau Commission, 2012, 133). Vito would also use charitable golf tournaments 
to foster and expand his web of contacts and clients in the legitimate world. Edwards & 
Nicaso (2015, 188) explains this: “These were classically Montreal events, with well-
dressed criminals wrapping themselves around a good cause to cleanse their image and 
public institutions making deals with the devil to gain funding. The golf fundraisers also 
drew at least one city councillor and strip club owner Paolo Gervasi, in 1992, 1993 and 
1994.”  
In short, thus, the Mafia conception of the all-powerful patron greatly influences 
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and even subsumes the broker or mediator role they play. This thesis argues that 
regardless of the brokerage role Rizzuto played, as a traditional Mafiosi this role was 
imbued with and heavily influenced by Vito’s self-conception as a patron to his clients. 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
Throughout various times in the past five decades, the Cosa Nostra has infiltrated the 
construction industry in North America. Its presence is, for the most part, accepted by 
developers, contractors, and suppliers in some instances as a necessary risk to promote 
stability and predictability, in other instances, as a provider of valuable illicit services. 
Even those who resent Cosa Nostra’s presence in the industry perceive it as a parasitic 
entity that society is powerless to remove.   
The findings of this study reveal that the Montreal Mafia members and associates 
entrenched themselves in the construction industry through the use of business 
racketeering. It accomplished these goals through the use of intimidation and violence, 
corrupting officials, as well as offering brokering and mediation services.   
The business racketeering by the Montreal Mafia witnessed in this case study 
exploited the vulnerabilities of the construction industry to criminal infiltration; in 
particular they capitalized on existing corruption within the private sector construction 
industry and among municipal government agencies and elected officials. Other factors 
that made the construction industry susceptible to criminal infiltration was the need for 
capital by private companies (which was not always available to them from legitimate 
lenders) and the preponderance of people of Italian heritage among the many owners and 
managers in the industry (including those originated from the same town in Sicily that 
members of the Rizzuto family originated from).   
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Central to the Montreal Mafia’s business racketeering model was the use of 
brokering and mediation “services.” Inherent in the bid-rigging conspiracy was a 
determination by Vito Rizzuto or other Mafia members who would be a winning bidder. 
When certain companies could not finish a project or did not have the funds to bid, Vito 
provided arbitration services to help secure financial investments.  
The use of brokerage and mediating services offered by members of the Montreal 
Mafia can be seen as an attempt to satisfy the objectives of controlling and influencing 
private sector actors, generating revenue (by a cut of a public sector contract) while also 
allowing the Mafiosi the opportunity the play the traditional Mafia role of a patron to his 
clients. Indeed, of particular relevance to this study is the overlap between the patron-
client model of organized crime and Morselli's network analysis (and specifically his 
conception of the role of the broker in criminal networks). Both theories focus on a 
network structure of crime offenders and the central and overlapping role played by 
Morselli's conception of a broker and Albini’s conception of the Mafiosi as a patron.  
While there is an overlap between the two theoretical frameworks, the intentions behind 
the two frameworks are different. A broker seeks to keep business operations going by 
mediating conflict and providing financial assistance. The broker does this regardless of 
structure and maintains equal relationships. The patron fulfills the same role as a broker; 
however, the patron operates these roles under a strict hierarchal structure that follows 
traditional Mafia philosophy. Both theories are needed for this research because 
Morselli’s framework addresses the vast criminal network that a broker operates within. 
However, this theory leaves out what this network looks like in a traditional Mafia 
organization where rules and structure are followed as a tradition. This is where Albini’s 
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patron-client model comes in. Albini explains what this criminal network looks like with 
a broker/patron within a Mafia type organization.  
Unlike a traditional neutral broker or mediator in legitimate transactions, the 
Mafiosi assumes a significant level of asymmetrical power over his "clients" and, thus, 
the conception of the Mafiosi as an all-powerful patron to his clients greatly influences 
and even subsumes the broker or mediator role they play. For this case study, the 
brokerage, mediation and even patron role all took place within the context of business 
racketeering and the use of protection rackets by the Montreal Mafia. Mafiosi may have 
viewed their relationship with construction companies as brokers or patrons, but it was 
ultimately about extorting money from the companies (in the form of a pizzo), which is 
fundamental to the Montreal Mafia’s role in the bid-rigging conspiracy. 
 In short, while the patron and broker share roughly the same roles (bringing 
parties together, making deals, protecting their clients, mediating conflict), the main 
difference when applying the two theories to this case study is that the conception of the 
“patron” in the context of the Mafia is that the clients are often victimized by the 
Mafiosi, which is not necessarily the case of broker in the criminal network model. 
Indeed, the brokerage role in a criminal network would be very much undermined if he 
or she consistently victimized his or her associates. This is not to say that brokers in 
some criminal networks have not betrayed or even victimized others participating in that 
particular network. However, construction companies needed the financial assistance 
from Vito in this case. Therefore, Vito’s clients (contractors) did not view it as 
victimization. This does give Vito (broker) a stronger position in the business 
relationship. However, to Vito’s clients, it does not appear as though the relationship is 
unequal because business operations continue and people are provided assistance (which 
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is the role and primary concern of the broker). Although some construction firms were 
the subjects of threats, it was only to serve Vito’s bid-rigging cartel and primary clients 
by eliminating any competition. Although this gives Vito power, it is still fulfilling that 
brokerage role and continuing the symbiotic relationship Vito had with his clients. This 
is exactly what permits organized crime to operate in private sectors and persist 
undetected for so long. Although Vito naturally has more power as a broker, the 
symbiotic relationship organized crime has with the private sector does not allow this to 
come to the limelight or affect the contractors he is looking out for within his network.  
The point is that the Mafiosi as a patron/broker has two inherent qualities that 
differ from Morselli’s conception of the broker: (i) there is always the possibility the 
patron will victimize the client in some way (e.g., extorting money or demanding the 
client commit or facilitate crimes on behalf of the Mafioso) and (ii) the inherent power of 
a member or associate of a Mafia family within the criminal underworld (and even the 
legitimate industries) allows the Mafioso or associate to wield power, not only to broker 
a deal, but to extort money or exact other favours or tributes from clients. 
To this end, this case study reflects traditional Mafiosi culture, which is not 
surprising because the Montreal Mafia (both as crew of the Bonanno family and as its 
own Rizzuto family) were led by men who viewed themselves as traditional Mafioso. In 
particular, both Paolo Violi and Vito Rizzuto saw that their ultimate roles were that of 
brokers, mediators and ultimately patrons who wield their power as “men of honour” that 
both help and victimize their clients. 
Thus, a principal conclusion of this study is that criminal network analysis can be 
applied to better understand the organizational structural and criminal operations of 
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traditional Mafia families. This is especially the case when analyzing the role of the 
Mafiosi as a central broker within the network. Using criminal network analysis also 
allows scholars to conduct more research on the specific actors that otherwise may be 
excluded from traditional theoretical frameworks (McIllwain, 2004). However, when 
applied to this case study, Morselli’s criminal network analysis needs to accommodate 
traditional Mafia philosophy, in particular the self-conception that some Mafioso hold as 
patrons – a role that goes far beyond what a broker is envisioned as. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Mafia patron exercises a twisted concept of protecting one’s clients, 
which means they may benefit from their relationship with the Mafiosi but can also be 
victimized by the Mafiosi. Regardless of this conclusion, this study reinforces Morselli’s 
arguments of the central role that a broker plays in a criminal network. This apparent 
dichotomy illustrates the Mafia’s relationship with its clients and society as a whole in 
that it is both parasitic and symbiotic and the same time. 
The conclusions of this thesis are applied primarily to this case study but could also 
be potentially extrapolated to other cases involving business racketeering in the 
construction industry by the so-called Italian Mafia in North America. Future research 
that combines both theories can also be applied to Mafia infiltration of other sectors of 
the legitimate economy to determine the extent to which criminal network analysis and 
the patron-client model can be applied both separately but also in tandem with one 
another. This would help determine the extent to which the role of the Mafiosi as a 
broker is influenced by his traditional conception of a patron to his clients (and thereby 
distorting the role of the broker as conceptualized by Morselli).  
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This research also highlights policy implications for the future. RCMP Cpl. Vinicio 
Sebastiano believed that police were more interested in evidence of drug crimes than in 
criminal ties to the construction industry. Cpl. Vinicio Sebastiano advised the 
Charbonneau Commission that if the surveillance footage on the Consenza Social Club 
picked up anything on construction, it wouldn’t have been listened to because it did not 
directly relate to the objectives of the investigation (Canadian Press, September 25, 
2012). In order to combat organized crime infiltration into private sectors, law 
enforcement efforts must focus on the brokers and patrons within criminal networks. In 
this particular case, law enforcement surveillance was more focused on the drug 









Charbonneau Commission Transcripts (2012-2015) 
La Commission d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie 
de la construction (France Charbonneau  & Renaud LaChance), 2015, Rapport de la 
Commission d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la 
construction, Quebec: La Commission, https://www.ceic.gouv.qc.ca/	
Amato, Mike, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (September, 2012, pp. 42). 
Borsellino, Giuseppe, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (February, 2013, 
(pp. 174, 254, 259). 
P a g e 	|	134	
Carrier, Martin, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (November, 2012, (p. 
133).  
Leclerc, Luc, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (2012, p. 200). 
Milioto, Nicolo, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (February, 2013, p. 153). 
Pagliarulo, Elio, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (October, 2012, (p. 200). 
Suprenant, Gilles, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (October, 2012, (pp. 
71, 133). 
Theberge, Gilles, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (May, 2013, p. 183) 
Vecchio, Eric, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (2012/2014, (pp. 50, 
67,162). 
Zambito, Lino, Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission (September/October, 
2012, (pp. 39, 109, 115, 195). 
 
Monographs 
Abadinsky, H. (1990). Organized Crime, 3rd ed., Nelson-Hall, Chicago, IL, pp.90-138.  
Abadinsky, H. (2007). Organized Crime (Eighth Edition). Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth.	
Albanese, J. (1996). Organized Crime in America. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing 
Co. 
Albanese, J.S. (2015). Organized Crime in America (7th Ed.). New York: Routledge.  
Albini, Joseph L (1971).  The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend. New York: 
Meredith. 
Alexander, H., Caiden, G. (1985). The Politics and Economics of Organized Crime. 
Toronto, Canada: D.C. Heath and Company/Lexington.  
 Allum, F. and Renate, S. (2003). Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy. 
Rutledge Taylor and Francis Group.  
Altheide, D. (1987). “Ethnographic Content Analysis”. Qualitative Sociology, 10, 65-77. 
Altheide, D. (1996).  Qualitative Media Analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
P a g e 	|	135	
Anderson, A.G. (1979). The Business of Organized Crime: A Costra Nostra Family. 
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.  
Asmundo, A. & Lisciandra, M. (2008) The cost of protection racket in Sicily, Global 
Crime, 9:3, 221-240, DOI: 10.1080/17440570802254338 
Atkinson, M., Mancuso, M. (1985). Do We Need a Code of Conduct for Politicians? The 
Search for Elite Political Culture of Corruption in Canada, Canadian Journal of Political 
Science (Volume 18, No. 3, 458-480). 
Atkinson, M. (2011). Discrepancies in perceptions of Corruption, or why is Canada so 
Corrupt? Political Science Quarterly, (Vol. 126, No. 3 (Fall 2011), pp. 445-464). 
Beare, M. (1996). Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in Canada. Scarborough, 
Ontario: Nelson Canada.	
Beare, M. and Ronderos, J. Exploratory Review of Media Coverage on Organized Crime 
in Canada: 1995-2000. Department of Justice: March 2001. 
Berger, A.A. (1982).  Media Analysis Techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Bhatnager, N. (2012). Encyclopedia of Case Study Research: Multiple Sources of 
Evidence. Sage Publications Inc., 1-4. Retrieved from 
http://methods.sagepub.com/reference/encyc-of-case-study-research/n218.xml.   
Bjelopera, J.P., & Finklea, K.M. (2012). Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for 
U.S. Law Enforcement. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.  
Block, A. & Chambliss, W.J. (1981). Organizing Crime. New York, NY: Elsevier.  
Block, A. (1983). East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930-1950. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Blok, Anton, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960 (New York: Harper and Row, 
1974).  
Blum, Jack A. (1999). “Offshore Money”. Pages 57-84 in Transnational Crime in the 
Americas, edited by Tom Farer. New York: Routledge.  
P a g e 	|	136	
Boissevain, J. (1974). Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Bortner, M.A. (1984). “Media Images and Public Attitudes toward Crime and Justice.” 
In: Ray Surette (Ed.), Justice and the Media: Issues and Research (pp. 15-30). 
Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishing.  
Bouchard, M., & Morselli, C. (2014). Opportunistic structures of organized crime, in L. 
Paoli (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime (pp. 288-302). Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Britz, M., Grennan, S. (2006).  Organized Crime: A worldwide Perspective. Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc.  
Bryman, A., Teevan, J (2005). Social Research Methods. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press. 
Buchanan, B. (2004). Money Laundering-A Global Obstacle. Research in International 
Business and Finance, 18 115-127.   
Burkolter, Verena (1976). The Patronage System: Theoretical Remarks. Basel: Social 
Strategies Publishers.  
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. 1992. Organized Crime Committee Report, 
1992. Ottawa, ON: CACP. 
Carrigan, D. Owen. (1991). Crime and Punishment in Canada: A History. Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart. 
Chambliss, W.J. (1986). State-organized crime. Paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the American Society of Criminology, November.  
Chambliss, William (1988).  “Vice, Corruption, Bureaucracy, and Power,” in George 
Cole (ed.), Criminal Justice: Law and Politics, 5th edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Charbonneau, Jean-Pierre. [Translated into English by James Stewart]. (1975). The 
Canadian Connection. Ottawa, ON: Optimum Publishing. 
P a g e 	|	137	
Charbonneau Commission Report. Governement du Quebec (2017). Volume 3 Of the 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public 
Contracts in the Construction Industry Schemes, Causes, Consequences and 
Recommendations. Quebec: Governement du Quebec.  
Chermak, Steven. (1994). “Crime in the News Media: A Refined Understanding of How 
Crimes Become News.” In: Gregg Barak (Ed.), Media, Process, and the Social 
Construction o f Crime (pp. 95-129). New York, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.  
Chermak, S. (1998). The presentation o f drugs in the news media: The news sources 
involved in the construction of social problems. In Gary W. Potter and Victor F. 
Rappeler (Eds.), Constructing crime: Perspectives on making news and social problems 
(pp. 161-192). Illinois: Wavcland Press Inc.  
CISC (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada) 2001. Annual Report on Organized Crime 
in Canada, 2001. Ottawa. 
_____. 1979. Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 1979. Ottawa. 
_____. 1983. Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 1983. Ottawa. 
_____. 1985. Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 1985. Ottawa. 
_____. 1992.  Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 1992. Ottawa.  
_____. 2001. Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 2001. Ottawa. 
_____. 2002. Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 2002. Ottawa.  
_____. 2004. Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 2004. Ottawa. 
_____. 2006. Criminal Intelligence Service Canada Annual Report, 2006. Ottawa. 
_____. 2007. Criminal Intelligence Service Canada Annual Report. 2007. Ottawa. 
_____. 2009. Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. 2009. Ottawa. 
______2010. Annual Report on Organized in Canada. 2009. Ottawa.  
Clarke, M. (1983) (ed.) Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Control. New York: St 
Martin’s.  
Conklin, J. (1973).  The Crime Establishment: Organized Crime and American Society. 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey.  
P a g e 	|	138	
Cressey, R. (1972). Criminal Organization: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harper 
and Row, Publishers, 1972.  
De Franco, E (1973).  Anatomy of a Scam: A Case Study of a Planned Bankruptcy by 
Organized Crime. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office.  
Demaris, O. (1981). The boardwalk jungle. New York, NY: Bantam Books.  
Dubro, James and Robin Rowland. 1987. King of the Mob. Toronto: Penguin.  
Dubro, James and Robin Rowland. 1991. Undercover: Cases of the RCMP’s Most 
Secretive Operative. Toronto: Octopus Publishing Group.  
Edelhertz, H., Overcast, Thomas (1993). The Business of Organized Crime: An 
Assessment of Organized Crime Business-Type Activities and Their Implications for Law 
Enforcement. California: Palmer Press.  
Edwards, P. (1990). Blood Brothers: How Canada’s Most Powerful Mafia Family Runs 
Its Business. Toronto: McClelland-Bantam. 
Edwards, P., & Nicaso, A. (1993). Deadly Silence: Canadian Mafia Murders. Toronto: 
Macmillan Canada.  
Finckenauer, J (2005). “Problems of Definition: What is Organized Crime” Trends in 
Organized Crime 8, no. 3: 63-83. 	
Fletcherm, C., & Herrmann,	D (2012). The Internationalization of Corruption. 
Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Gambetta, D. (1993). The Sicilian Mafia: The business of private protection. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 	
Gardiner, J.A. (1970) The Politics of Corruption: Organized Crime in an American City. 
New York: Russell Sage.  
Genzman, Robert W. (1988). “Press Release”. October 11. 	
Gibbons, K., Rowat, D. (1976). Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and 
Cures. Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart Limited. 
P a g e 	|	139	
Goldstock, R., Jacobs, J., Marcus, M., Thacher, T. (1990). Corruption and Racketeering 
in The New York Construction Industry: The Final Report of the New York State 
Organized Crime Task Force. New York and London: New York University Press.  
Government of Canada Website: Competition Bureau (2015, 11, 5). Retrieved from: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03152.html.	
Graber, D. Evaluating Crime-Fighting Policies. Evaluating Alternative Law Enforcement 
Policies. Ed. R. Baker and F. Meyer. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1979. 179-200.  
Guerra, A. (2000) Machine Translation: Capabilities and Limitations. Valencia: Studies 
in English Language and Linguistics. 
Haller, M (1974). “Bootlegging in Chicago: The Structure of an Illegal Enterprise”. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Chicago, 
December 28.  
Haller, M (1985). “Bootleggers as Businessmen: From City Slums to City Builders”. 
Pages 139-57 in Law, Alcohol, and Order: Perspectives on National Prohibition, edited 
by David E. Kyvig. Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
Haller, M (1985). “Philadelphia Bootlegging and the Report of the Special Grand Jury”. 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 109 (April): 215-233.  
Haller, M. (1990). “Illegal Enterprise: A Theoretical and Historical Interpretation”. 
Criminology 28, no. 2: 206-234.  
Heidenheimer & Johnston (2002). Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (3rd Ed). 
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 	
Hesse-Biber, S., Leavy, P. (2008). Handbook of Emergent Methods. New York, NY: 
Guilford Publications Inc. 
Hignett, K. (2012). Transnational organized crime and the global village, in F. Allum & 
S. Gilmour (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime (pp.281-
293). London, New York: Routledge.  
P a g e 	|	140	
Hill, P.B.E. (2003). The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, law, and the state. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Hills, S.L. (1969). Combating organized crime in America. Federal Probation, 33 
(March).  
Hortis, A.C. (2014).  The Mob and the City: The Hidden History of How the Mafia 
Captured New York. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.  
Hostetter, G.L., & Beesley, T.Q. (1929). It’s a racket. Chicago, IL: Les Quin.  
Humphreys, A., Lamothe, L (2014). The Sixth Family: The Collapse of the New York 
Mafia and The Rise of Vito Rizzuto. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: HarperCollins Publishers 
Ltd.  
Hunt, C.W. 1988. Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold, Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart.  
Hunt, C.W. 1995. Whisky and Ice: The Saga of Ben Kerr, Canada’s Most Daring 
Rumrunner. Toronto: Dundurn Press. 
Hutchins, W.J. & Somers, H.L. (1992). An Introduction to Machine Translation. 
London: Academic Press.  
Hutchins, W.J. & Somers, H.L. (1986). Machine Translation. Past, Present and Future. 
Chichester: Ellis Horwood Ltd.  
Ianni, Francis A.J., with Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni (1972). A Family Business: Kinship and 
Social Control in Organized Crime. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
Jacobs, J.B. (1994). Busting the mob: United States v. Costra Nostra. New York: New 
York University Press.  
Jacobs, J.B. (1999). Gotham Unbound: How New York City was liberated from the grip 
of organized crime. New York: New York University Press.  
Jacobs, J.B. (2006). Mobsters, unions and feds: The Mafia and the American labor 
movement. New York: New York University Press.  
P a g e 	|	141	
Jacobs, J.B., & Peters, E. (2003). Labor Racketeering: The Mafia and the Unions. In M. 
Tonry (E.d.), Crime and Justice: A review of research (pp.229-282). Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press.  
Kelly, R (1999). The Upperworld and the Underworld: Case Studies of Racketeering and 
Business Infiltrations in the United States. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers: New 
York, New York.  
Kenney M., (2007), "The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of 
Organization in the Colombian Cocaine Trade,” Global Crime 8: 233-259. 
Kenny, D., and J. Finckenauer. (1995). Organized Crime in America. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth.	
Kernaghan, Kenneth, Ethical Conduct: Guidelines for Government Employees (Toronto: 
Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1975). 
King, R. (1969). Gambling and Organized Crime. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.  
Kleemans, E.R. (2014). Theoretical Perspectives on organized crime, in L. Paoli (Ed.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime (pp. 32-52). Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Klerks, Peter (2001). “The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organizations,” 
Connections Vol. 24, pp: 53-65. 
Krippendorff, K. (2004).  Content Analysis: An Introduction to its methodology. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lamothe, L., & Humphreys, A. (2006). The Sixth Family: The Collapse of the New York 
Mafia and the Rise of Vito Rizzuto. Toronto: Wiley & Sons Canada. 
Lamothe, L., & Nicaso, A. (1994). Global Mafia: The New World Order of Organized 
Crime. Toronto: MacMillan Canada.  
Lampe, Von. K (2016). Organized Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal 
Structures, and Extra-Legal Governance. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications 
Inc.  
P a g e 	|	142	
Lehr, D., & O’Neill, G. (2001). Black Mass: The True Story of an unholy alliance 
between the FBI and the Irish Mob. New York, NY: Perennial.  
Levi, M. (2014). Money Laundering. In L. Paoli (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Organized Crime (pp. 419-433). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 	
Liddick, D. (1999). An Empirical, Theoretical, and Historical Overview of Organized 
Crime.  
Liddick, D. (2000). Campaign fund-raising abuses and money laundering in recent U.S. 
elections: Criminal networks in action. Crime, Law & Social Change 34: 111–157. 
Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. The American 
Political Science Review, 65(2), 682–693. 
Linden, R. (2012). Criminology: A Canadian Perspective (8th Edition). Nelson Education 
Ltd: Toronto, Ontario Canada.  	
Lyman, D. M., Potter, G.W. (2011). Organized Crime (fifth edition). Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 
Lyman, M.D., & Potter, G.W. (2014). Organized Crime (6th Ed.). Boston: Pearson. 
Maas, P (1968). The Valachi Papers. New York: J.P. Putnam. 	
Malvern, P. (1985). Persuaders: Influence Peddling, Lobbying and Political Corruption 
in Canada. Ontario, Canada: Methuen Publications.	
Mann, W.E and L.G. Hanley. (1968). The Mafia in Canada. Toronto: Social Sciences 
Publishing. 
Marine, F. (2006). The effects of Organized Crime on Legitimate Businesses. Journal of 
Financial Crime. 13, 2: 214-234. DOI 10.1108/13590790610660926.  
McClellan Committee, Final Report of the Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor or Management Field, S. Rep. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 856 (1960). 
McIllwain, J. (2004). Organizing Crime in Chinatown: Race and Racketeering in New 
York City 1890-1910. North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. 	
P a g e 	|	143	
McMullan, J. (1992). Beyond The Limits of the Law: Corporate Crime and Law and 
Order. Halifax, NS: Fernwood Publishing. 
McNulty, William. 1923. “Smuggling whisky from Canada.” pp. 123-125 in The New 
York Times Current History. June.  
Moore, M. (1987). Organized Crime as a business enterprise. In H. Edelhertz, ed., Major 
Issues in Organized Crime Control. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. 	
Morash, M., and D. Hale. (1987). Organized Crime in America: Concepts and 
Controversies (pp.129-148). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 
Morselli, C. (2003). Career opportunities and network-based privileges in the Cosa 
Nostra. Crime, Law & Social Change 39: 383–418.  
Morseeli, C. (2005). Contacts, Opportunities, and Criminal Enterprise. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Morselli, C. (2009). Hells Angels in springtime, Trends in Organized Crime, 12 (2, 
June): 145-158).  
Morselli, C. (2009). Inside Criminal Networks. Montreal, QC: Springer Science + 
Business Media, LLC. 
Morselli, C. (2009). Inside Criminal Networks. Springer Science + Business Media, 
LLC, 8, 1-201. DOI 10.1007/978-0-387-09526-4.  
Morselli, C. (2010). Assessing Vulnerable and Strategic Positions in a Criminal Network. 
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. 26(4) 382–392. DOI: 
10.1177/1043986210377105.  
Morselli, C., Gabor, T., Kiedrowski, J (2010). The Factors That Shape Organized Crime. 
Research and National Coordination Organized Crime Division Law Enforcement and 
Policy Branch Public Safety Canada, Report No. 007. Retrieved from: 
http://celarc.ca/cppc/234/234337.pdf  
Morselli, C., & Roy, J. (2008). Brokerage qualifications in ringing operations, 
Criminology, 46 (1): 71-98. 
P a g e 	|	144	
Nash, Jay Robert. 1993. World Encyclopedia of Organized Crime. New York: De Capo 
Press.  
Nelli, Humbert S. (1976). The Business of Crime. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Nicaso, Antonio. 2001. “Extortion and racketeering. Part 2 - The rise of organized crime 
in Canada and the hold of Mano Nera.” Special Series: Le Mafie Tandem News. May 24. 
Internet Web Site: http://tandemnews.com  
Nicaso, Antonio. 2001. “The violent Paolo Violi connection Part 5 - How a boy from 
Sinopoli in Reggio Calabria became the most feared man in Montreal” Special Series: Le 
Mafie. Tandem News. May 24. Internet Web site: http://tandemnews.com/  
Nicaso, Antonio. 2005. Rocco Perri. The Story of Canada’s Most Notorious Bootlegger. 
Toronto: John Wiley & Sons.  
Nicaso, Antonio and Lee Lamothe. 1995. The Global Mafia. The New World Order of 
Organized Crime. Toronto: Macmillan Canada.  
Nicaso, Antonio and Lee Lamothe. 2005. Angels, Mobsters, and Narco-Terrorists: The 
Rising Menace of Global Criminal Enterprises. Toronto: John Wiley & Sons.  
Pace, D. (1991). Concepts of Vice, Narcotics, and Organized Crime (Third Edition). 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.  
Peterson, Virgil W. The Mob: 200 Years of Organized Crime in New York, Ottawa, 
Illinois: Green Hill Publishers, 1983.  
Phillips, Alan. 1963. “Organized crime’s grip on Ontario.” pp. 15-17; 55-64 in 
Maclean’s. September 21.  
Phillips, Alan. 1963. “The inner workings of the crime cartel.” pp. 24, 66-75 in 
Maclean’s. October 5. 
Phillips, A. (1963-1964). “The Mafia in Canada”. Five-part series in Maclean’s 
magazine. August 24, 1963; September 21, 1963; October 5, 1963; December 2nd, 1963; 
March 7, 1964).	
Potter, G.W. (1994). Criminal Organizations: Vice, Racketeering and Politics in an 
American City. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.	
P a g e 	|	145	
Potter, G.W and V. Kappeler. (1998). Constructing Crime. Prospect Heights, IL: 
Waveland Press.  
President’s Commission on Organized Crime (1985). Organized Crime and Labor-
Management Racketeering in the United States. Washington, D.C: US. Government 
Printing Offices.  
President’s Commission on Organized Crime (1986). The Impact: Organized Crime 
Today. Washington, D.C: US. Government Printing Offices.  
President’s Commission on Organized Crime (1986). The Edge: Organized Crime, 
Business, and Labor Unions. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Offices. 	
Quebec Police Commission. (1977). “The Fight against Organized Crime in Quebec.” 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry, presented to the Quebec Solicitor General, Jean L. 
Dutil (September 30, 1976). Quebec Official Publisher.  
Ragin, C. C. (1992). Introduction: Cases of “What is a case?” In C. C. Ragin & H. S. 
Becker (Eds.), What is a case? (pp. 1–18) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Ragin, C. C., & Becker, H. S. (1992). What is a case? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rawlinson, P. (2012). Transnational organized crime: Media, myths and moralities, in F. 
Allum & S. Gilmour (Eds.)  
Reckless, W. (1961). The Crime Problem. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.  
Reuter, P (1981). Racketeering in Legitimate Industries. Washington, D.C.: Rand 
Corporation.  
Reuter, P. (1987). “Methodological and Institutional Problems in Organized Crime 
Research”. In Herbert Edelhertz (ed.) Major Issues in Organized Crime Control. 
National Institute of Justice Symposium Proceedings (September 25-26).  
Reuter, P. (1987). Racketeering in Legitimate Industries: A study in the economics of 
intimidation. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.  
P a g e 	|	146	
Roniger, Lousi and S.N. Eisenstadt (1980). “Patron-Client Relations as a Model of 
Structuring Social Exchange,” Society for Comparative Study of Society and History. The 
Truman Research Institute.  
Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime (pp. 294–306). London: 
Routledge. 
Salerno, R., and Tompkins, J. (1969). The Crime Confederation: Cosa Nostra and Allied 
Operations in Organized Crime. Garden City, New York:  Doubleday & Company, Inc.,  
Schelling, Thomas. “Economic Analysis and Organized Crime,” President’s Commission 
on Organized Crime and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report on Organized 
Crime, Appendix D, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967. 
Schmidt, Steffen W. (1977). Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political 
Clientelism. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Schneider, S. (2004). The incorporation and operation of criminally controlled 
companies in Canada. Journal of Money Laundering Control. DOI: 
10.1108/13685200410809832 
Schneider, S. (2009). Iced: The Story of Organized Crime in Canada. Mississauga, 
Ontario: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd.  
Schneider, S. (2018).  Canadian Organized Crime. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Scholars.  
Schulte-Bockholt, A. (2013). Corruption as Power: Criminal Governance in Peru during 
the Fujimori Era (1990-2000). Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang AG, International 
Academic Publishers.	
Scott, J.C. (1972). Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.  
Simons, H. (2009). Case study research in practice. London: SAGE. 
Smith, D.C (1975). The mafia mystique. New York, NY: Lanham.  
Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
Sukharenko, A. (2004). Trends in Organize Crime. Vol 8, No.2. 
P a g e 	|	147	
Surette, R. (1994). “Predator Criminals as Media Icons.” In: Gregg Barak (Ed.), Media, 
Process, and the Social Construction of Crime (pp. 131-158). New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc.  
Surrctte. R. (1998). Media, crime and criminal iustice: Images and realities. Belmont. 
California: West/Wadsworth.  
Surette, R. (1998a). “A Serendipitous Finding of a News Media History Effect.” In: Gary 
Potter & Victor Kappeler (Eds.), Constructing Crime: Perspectives on Making News and 
Social Problems (pp. 265-274). Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc.  
Tepperman. L., V. Grabb, and C. Wilton. (1976). “The Modernization of crime.” 
Research report prepared for the Solicitor General of Canada.  
Thomas, G. (2011). A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a 
Review of Definition, Discourse and Structure. Sage-pub Journals. 17, 6, 511-521. DOI: 
10.1177/1077800411409884http://qix.sagepub.com 
 
United States, Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate 
Commerce, 1951, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 725, 82nd Cong, 1st Sess. 
 
Wasserman, J. (2013). The Press and Ashely Smith: Power, Knowledge, and the 
Production of Truth about a Death in Custody. A thesis submitted to Saint Mary’s 
University: Halifax, Nova Scotia.  
Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (2008). Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 W.H. (1974). The Kefauver Committee and the Politics of Crime, 1950–1952. 
Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 
Wolf, Eric R. (1966). “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex 
Societies. Pages 1-22 in The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, edited by 
Michael Banton. London: Tavistock.  
Zamora, K (2013).  Dangerous Liaisons: Organized Crime and Political Finance in 
Latin America and Beyond. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C. 
 
News Media Sources 
P a g e 	|	148	
Canadian Press:  
October 16, 2009, “Report of mob control over infrastructure spending prompts inquiry 
demand”.  
September 25, 2012, “Construction bosses swapped cash with top mobsters, Quebec 
inquiry hears”.  
October 2, 2013, “Quebec union had big ties to organized crime, inquiry hears”.  
CBC News: 
March 12, 2014, “Vito Rizzuto wiretaps heard by Quebec corruption inquiry”. 
March 13, 2014, “Corruption inquiry hears Rizzuto made astronomical profits from 
condo sales”. 
Global News: 
October 18, 2012, “Montreal city engineer admits to taking kickbacks on public work 
projects”. 
November 14, 2014, “14 highlights from Quebec’s corruption inquiry”.  
Hamilton Spectator: 
April 12, 2001, “Gambling syndicate smashed”.  
Montreal Gazette:  
November 29, 1975, “Paolo Violi called new crime ‘Godfather’”. 
November 29, 1975, “Violi suggested neighbor’s burglary, crime probe told”. 
National Post: 
 September 25, 2012, “Bloody rise of the Montreal’s Rizzuto clan detailed at Quebec 
corruption commission”.  
September 26, 2012, “Rizzuto family exchanges money with construction bosses in 
Quebec corruption inquiry videos”. 
P a g e 	|	149	
September 27, 2012, “We rigged contracts, gave Montreal Mafia a 2.5 % cut of project: 
Quebec construction boss at inquiry”.  
October 17, 2012, “From the Prime Minister’s Office to Montreal City Hall, Quebec’s 
corruption inquiry sparks a flurry of denials”.	
October 25, 2012, “It wasn’t my job to stop corruption, testifies Montreal bureaucrat who 
took up to $700K in bribes”. 	
November 28, 2012, “Tory senator denies mafia links as Quebec’s construction inquiry 
probes ties to high-end Club 375c”.	
March 12, 2014, “Quebec corruption inquiry hears the voice of Vito Rizzuto from 
beyond the grave. Apparently he had hiccups”. 
New York Times: 
December 12, 1904, “‘Black Hand’ after baker”. 
May 23, 1905, “Dynamited by the Black Hand”. 
July 9, 1905, “‘Black Hand’ scare”. 
October 12, 1905, “A Black Hand four kill Italian butcher”. 
October 15, 1905, “New York is full of Italian brigands”. 
November 13, 1905, “Black hand firebug at old Audubon house”. 
The Globe: 
February 27, 1928, “Sentence is given in extortion case”. 
Toronto Star: 
October 13, 1905, “No escape from bloody mafia”. 
May 4, 1906, “Black hand again: Italians at Port Colborne said to have been terrorized”. 
September 14, 1907, “Made his will after getting message”. 
January 9, 1908, “Manufacture bombs in Cleveland”. 
P a g e 	|	150	
January 9, 1909, “Expose methods of Black Hand”. 
April 12, 2001, “54 face charges in huge gambling bust”. 
March 12, 2014, “Mob made money in real-estate deals without investing”.  
 
